Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a nine-year-old victim's allegation that her mother's boyfriend, defendant R.K., repeatedly molested her. No physical evidence of the alleged sexual assaults was presented. Trial turned on whether the jury believed the victim or defendant. Ultimately, defendant was convicted of endangering the welfare of a child and child abuse. The trial court permitted three different witnesses to testify regarding the same underlying allegation under the fresh-complaint doctrine. That testimony included details and graphic demonstrations, and improperly bolstered the victim's credibility. Defendant argued on appeal that the victim's mother and sister improperly bolstered her credibility by stating they believed her allegations, and that it was not in her character to lie. In addition, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it barred proposed testimony from a defense witness that defendant's girlfriend suspected he cheated on her and was planning to leave him as her testimony went to bias and was admissible. After review, the Supreme Court held that the errors raised in defendant's appeal denied defendant a fair trial. The Court reversed the Appellate Division judgment: admission of the fresh-complaint testimony, bolstering of the victim's credibility, and exclusion of bias testimony constituted reversible error. The case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. R.K." on Justia Law

Defendant John Tate pled guilty to the fourth-degree offense of abuse of his foster child "by engaging in the habitual use . . . in the hearing of [the] child, of profane, indecent or obscene language." The trial court accepted the guilty plea based solely on defendant's admission that he cursed in the child s presence in a way that would "debauch his morals" and that he used off-color language. The trial court denied defendant's motion to vacate his guilty plea based on an inadequate factual basis, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed: during the brief plea colloquy, defendant was not asked to repeat the offending language or the frequency with which he used the language. The court did not assess whether defendant s conception of a curse word or off-color language was equivalent to the statutory language prohibited by N.J.S.A. 9:6-1(d). The court could not (based on the colloquy) determine that defendant admitted to committing the crime of child abuse. Defendant s guilty plea was vacated, his indictment was reinstated, and this matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Tate" on Justia Law

Defendant Tahir Gregory was arrested and charged in a ten-count indictment with, among other things, possession of a controlled dangerous substance (heroin) with the intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school. Defendant pled guilty to a violation of N.J.S.A.2C:35-7, which provided that "[a]ny person who . . . possess[es] with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance . . . within 1,000 feet of [any] school property. . ." was guilty of a crime. At his plea hearing, defendant admitted that he knowingly possessed heroin contained in individual, stamp-sized packages with specific markings while within 1000 feet of school property. He acknowledged initialing and signing the plea form, and admitted during his plea colloquy that he was entering his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. The nature of the offense section of the standard plea form initialed and signed by defendant lists the charge against defendant as "Poss CDS w/ intent School Zone." Nowhere on the form did it state intent to distribute. The trial court accepted defendant's plea of guilty and sentenced him to an extended term of eight years in prison with a forty-eight month parole disqualifier. Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that he did not provide an adequate factual basis to sustain his guilty plea. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant s conviction. The Supreme Court, after its review, concluded that defendant indeed did not provide a factual basis sufficient to sustain his guilty plea because he did not admit to all of the elements of the crime or admit facts from which the court could conclude that all of the elements of the crime had been established. The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, the defendant's guilty plea was vacated, the indictment was reinstated, and the matter was remanded to the trial court. View "New Jersey v. Gregory" on Justia Law

Defendant placed three phone calls to N.C., then a 13-year-old boy. That same night, defendant sent four text messages to N.C. in which he expressed a desire to engage in sexual activity with the child. N.C. showed the text messages to his grandfather, who contacted the police. Defendant was subsequently indicted for second-degree child luring and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant pled guilty to both counts, specifically admitting that he attempted to lure N.C. to engage in sexual relations with him. Defendant later moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The court denied the motion and sentenced him to concurrent, extended terms of ten years imprisonment, with a ten-year parole disqualifier, for luring and five years imprisonment, with a five-year parole disqualifier, for endangering the welfare of a child. Both terms were imposed pursuant to N.J.S.A.2C:43-6.4, which applied to individuals who commit an enumerated offense while serving parole supervision for life (PSL). At the time of defendant s offense, he was serving a special sentencing condition of community supervision for life (CSL) stemming from a 1998 conviction for aggravated sexual assault that was imposed pursuant to an earlier version of the statute. A 2003 amendment to the statute replaced all references to CSL with PSL. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court should have rejected his guilty plea to child luring because there was no evidence that he tried to entice N.C. to meet him at a particular place. He further claimed that the extended-term sentences were illegal because he was serving CSL, not PSL. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed both the conviction and sentences, holding that the legislative history of the child luring statute did not require defendant to explicitly state the location where he planned to meet N.C. The panel further reasoned that the word-for-word substitution of parole for community suggested that the amendment was a matter of form and not substance. This issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the sufficiency of the factual basis of defendant s guilty plea, in addition to the legality of the extended-term sentences imposed on defendant. The Court concluded that defendant's admissions during the plea colloquy, in combination with the text messages introduced at the hearing, established a sufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea to child luring. On the other hand, the imposed sentences were illegal. Defendant was subject to CSL at the time he committed both offenses. CSL and PSL are distinct special post-sentence supervisory schemes for certain sex offenders. The extended term authorized for those who commit statutorily designated offenses while serving the special sentencing condition of CSL does not preclude parole. The Court remanded the case for resentencing on both counts. View "New Jersey v. Perez" on Justia Law

Defendants Fuquan Cromwell and James Grate were stopped by police officers on the campus of Drew University during the attempted robbery of someone they knew. Defendants were charged with various offenses, including second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon at an educational institution. With regard to the latter, the trial judge instructed the jury that the State must prove the defendant possessed the firearm in or upon the buildings or grounds of any school, college, university, or other educational institution. The judge did not ask the jury to decide whether defendants were aware that they were on the property of an educational institution. The jury found defendants guilty of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon and third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon at an educational institution, and acquitted them of the remaining charges. On appeal, defendants contended, among other things, that the jury charge for unlawful possession of a weapon at an educational institution improperly failed to instruct the jury that the knowingly mens rea requirement applied to the locational element of the crime. The Appellate Division rejected defendants arguments and affirmed their convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court found that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the mens rea requirement was an error. The Court reversed with respect to that charge, and the case was remanded for a new trial on that issue. The Court affirmed the appellate court in all other respects. View "New Jersey v. Grate" on Justia Law

At the time of the events that led to the charges in this case, defendant lived with his girlfriend and her daughter "Chloe," the victim. Chloe testified that defendant first sexually abused her when she was approximately eight years old. In the years immediately afterward, Chloe performed poorly in school and had run-ins with the law, resulting in spending time in juvenile detention centers. Eventually, Chloe told her mother about the abuse and identified defendant as the abuser. Defendant was charged with two counts of second-degree sexual assault, one count of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, and one count of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court determined that defendant s six-year-old conviction for resisting arrest the result of a guilty plea would be admissible to impeach him. The trial court clarified that defense counsel would be limited in any cross-examination regarding Chloe's involvement with the juvenile justice system. Defense counsel also objected to the prosecutor asking the jurors whether they were surprised that Chloe was involved in the juvenile system. In response, the prosecutor noted that defense counsel had led off his closing argument by referring to Chloe as a troubled young lady. Following those arguments and prior to charging the jury on the law, the court instructed the jury regarding the prosecutor's remarks, stating that the jury's recollection of the evidence governed, not counsels' comments. The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of second-degree sexual assault and one count of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, and acquitted defendant of aggravated sexual assault. Defendant appealed, arguing that several prosecutorial and trial court errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial. A majority of an Appellate Division panel affirmed in an unpublished opinion: though the majority identified several prosecutorial improprieties, no issue convinced the majority that defendant's conviction should have been reversed. After its review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment. View "New Jersey v. T.J.M." on Justia Law

Defendant K.S. was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated and refusing to submit to a breath test. As he was being transported to the Watchung Borough police station, defendant struck and attempted to spit blood onto the arresting officer. In addition to the above offenses, defendant was charged and ultimately indicted for third-degree aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, fourth-degree throwing bodily fluids at a law enforcement officer, third-degree resisting arrest, and fourth-degree criminal mischief. Following his indictment, defendant sought admission into the Pretrial Intervention Program (PTI). The PTI director recommended denial of defendant s PTI application because of the assaultive nature of the offense and because of defendant s pattern of past anti-social behavior. After denial of his PTI application, defendant filed a motion to compel admission claiming that the prosecutor failed to consider whether his bipolar disorder and mental illness contributed to his conduct. The trial court remanded the matter to the prosecutor for consideration of the medical report provided by defendant. The prosecutor responded by letter explaining that the report had been considered and confirming the denial of defendant s admission into PTI. The trial court subsequently denied defendant s motion, concluding that the denial of his PTI application was not an abuse of discretion. After his motion was denied, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to the charges in exchange for the State s recommendation to dismiss the driving while intoxicated charge. The State also agreed to recommend a non-custodial probationary sentence, community service, and restitution. Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement and later appealed, challenging the denial of his PTI application. Because the record included no admissions of conduct to support the truth of the allegations in defendant's dismissed adult charges and diverted and dismissed juvenile charges, those charges were not appropriate factors to be considered in deciding whether to admit defendant into PTI. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the case to the prosecutor for reconsideration of defendant s eligibility for PTI. View "New Jersey v. K.S." on Justia Law

Defendant was first convicted of DWI in 1981. He was charged with DWI again in 1982 and, unrepresented by counsel, pled guilty to that charge. Defendant had a third DWI conviction in 1994. Because that conviction was more than ten years after defendant s second DWI offense, he was sentenced as a second DWI offender, rather than a third DWI offender. Defendant was convicted of his fourth DWI offense in 2011. Although there was a sixteen-year gap between defendant s third and fourth DWI offenses, the municipal court construed N.J.S.A.39:4-50(a)(3) to afford a defendant only a single step-down. The municipal court therefore sentenced defendant as a third or subsequent DWI offender. The Law Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant s conviction and sentence. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for review in which he challenged only his sentence and raised no issues regarding his conviction. The N.J.S.A.39:4-50(a)(3) step-down provision can benefit a DWI offender more than once, provided that the defendant's most recent and current DWI offenses are separated by more than ten years. In this case, defendant should have been sentenced as a second DWI offender with respect to any term of incarceration imposed, and as a third DWI offender with respect to the applicable administrative penalties. View "New Jersey v. Revie" on Justia Law

Defendant and two others were charged with various drug offenses. Defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to third-degree conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute, and to cooperate with the State's prosecution of his co-defendants. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend a three-year prison term and to allow defendant the right to argue for probation or a custodial sentence to be served in county jail. Defendant pled guilty on August 16, 2011, but sentencing was delayed until his co-defendants cases were resolved. As a result, defendant was not sentenced until August 3, 2012. At sentencing, defense counsel asked the court to consider defendant's rehabilitative efforts since he was arrested and charged. The trial court declined to weigh such evidence in assessing mitigating factors, concluding that applicable law did not allow him to consider post-offense conduct. The Supreme Court concluded that the sentencing court, in light of recent case law, had to consider a defendant's relevant post-offense conduct in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. The case was remanded for resentencing "to ensure consideration of all of the facts relevant to the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors." View "New Jersey v. Jaffe" on Justia Law

Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and was convicted of second-degree luring, among other crimes, at the conclusion of a bench trial. The convictions were based on Internet conversations between defendant and a law enforcement officer impersonating a fourteen-year-old female named Amanda. Defendant testified and offered a diminished-capacity defense. Then twenty-nine years old, defendant stated that during his years as a professional firefighter and emergency medical technician (EMT), he experienced traumatic events that caused him to suffer a mental breakdown. He repeated that he did not intend to engage in sexual acts with Amanda. He denied using the Internet to search for child pornographic materials, and police did not find any such materials on his home computer or in his apartment. Defendant called three mental health experts to support his diminished-capacity defense. All three expressed the view that defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress and did not possess the requisite mental state to commit the crimes charged. The defense also called a number of character witnesses who testified to defendant s trustworthiness and good reputation in the community. The State's expert rejected the validity of the diminished-capacity defense, finding that defendant engaged in a series of purposeful goal-directed behaviors that led him to an intended sexual liaison with a minor. In finding defendant guilty, the trial court rejected the defense of diminished capacity. The Court found both aggravating factors proposed by the State: risk that defendant will commit another offense, and need for deterrence. Attempted luring is a second-degree crime with a range of imprisonment between five and ten years. The trial court imposed an aggregate custodial term of eight years with a four-year parole disqualifier. In addition, the court ordered defendant placed on parole supervision for life, that he register as a sex offender, that he forfeit his public employment as a firefighter, that he not possess a device with Internet capability unless required for employment, and that he submit to random searches of his computer or other Internet-capable device. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the sentencing proceeding in this case was flawed for several reasons, including the trial court's finding of a critical aggravating factor that was not based on credible evidence in the record. The trial court also failed to articulate clearly how the aggravating and mitigating factors were balanced to arrive at the sentence. View "New Jersey v. Case" on Justia Law