Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant K.S. was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated and refusing to submit to a breath test. As he was being transported to the Watchung Borough police station, defendant struck and attempted to spit blood onto the arresting officer. In addition to the above offenses, defendant was charged and ultimately indicted for third-degree aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, fourth-degree throwing bodily fluids at a law enforcement officer, third-degree resisting arrest, and fourth-degree criminal mischief. Following his indictment, defendant sought admission into the Pretrial Intervention Program (PTI). The PTI director recommended denial of defendant s PTI application because of the assaultive nature of the offense and because of defendant s pattern of past anti-social behavior. After denial of his PTI application, defendant filed a motion to compel admission claiming that the prosecutor failed to consider whether his bipolar disorder and mental illness contributed to his conduct. The trial court remanded the matter to the prosecutor for consideration of the medical report provided by defendant. The prosecutor responded by letter explaining that the report had been considered and confirming the denial of defendant s admission into PTI. The trial court subsequently denied defendant s motion, concluding that the denial of his PTI application was not an abuse of discretion. After his motion was denied, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to the charges in exchange for the State s recommendation to dismiss the driving while intoxicated charge. The State also agreed to recommend a non-custodial probationary sentence, community service, and restitution. Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement and later appealed, challenging the denial of his PTI application. Because the record included no admissions of conduct to support the truth of the allegations in defendant's dismissed adult charges and diverted and dismissed juvenile charges, those charges were not appropriate factors to be considered in deciding whether to admit defendant into PTI. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the case to the prosecutor for reconsideration of defendant s eligibility for PTI. View "New Jersey v. K.S." on Justia Law

Defendant was first convicted of DWI in 1981. He was charged with DWI again in 1982 and, unrepresented by counsel, pled guilty to that charge. Defendant had a third DWI conviction in 1994. Because that conviction was more than ten years after defendant s second DWI offense, he was sentenced as a second DWI offender, rather than a third DWI offender. Defendant was convicted of his fourth DWI offense in 2011. Although there was a sixteen-year gap between defendant s third and fourth DWI offenses, the municipal court construed N.J.S.A.39:4-50(a)(3) to afford a defendant only a single step-down. The municipal court therefore sentenced defendant as a third or subsequent DWI offender. The Law Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant s conviction and sentence. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for review in which he challenged only his sentence and raised no issues regarding his conviction. The N.J.S.A.39:4-50(a)(3) step-down provision can benefit a DWI offender more than once, provided that the defendant's most recent and current DWI offenses are separated by more than ten years. In this case, defendant should have been sentenced as a second DWI offender with respect to any term of incarceration imposed, and as a third DWI offender with respect to the applicable administrative penalties. View "New Jersey v. Revie" on Justia Law

Defendant and two others were charged with various drug offenses. Defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to third-degree conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute, and to cooperate with the State's prosecution of his co-defendants. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend a three-year prison term and to allow defendant the right to argue for probation or a custodial sentence to be served in county jail. Defendant pled guilty on August 16, 2011, but sentencing was delayed until his co-defendants cases were resolved. As a result, defendant was not sentenced until August 3, 2012. At sentencing, defense counsel asked the court to consider defendant's rehabilitative efforts since he was arrested and charged. The trial court declined to weigh such evidence in assessing mitigating factors, concluding that applicable law did not allow him to consider post-offense conduct. The Supreme Court concluded that the sentencing court, in light of recent case law, had to consider a defendant's relevant post-offense conduct in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. The case was remanded for resentencing "to ensure consideration of all of the facts relevant to the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors." View "New Jersey v. Jaffe" on Justia Law

Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and was convicted of second-degree luring, among other crimes, at the conclusion of a bench trial. The convictions were based on Internet conversations between defendant and a law enforcement officer impersonating a fourteen-year-old female named Amanda. Defendant testified and offered a diminished-capacity defense. Then twenty-nine years old, defendant stated that during his years as a professional firefighter and emergency medical technician (EMT), he experienced traumatic events that caused him to suffer a mental breakdown. He repeated that he did not intend to engage in sexual acts with Amanda. He denied using the Internet to search for child pornographic materials, and police did not find any such materials on his home computer or in his apartment. Defendant called three mental health experts to support his diminished-capacity defense. All three expressed the view that defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress and did not possess the requisite mental state to commit the crimes charged. The defense also called a number of character witnesses who testified to defendant s trustworthiness and good reputation in the community. The State's expert rejected the validity of the diminished-capacity defense, finding that defendant engaged in a series of purposeful goal-directed behaviors that led him to an intended sexual liaison with a minor. In finding defendant guilty, the trial court rejected the defense of diminished capacity. The Court found both aggravating factors proposed by the State: risk that defendant will commit another offense, and need for deterrence. Attempted luring is a second-degree crime with a range of imprisonment between five and ten years. The trial court imposed an aggregate custodial term of eight years with a four-year parole disqualifier. In addition, the court ordered defendant placed on parole supervision for life, that he register as a sex offender, that he forfeit his public employment as a firefighter, that he not possess a device with Internet capability unless required for employment, and that he submit to random searches of his computer or other Internet-capable device. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the sentencing proceeding in this case was flawed for several reasons, including the trial court's finding of a critical aggravating factor that was not based on credible evidence in the record. The trial court also failed to articulate clearly how the aggravating and mitigating factors were balanced to arrive at the sentence. View "New Jersey v. Case" on Justia Law

In "New Jersey v. Rodriguez," the Supreme Court held that a person who acts in self-defense and kills in the honest and reasonable belief that the protection of his own life requires the use of deadly force cannot be convicted of murder, aggravated manslaughter, or manslaughter. In the 2003 trial of defendant Naquan O'Neil, the court instructed the jury that self-defense is a valid justification for murder but not for aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter. Defense counsel did not object to the charge. The jury acquitted defendant of murder and convicted him of aggravated manslaughter. On appeal, defense counsel did not challenge the court's charge on self-defense. In his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), defendant claimed he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel, arguing appellate counsel did not raise on direct appeal the erroneous jury instruction that denied him a valid defense to the charges of aggravated manslaughter and manslaughter. The Law Division denied the PCR petition, and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding that appellate counsel's performance was not deficient because different caselaw controlled at the time of defendant s appeal. The Supreme Court reversed. The Appellate Division panel in defendant's direct appeal heard argument on March 21, 2007, but did not render its decision until August 10, 2007. Between those dates, another Appellate Division panel ruled, in a decision published on March 29, 2007, that self-defense was a valid defense to a charge of manslaughter. On this precise issue, the Supreme Court granted certification on July 6, 2007. "Whatever confusion was caused by 'Moore,' defendant's appellate counsel s failure to bring the 'Rodriguez' decisions to the attention of the Appellate Division panel that heard this case rendered counsel's performance ineffective under both our Federal and State Constitutions." Defendant's aggravated manslaughter conviction was vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. O'Neil" on Justia Law

In New Jersey, custodial sentences for criminal and quasi-criminal violations are governed by different codes depending on the classification of the offense. Sentencing for crimes and disorderly persons offenses are governed by the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice. Offenses arising from violations of motor vehicle and traffic regulations are governed by the Motor Vehicle Code. In this category of cases, custodial terms and license suspensions are characterized as consequences of magnitude. In reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence, one of the principal goals, under either the Criminal Code or Motor Vehicle Code, is the elimination of disparity in order to ensure uniformity and predictability. Defendant was not under the influence at the time of the accident. Defendant struck the victim while the victim was crossing the street. Defendant did not realize the victim had become pinned between the vehicle's undercarriage and the pavement, and had been dragged under the vehicle. The victim died a few months after the accident. Defendant received citations for careless driving, and failure to yield to a pedestrian. The Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office reviewed the police investigation reports and declined to present criminal charges against defendant to the county grand jury. The prosecutor forwarded the traffic summonses to the Red Bank Municipal Court for adjudication. In the municipal court, pursuant to an agreement, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the careless-driving charge. The remaining charge was dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to a fifteen-day term in the Monmouth County Jail to be served on weekends; a ninety-day license suspension; and fines and costs. The municipal court judge stayed the custodial sentence and license suspension pending appeal. Subsequently, by agreement, the stay of the license suspension was vacated. Defendant appealed only the custodial sentence to the Law Division. On de novo review, the Law Division judge imposed the same sentence. Defendant then appealed to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division rejected the Law Division’s use of the Criminal Code factors to justify the custodial sentence. The panel then vacated defendant’s sentence and held that the "Moran"("State v. Moran," 202 N.J. 311 (2010)) factors were "equally apt in determining whether to impose a custodial sentence in this matter" as they were to impose a license suspension in "Moran." The State argued in its appeal that the Appellate Division incorrectly interpreted Moran, conflating the statutory language of the reckless driving statute with that of the careless driving statute. Recognizing the distinction between the facts of this case and that of the case law relied upon by the sentencing court, the Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to outline the factors to be used when imposing sentences for careless driving. The Court concluded lower courts should use the "Moran" factors, and affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "New Jersey v. Palma" on Justia Law

Defendant Cesar Lipa, pleaded guilty to first-degree aggravated sexual assault, based on allegations that he committed sexual acts against M.G. on three occasions when she was between the ages of thirteen and sixteen. During the plea colloquy, defendant gave answers to leading questions by his counsel. The questions established all of the elements of the offense to which he intended to plead guilty. The judge then asked another leading question: “And the only reason why you give up all those rights [waived as a result of the guilty plea] is because you’re in fact guilty. Is that true?” Defendant answered, “yes,” and the judge accepted defendant’s plea. After retaining new counsel, and before his sentencing hearing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant also moved to compel production of certain Division of Youth and Family Services records. Defendant certified that “[m]y prior attorney failed to obtain the necessary documentations to support my innocence.” In particular, defendant claimed that he told his first counsel “that alleged victim M.G. had on at least two other occasions made false allegations of sexual assault which were investigated by DYFS.” One incident allegedly involved defendant; another allegation involved a friend of M.G.’s father. According to the certification, “DYFS found that the allegations of both matters were without merit.” The judge first reviewed the DYFS records and noted that they provided “no basis of a false allegation.” The judge therefore denied defendant’s request to compel production as irrelevant. The judge then reviewed defendant’s certification in support of his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Defendant asks this Court to reverse the Appellate Division’s affirmance of the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to first-degree aggravated sexual assault. Defendant argued, after the trial court denied defendant's motion to withdraw, that the Law Division judge misapplied the standard for deciding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing, as set forth in "New Jersey v. Slater," (198 N.J. 145 (2009)), and Rule 3:21-1. "In the face of a general denial and specific, potentially plausible facts negating guilt," the Supreme Court found merit in this argument and reversed the Appellate Division. View "New Jersey v. Lipa" on Justia Law

Defendant Terry Jones was convicted of two counts of sexual assault and two counts of criminal sexual contact. He sought post-conviction relief (PCR), claiming in relevant part, that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) procure the appearance of an alibi witness who would have provided exculpatory and corroborative evidence that would have supported his defense; (2) obtain and introduce into evidence phone records that would have corroborated the defense’s theory of why the accuser fabricated the sexual assault charges against him; and (3) advise defendant that, if he were to testify, the jury could be informed only that he had a prior conviction for “a fourth-degree crime” and not a conviction for endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant did not take the stand in his own defense. The PCR court denied defendant’s petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing, and the Appellate Division affirmed. "This matter came down to a question of whom to believe -- defendant or his accuser -- notwithstanding the presentation of DNA evidence at trial. We cannot dismiss defendant’s assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel by calling them simple matters of strategy. [. . .] The disputed facts should have been judged in the light most favorable to defendant. [D]efendant presented a close but creditable prima facie case of ineffective assistance, entitling him to an evidentiary hearing." View "New Jersey v. Jones" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the State challenged a family court order allowing seventeen-year-old A.B. and his attorney to conduct a thirty-minute inspection of a home where the juvenile was alleged to have committed sexual offenses against his six-year-old cousin, N.A. The juvenile moved for the inspection after the prosecutor’s investigators had photographed the home and cut a piece of rug from it for forensic testing. The juvenile’s attorney gave specific and particularized reasons for the need to visit and photograph the home in preparation for A.B.’s defense. The prosecutor opposed the juvenile’s motion on the ground that the defense inspection of the home (the crime scene) constituted “intimidation, harassment or abuse” in violation of the Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights. On interlocutory review, the Appellate Division upheld the inspection order, finding that the family court had exercised its sound discretion. The order provided that the inspection be conducted at a reasonable time and in the presence of a prosecutor’s investigator and with N.A.’s parents present in the home, if they wished. The Supreme Court also affirmed: "[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding includes the right to conduct a reasonable investigation to prepare a defense. The right of the accused to a fair trial, and the right of a purported victim and her family to privacy must be balanced. The family court found that A.B. made a sufficient showing of need to inspect and photograph N.A.’s home. The court issued the inspection order only after carefully weighing the juvenile’s fair-trial rights and N.A.’s privacy interests and imposing reasonable time and manner restrictions. We conclude that the family court did not abuse its discretion. " View "New Jersey in the Interest of A.B." on Justia Law

In 2009, George Riley, then seventy-six years old, completed serving a twenty-year sentence for aggravated sexual assault. On his release from prison, Riley was under no form of parole supervision, although he was required to comply with the registration and notification provisions of Megan’s Law. Six months later, the New Jersey Parole Board advised Riley that he was subject to the Sex Offender Monitoring Act (SOMA), which was passed in 2007, more than twenty years after Riley committed his last offense. Riley was told that he would have to wear an ankle bracelet twenty-four hours a day for the rest of his life, that his movements would be tracked continuously by global positioning system (GPS) satellites, and that he would be assigned a monitoring parole officer to whom he would have to report and give access to his home. This monitoring program placed restrictions on Riley’s freedom to travel, and his failure to comply with the program would subject him to prosecution for a third-degree crime. On appeal to the Parole Board, Riley claimed that the retroactive application of SOMA to him, based on his 1986 conviction, violated the bar against ex post facto laws. The Chairman of the Parole Board rejected Riley’s challenge, explaining that he was carrying out the mandate of the statute. The Appellate Division reversed in a split decision, finding that the retroactive application of SOMA to Riley based on his 1986 conviction constituted punishment under both the Federal and State Ex Post Facto Clauses. The Supreme Court affirmed: "The constraints and disabilities imposed on Riley by SOMA, and SOMA’s similarity to parole supervision for life, clearly place this law in the category of a penal rather than civil law. Accordingly, when applied to Riley, SOMA violates both the federal and state constitutional guarantees against ex post facto laws." View "Riley v. New Jersey State Parole Board" on Justia Law