Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In "New Jersey v. Rodriguez," the Supreme Court held that a person who acts in self-defense and kills in the honest and reasonable belief that the protection of his own life requires the use of deadly force cannot be convicted of murder, aggravated manslaughter, or manslaughter. In the 2003 trial of defendant Naquan O'Neil, the court instructed the jury that self-defense is a valid justification for murder but not for aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter. Defense counsel did not object to the charge. The jury acquitted defendant of murder and convicted him of aggravated manslaughter. On appeal, defense counsel did not challenge the court's charge on self-defense. In his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), defendant claimed he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel, arguing appellate counsel did not raise on direct appeal the erroneous jury instruction that denied him a valid defense to the charges of aggravated manslaughter and manslaughter. The Law Division denied the PCR petition, and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding that appellate counsel's performance was not deficient because different caselaw controlled at the time of defendant s appeal. The Supreme Court reversed. The Appellate Division panel in defendant's direct appeal heard argument on March 21, 2007, but did not render its decision until August 10, 2007. Between those dates, another Appellate Division panel ruled, in a decision published on March 29, 2007, that self-defense was a valid defense to a charge of manslaughter. On this precise issue, the Supreme Court granted certification on July 6, 2007. "Whatever confusion was caused by 'Moore,' defendant's appellate counsel s failure to bring the 'Rodriguez' decisions to the attention of the Appellate Division panel that heard this case rendered counsel's performance ineffective under both our Federal and State Constitutions." Defendant's aggravated manslaughter conviction was vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. O'Neil" on Justia Law

In New Jersey, custodial sentences for criminal and quasi-criminal violations are governed by different codes depending on the classification of the offense. Sentencing for crimes and disorderly persons offenses are governed by the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice. Offenses arising from violations of motor vehicle and traffic regulations are governed by the Motor Vehicle Code. In this category of cases, custodial terms and license suspensions are characterized as consequences of magnitude. In reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence, one of the principal goals, under either the Criminal Code or Motor Vehicle Code, is the elimination of disparity in order to ensure uniformity and predictability. Defendant was not under the influence at the time of the accident. Defendant struck the victim while the victim was crossing the street. Defendant did not realize the victim had become pinned between the vehicle's undercarriage and the pavement, and had been dragged under the vehicle. The victim died a few months after the accident. Defendant received citations for careless driving, and failure to yield to a pedestrian. The Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office reviewed the police investigation reports and declined to present criminal charges against defendant to the county grand jury. The prosecutor forwarded the traffic summonses to the Red Bank Municipal Court for adjudication. In the municipal court, pursuant to an agreement, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the careless-driving charge. The remaining charge was dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to a fifteen-day term in the Monmouth County Jail to be served on weekends; a ninety-day license suspension; and fines and costs. The municipal court judge stayed the custodial sentence and license suspension pending appeal. Subsequently, by agreement, the stay of the license suspension was vacated. Defendant appealed only the custodial sentence to the Law Division. On de novo review, the Law Division judge imposed the same sentence. Defendant then appealed to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division rejected the Law Division’s use of the Criminal Code factors to justify the custodial sentence. The panel then vacated defendant’s sentence and held that the "Moran"("State v. Moran," 202 N.J. 311 (2010)) factors were "equally apt in determining whether to impose a custodial sentence in this matter" as they were to impose a license suspension in "Moran." The State argued in its appeal that the Appellate Division incorrectly interpreted Moran, conflating the statutory language of the reckless driving statute with that of the careless driving statute. Recognizing the distinction between the facts of this case and that of the case law relied upon by the sentencing court, the Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to outline the factors to be used when imposing sentences for careless driving. The Court concluded lower courts should use the "Moran" factors, and affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "New Jersey v. Palma" on Justia Law

Defendant Cesar Lipa, pleaded guilty to first-degree aggravated sexual assault, based on allegations that he committed sexual acts against M.G. on three occasions when she was between the ages of thirteen and sixteen. During the plea colloquy, defendant gave answers to leading questions by his counsel. The questions established all of the elements of the offense to which he intended to plead guilty. The judge then asked another leading question: “And the only reason why you give up all those rights [waived as a result of the guilty plea] is because you’re in fact guilty. Is that true?” Defendant answered, “yes,” and the judge accepted defendant’s plea. After retaining new counsel, and before his sentencing hearing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant also moved to compel production of certain Division of Youth and Family Services records. Defendant certified that “[m]y prior attorney failed to obtain the necessary documentations to support my innocence.” In particular, defendant claimed that he told his first counsel “that alleged victim M.G. had on at least two other occasions made false allegations of sexual assault which were investigated by DYFS.” One incident allegedly involved defendant; another allegation involved a friend of M.G.’s father. According to the certification, “DYFS found that the allegations of both matters were without merit.” The judge first reviewed the DYFS records and noted that they provided “no basis of a false allegation.” The judge therefore denied defendant’s request to compel production as irrelevant. The judge then reviewed defendant’s certification in support of his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Defendant asks this Court to reverse the Appellate Division’s affirmance of the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to first-degree aggravated sexual assault. Defendant argued, after the trial court denied defendant's motion to withdraw, that the Law Division judge misapplied the standard for deciding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing, as set forth in "New Jersey v. Slater," (198 N.J. 145 (2009)), and Rule 3:21-1. "In the face of a general denial and specific, potentially plausible facts negating guilt," the Supreme Court found merit in this argument and reversed the Appellate Division. View "New Jersey v. Lipa" on Justia Law

Defendant Terry Jones was convicted of two counts of sexual assault and two counts of criminal sexual contact. He sought post-conviction relief (PCR), claiming in relevant part, that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) procure the appearance of an alibi witness who would have provided exculpatory and corroborative evidence that would have supported his defense; (2) obtain and introduce into evidence phone records that would have corroborated the defense’s theory of why the accuser fabricated the sexual assault charges against him; and (3) advise defendant that, if he were to testify, the jury could be informed only that he had a prior conviction for “a fourth-degree crime” and not a conviction for endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant did not take the stand in his own defense. The PCR court denied defendant’s petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing, and the Appellate Division affirmed. "This matter came down to a question of whom to believe -- defendant or his accuser -- notwithstanding the presentation of DNA evidence at trial. We cannot dismiss defendant’s assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel by calling them simple matters of strategy. [. . .] The disputed facts should have been judged in the light most favorable to defendant. [D]efendant presented a close but creditable prima facie case of ineffective assistance, entitling him to an evidentiary hearing." View "New Jersey v. Jones" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the State challenged a family court order allowing seventeen-year-old A.B. and his attorney to conduct a thirty-minute inspection of a home where the juvenile was alleged to have committed sexual offenses against his six-year-old cousin, N.A. The juvenile moved for the inspection after the prosecutor’s investigators had photographed the home and cut a piece of rug from it for forensic testing. The juvenile’s attorney gave specific and particularized reasons for the need to visit and photograph the home in preparation for A.B.’s defense. The prosecutor opposed the juvenile’s motion on the ground that the defense inspection of the home (the crime scene) constituted “intimidation, harassment or abuse” in violation of the Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights. On interlocutory review, the Appellate Division upheld the inspection order, finding that the family court had exercised its sound discretion. The order provided that the inspection be conducted at a reasonable time and in the presence of a prosecutor’s investigator and with N.A.’s parents present in the home, if they wished. The Supreme Court also affirmed: "[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding includes the right to conduct a reasonable investigation to prepare a defense. The right of the accused to a fair trial, and the right of a purported victim and her family to privacy must be balanced. The family court found that A.B. made a sufficient showing of need to inspect and photograph N.A.’s home. The court issued the inspection order only after carefully weighing the juvenile’s fair-trial rights and N.A.’s privacy interests and imposing reasonable time and manner restrictions. We conclude that the family court did not abuse its discretion. " View "New Jersey in the Interest of A.B." on Justia Law

In 2009, George Riley, then seventy-six years old, completed serving a twenty-year sentence for aggravated sexual assault. On his release from prison, Riley was under no form of parole supervision, although he was required to comply with the registration and notification provisions of Megan’s Law. Six months later, the New Jersey Parole Board advised Riley that he was subject to the Sex Offender Monitoring Act (SOMA), which was passed in 2007, more than twenty years after Riley committed his last offense. Riley was told that he would have to wear an ankle bracelet twenty-four hours a day for the rest of his life, that his movements would be tracked continuously by global positioning system (GPS) satellites, and that he would be assigned a monitoring parole officer to whom he would have to report and give access to his home. This monitoring program placed restrictions on Riley’s freedom to travel, and his failure to comply with the program would subject him to prosecution for a third-degree crime. On appeal to the Parole Board, Riley claimed that the retroactive application of SOMA to him, based on his 1986 conviction, violated the bar against ex post facto laws. The Chairman of the Parole Board rejected Riley’s challenge, explaining that he was carrying out the mandate of the statute. The Appellate Division reversed in a split decision, finding that the retroactive application of SOMA to Riley based on his 1986 conviction constituted punishment under both the Federal and State Ex Post Facto Clauses. The Supreme Court affirmed: "The constraints and disabilities imposed on Riley by SOMA, and SOMA’s similarity to parole supervision for life, clearly place this law in the category of a penal rather than civil law. Accordingly, when applied to Riley, SOMA violates both the federal and state constitutional guarantees against ex post facto laws." View "Riley v. New Jersey State Parole Board" on Justia Law

In 2007, then eighteen-year-old defendant Kirby Lenihan was driving her vehicle on a road whose speed limit was posted at forty-five miles per hour. K.G., who was then sixteen years old, was in the passenger seat. It was raining heavily and visibility was poor. At approximately 12:39 a.m., defendant veered to the right, drove through the shoulder, collided head-on with the guardrail, and hit a yellow roadway sign about five feet off the side of the road. Defendant and K.G. suffered serious head injuries as a result of the crash. K.G. also sustained serious bodily injuries. Neither defendant nor K.G. were wearing seat belts. Both airbags deployed. Defendant admitted that she was "driving too fast" given the road and weather conditions and her inexperience as a driver. Two aerosol cans of household cleaners, the contents of which contained difluoroethane, were discovered in defendant's car during the police investigation of the accident. Defendant and K.G. were transported to Morristown Memorial Hospital. As a result of the evidence of suspected inhalation ("huffing"), blood was drawn from defendant at the hospital about forty-five minutes after the accident, and difluoroethane was found in her blood. The following morning, K.G. died at 5:26 a.m., as a result of her injuries. Defendant asserted that due to the injuries suffered in the accident, she had no specific recollection of the accident or the events leading up to it. A Grand Jury returned an indictment charging defendant in count one with a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18a, a second-degree offense, based on the Seat Belt Law and recklessly causing the death of K.G. The indictment also charged defendant with second-degree vehicular homicide (count two); and first-degree vehicular homicide within 1000 feet of school property (count three). The latter charge was subsequently dismissed on defendant's motion. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment in its entirety on the grounds of "bias and preconceived attitude by a grand juror," and "prejudicially improper instructions to the grand jury by the State." Defendant also moved to dismiss count one on the grounds that the Seat Belt Law was not intended to "protect the public health and safety" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18. That motion was denied by the trial court. As a result of plea negotiations, count one was amended to charge a third-degree crime. The State agreed to recommend dismissal or merger of the vehicular homicide charge and to dismiss various summonses for: failure to wear a seat belt and to ensure that K.G. buckled her seat belt, N.J.S.A. 39:3-76.2f(b); driving under the influence, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(g); and reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96. Defendant retained the right to appeal the denial of her motion to dismiss count one. The judge imposed a three-year term of supervised probation conditioned upon serving 180 days in the Sussex County jail. Defendant moved for a stay of the custodial term pending appeal. The Appellate Division granted the application. The Appellate Division held that the Seat Belt Law was a "law intended to protect the public health and safety" as stated in N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18. Moreover, the panel held that the statutory language of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. Defendant appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. The issue presented for the Court's review was whether N.J.S.A. 39:3-76.2f could be deemed "a law intended to protect the public health and safety," or a predicate offense within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18b. Under the circumstances presented in this case, a Seat Belt Law violation is a predicate offense that can support a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18b. View "New Jersey v. Lenihan" on Justia Law

Winslow Township Police Patrolman Carl Mueller testified that he stopped defendant after defendant’s car passed the officer’s police vehicle. Officer Mueller testified defendant was traveling at a “high rate of speed,” and failed to use his turn signal when returning to the normal travel lane. After he approached the vehicle, Officer Mueller detected an odor of alcoholic beverage. Defendant admitted that he had been drinking. Officer Mueller ordered defendant to perform field sobriety tests and defendant acquiesced. Defendant later resisted arrest. The officer requested backup, and eventually resorted to the use of pepper spray to subdue defendant. Defendant was charged with DUI, reckless driving and failing to signal. A Camden County Grand Jury also indicted defendant for third-degree aggravated assault on a police officer, third-degree resisting arrest, and two counts of fourth-degree subjecting a law enforcement officer to bodily fluid. Defendant pled guilty to assaulting the officer and was sentenced to two years non-custodial probation. The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed and the motor vehicle charges were remanded to municipal court for disposition. At trial, the conviction was entered solely on the basis of evidence elicited at a pre-trial hearing to suppress the fruits of the stop and subsequent arrest. The Appellate Division reversed defendant’s conviction, and entered a judgment of acquittal, holding that a trial court sitting as a fact-finder in a quasi-criminal matter may not rely on the evidence heard in a pre-trial suppression hearing as proof of guilt in the trial on the merits without defendant’s consent. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was the correct remedy when the municipal court convicts a defendant solely based on evidence adduced in a pre-trial suppression hearing, without defendant’s consent but without objection. Due to the fundamental differences between the purposes of a suppression hearing and a trial on the merits of the charges, the evidence from the pre-trial hearing cannot be used in a subsequent trial on the merits, without a stipulation from both parties. However, the correct remedy for this error is a remand for a new trial rather than a judgment of acquittal. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanded the case to the municipal court for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Gibson" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a defendant released on bail on one indictment, later incarcerated on a different indictment, could claim jail credit for the first one. Defendant Daryel Rawls was indicted on drug-related charges in Union County, made bail, but was later arrested for unrelated offenses in Ocean County. Defendant spent 155 days in Ocean County custody before he pled guilty to his Union County charges and his bail was formally revoked. The trial court denied defendant's motion to receive jail credit for this period toward his Union County sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a direct application of "New Jersey v. Hernandez,"(208 N.J. 24 (2011)), mandated that defendant receive a 155-day jail credit toward his Union County sentence. Accordingly, the Court reverseed the Appellate Division and remanded the case to the trial court for application of the 155-day jail credit. View "New Jersey v. Rawls" on Justia Law

In late June 2004, approximately fifty young men and women gathered at the apartment of a recent high school graduate to celebrate her graduation. Later in the evening, a verbal argument erupted on the street in front of the apartment between two young men -- defendant Jahnell Weaver and Edward Williams. As the verbal altercation continued, someone drew a gun and fired five shots. Williams died from three gunshot wounds. His friend, Amyr Hill, was gravely wounded by two gunshots but survived. Weaver and his friend fled from the scene. Based on statements obtained from Hill and several eyewitnesses, police determined that the shots were fired by either Weaver or Khalil Bryant. Both were subsequently charged with the murder of Williams, the attempted murder of Hill, and various weapons charges. An issue at trial was the identity of the shooter. Hill initially identified Bryant as the shooter but later modified his identification, stating that he was not sure whether Weaver or Bryant fired the shots. An eyewitness provided similar testimony. Another eyewitness provided a description of the shooting that suggested Bryant was the shooter. Two other eyewitnesses stated unequivocally that Weaver shot both young men. Weaver contended that Bryant, shot the victims. In support of this defense, Weaver sought to introduce evidence of Bryant’s involvement in a later shooting in which he used the murder weapon. Weaver also moved for a separate trial. The trial court denied Weaver’s defensive use of the subsequent other-crimes evidence and denied the severance motion. The jury found defendant guilty of all counts and found Bryant guilty of third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon and two counts of third-degree endangering an injured victim. On appeal, defendant argued that his right to confrontation was violated because the trial court admitted Bryant’s statements identifying defendant as the shooter, even though Bryant did not testify. Defendant also contended that the trial court should have permitted him to introduce the other-crimes evidence, namely that Bryant used the murder weapon in connection with the another shooting incident. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "The confluence of defendant’s third-party defense strategy, the erroneous denial of his defensive use of co-defendant’s subsequent acts with the murder weapon, the denial of his motion to sever the trial, the admission of an inadequately redacted statement, and the erroneous admission of when co-defendant received the murder weapon require a new trial. The cumulative impact of these errors was not harmless." View "New Jersey v. Weaver" on Justia Law