Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant K.P.S. was charged with numerous counts of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, child abuse, endangering the welfare of a child, and conspiracy to commit these crimes. Defendants Peter Lisa and Carmini Laloo were named as co-defendants in the indictment and charged with many of the same offenses as well as a number of additional ones. The charges against the three co-defendants arose from evidence discovered by the police during a series of searches of Lisa's residence (a home owned by Lisa's mother). Police were called to investigate a domestic violence dispute. During the search, the police seized guns, some of which they later learned were stolen, and observed in the garage a motorcycle trailer that fit the description of a trailer reported as stolen. Additionally, while conducting the search, the police saw Lisa in his bedroom quickly and suspiciously turning off his computer. The three co-defendants jointly filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the evidence seized during those searches was in violation of their rights under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. According to Lisa's mother, she did not give her consent to the police to conduct a further search of the garage, despite the presence of her signature on a consent-to-search form. The police executed two subsequent search warrants on Lisa's home, seizing the motorcycle trailer and other purportedly stolen items as well as Lisa's computer, a camcorder, videotapes, and digital photo flash cards. The evidence revealed that Lisa, Laloo, and defendant engaged in illicit sexual activities with defendant's minor son. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. In accordance with a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to a fifteen-year term of imprisonment subject to the No Early Release Act, to be followed by a five-year period of parole supervision and community supervision for life. The court also ordered that defendant comply with the registration requirements of Megan's Law. Lisa and Laloo also entered guilty pleas to first-degree aggravated sexual assault, pursuant to plea agreements with the State, and were sentenced to state prison terms. Defendant, Lisa, and Laloo appealed their sentences and the denial of their suppression motions. Lisa's appeal and defendant and Laloo's appeals were heard by two different panels of the Appellate Division. The issue in this appeal was whether the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded defendant's appellate panel from considering anew the issues that had been decided earlier by his co-defendant's panel. The Supreme Court held that the decision rendered by the appellate panel in Lisa's appeal was not the law of the case in defendant's later-heard appeal. Defendant had a due process right to have a meaningful opportunity to be heard on his appeal. View "New Jersey v. K.P.S." on Justia Law

Defendant "L.A." was employed by the Trenton Board of Education as an elementary school security guard. While at work, L.A. allegedly had unlawful sexual contact with two minor students, N.F. and K.O. The allegations were referred to the Institutional Abuse Investigation Unit (IAIU) of the Department of Children and Families (DCF) and defendant was subsequently indicted. In the N.F. indictment, L.A. was charged with third-degree aggravated criminal sexual contact and second-degree endangering the welfare of a minor. In the K.O. indictment, L.A. was charged with two counts of second-degree sexual assault and one count of second-degree endangering the welfare of a minor. L.A. pled guilty to one count of second-degree endangering the welfare of a minor (N.F.) in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges regarding N.F. and complete dismissal of the K.O. indictment. K.O. s guardian ad litem subsequently filed a civil complaint alleging that L.A. sexually assaulted K.O. and that the Board negligently hired L.A. The Board answered the complaint, taking no position with regard to the allegations against L.A. However, L.A. was assigned counsel by the Horace Mann Insurance Agency, pursuant to a private insurance policy maintained by the New Jersey Education Association. Ultimately, K.O.'s civil action was settled without any admission of wrongdoing by L.A. or the Board. After the settlement, L.A., through counsel provided by Horace Mann, filed a verified petition against the Commissioner of Education seeking reimbursement for the attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against K.O.'s civil action. The matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law and L.A.'s counsel and the Board filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted L.A.'s motion, denied the Board's, and awarded L.A. attorney's fees and costs pursuant to N.J.S.A.18A:16-6, the statute that addressed the right to indemnification for officers and employees of boards of education in civil actions. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 entitled a school board employee to indemnification for attorney's fees and costs spent in defense of a civil action arising from the same allegations contained in a dismissed criminal indictment. The Court concluded that in such circumstances N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 requires indemnification unless there was proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee's conduct fell outside the course of performance of his or her employment duties. Here, rather than conducting an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ disposed of the matter by way of summary judgment. Because there are disputed issues of material fact regarding whether L.A. was acting within the scope of the responsibilities of his employment, the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed. The matter was remanded to the Commissioner of Education for a hearing to determine whether L.A.'s conduct fell outside the course of performance of his employment duties. View "L.A. v. Board of Education of the City of Trenton" on Justia Law

A Bergen County Grand Jury charged Michael Sumulikoski with three counts of second-degree sexual assault (Counts 2, 3, and 4), one count of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual contact (Count 1), and two counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child by allowing Artur Sopel to perform unlawful acts in the victim's presence (Counts 5 and 6). The Grand Jury charged Sopel with six counts of second-degree sexual assault (Counts 8, 9, and 13 through 16) and two counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual contact (Counts 7 and 12). Sopel was also charged with several additional offenses that were not part of this appeal, including one count of endangering and six counts of sexual assault relating to acts from 2010 involving another seventeen-year-old victim (Counts 19-25), two counts of witness tampering (Counts 10 and 17), and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child with respect to the witness tampering (Counts 11 and 18). Defendants moved to dismiss the sexual assault and endangerment charges involving conduct in Germany, asserting that the State lacked territorial jurisdiction to prosecute the offenses in New Jersey. The trial court denied the motions, focusing on N.J.S.A.2C:1-3(a)(1), which allowed for jurisdiction in New Jersey when "[e]ither the conduct which is an element of the offense or the result which is such an element occurs within this State". The court concluded that material elements of both offenses having supervisory or disciplinary power over a victim (sexual assault), and assuming the responsibility for the care of a child (endangerment) occurred in New Jersey and constitute conduct sufficient to establish territorial jurisdiction. Defendants appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed substantially for the reasons set forth by the trial court. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the State could prosecute offenses that occurred in Germany in a New Jersey courtroom. After review, the Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and dismissed a number of counts in the indictment. The case proceeded on counts relating to witness tampering and a separate series of allegations of sexual assault against a victim in New Jersey. View "New Jersey v. Sumulikoski" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a)(3), a bias-crime statute that allows a jury to convict a defendant even when bias did not motivate the commission of the offense. Under the statute, a defendant may be convicted of bias intimidation if the victim reasonably believed that the defendant committed the offense on account of the victim's race. Unlike any other bias-crime statute in the country, N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a)(3) focuses on the victim's, not the defendant's, state of mind. Defendants David Pomianek, Jr. and Michael Dorazo, Jr., and Steven Brodie, Jr., worked for the Parks and Recreation Division of the Gloucester Township Department of Public Works. Defendants are Caucasian and worked as truck drivers. Brodie is African-American and worked as a laborer. The three men were assigned to work at an old garage used for storage by Public Works. In the garage was a sixteen-foot long and eight-foot wide steel storage cage, enclosed by a heavy chain-link fence on three sides and a cinder block wall on the fourth. The cage was secured by a sliding chain-link door with a padlock. A number of employees were horsing around in the building and wrestling in the cage. In a ruse, Dorazo approached Brodie and told him that their supervisor needed an item from the cage. Once inside the cage, Dorazo shut the cage door, locking Brodie inside. A number of Public Works employees began laughing, but Brodie found nothing funny about being locked in the cage. Brodie recalled defendant saying, "Oh, you see, you throw a banana in the cage and he goes right in," which triggered more laughter among the men. Brodie considered the remark to be racial in nature. From his perspective, the line about throwing the banana in there was like being called a monkey in a cage. Brodie admitted, however, that he never heard defendant call him a monkey. The cage door was unlocked after three to five minutes. Brodie felt humiliated and embarrassed. After his release, Dorazo was heard saying, "You all right, buddy? We were just joking around." Brodie replied, "Yeah, yeah, I'm fine." Defendant and Dorazo were charged in a sixteen-count indictment with two counts of second-degree official misconduct, twelve counts of fourth-degree bias intimidation, and two counts of third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution. The hindering charges were later dismissed. The court denied defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss the bias-intimidation counts based on a constitutional challenge to the bias-intimidation statute. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted defendant of all counts alleging that he falsely imprisoned or harassed Brodie either with the purpose to intimidate him or knowing that his conduct would cause Brodie to be intimidated because of his race, color, national origin, or ethnicity. In addition, defendant was acquitted of the lesser-included offense of false imprisonment. Defendant, however, was found guilty of two fourth-degree bias-intimidation crimes, one for harassment by alarming conduct and the other for harassment by communication. The jury also convicted defendant of official misconduct based in part on the finding that he committed the crime of bias intimidation. Last, the jury convicted defendant of the petty disorderly persons offenses of harassment by alarming conduct and harassment by communication. The Appellate Division reversed the bias-intimidation conviction, concluding that a conviction based on the victim's perception and not on the defendant's biased intent would violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. In affirming in part, and reversing in part, the Appellate Court's judgment, the Supreme Court held that N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a)(3), due to its vagueness, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "In focusing on the victim's perception and not the defendant's intent, the statute does not give a defendant sufficient guidance or notice on how to conform to the law." View "New Jersey v. Pomianek" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a nine-year-old victim's allegation that her mother's boyfriend, defendant R.K., repeatedly molested her. No physical evidence of the alleged sexual assaults was presented. Trial turned on whether the jury believed the victim or defendant. Ultimately, defendant was convicted of endangering the welfare of a child and child abuse. The trial court permitted three different witnesses to testify regarding the same underlying allegation under the fresh-complaint doctrine. That testimony included details and graphic demonstrations, and improperly bolstered the victim's credibility. Defendant argued on appeal that the victim's mother and sister improperly bolstered her credibility by stating they believed her allegations, and that it was not in her character to lie. In addition, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it barred proposed testimony from a defense witness that defendant's girlfriend suspected he cheated on her and was planning to leave him as her testimony went to bias and was admissible. After review, the Supreme Court held that the errors raised in defendant's appeal denied defendant a fair trial. The Court reversed the Appellate Division judgment: admission of the fresh-complaint testimony, bolstering of the victim's credibility, and exclusion of bias testimony constituted reversible error. The case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. R.K." on Justia Law

Defendant John Tate pled guilty to the fourth-degree offense of abuse of his foster child "by engaging in the habitual use . . . in the hearing of [the] child, of profane, indecent or obscene language." The trial court accepted the guilty plea based solely on defendant's admission that he cursed in the child s presence in a way that would "debauch his morals" and that he used off-color language. The trial court denied defendant's motion to vacate his guilty plea based on an inadequate factual basis, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed: during the brief plea colloquy, defendant was not asked to repeat the offending language or the frequency with which he used the language. The court did not assess whether defendant s conception of a curse word or off-color language was equivalent to the statutory language prohibited by N.J.S.A. 9:6-1(d). The court could not (based on the colloquy) determine that defendant admitted to committing the crime of child abuse. Defendant s guilty plea was vacated, his indictment was reinstated, and this matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Tate" on Justia Law

Defendant Tahir Gregory was arrested and charged in a ten-count indictment with, among other things, possession of a controlled dangerous substance (heroin) with the intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school. Defendant pled guilty to a violation of N.J.S.A.2C:35-7, which provided that "[a]ny person who . . . possess[es] with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance . . . within 1,000 feet of [any] school property. . ." was guilty of a crime. At his plea hearing, defendant admitted that he knowingly possessed heroin contained in individual, stamp-sized packages with specific markings while within 1000 feet of school property. He acknowledged initialing and signing the plea form, and admitted during his plea colloquy that he was entering his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. The nature of the offense section of the standard plea form initialed and signed by defendant lists the charge against defendant as "Poss CDS w/ intent School Zone." Nowhere on the form did it state intent to distribute. The trial court accepted defendant's plea of guilty and sentenced him to an extended term of eight years in prison with a forty-eight month parole disqualifier. Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that he did not provide an adequate factual basis to sustain his guilty plea. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant s conviction. The Supreme Court, after its review, concluded that defendant indeed did not provide a factual basis sufficient to sustain his guilty plea because he did not admit to all of the elements of the crime or admit facts from which the court could conclude that all of the elements of the crime had been established. The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, the defendant's guilty plea was vacated, the indictment was reinstated, and the matter was remanded to the trial court. View "New Jersey v. Gregory" on Justia Law

Defendant placed three phone calls to N.C., then a 13-year-old boy. That same night, defendant sent four text messages to N.C. in which he expressed a desire to engage in sexual activity with the child. N.C. showed the text messages to his grandfather, who contacted the police. Defendant was subsequently indicted for second-degree child luring and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant pled guilty to both counts, specifically admitting that he attempted to lure N.C. to engage in sexual relations with him. Defendant later moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The court denied the motion and sentenced him to concurrent, extended terms of ten years imprisonment, with a ten-year parole disqualifier, for luring and five years imprisonment, with a five-year parole disqualifier, for endangering the welfare of a child. Both terms were imposed pursuant to N.J.S.A.2C:43-6.4, which applied to individuals who commit an enumerated offense while serving parole supervision for life (PSL). At the time of defendant s offense, he was serving a special sentencing condition of community supervision for life (CSL) stemming from a 1998 conviction for aggravated sexual assault that was imposed pursuant to an earlier version of the statute. A 2003 amendment to the statute replaced all references to CSL with PSL. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court should have rejected his guilty plea to child luring because there was no evidence that he tried to entice N.C. to meet him at a particular place. He further claimed that the extended-term sentences were illegal because he was serving CSL, not PSL. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed both the conviction and sentences, holding that the legislative history of the child luring statute did not require defendant to explicitly state the location where he planned to meet N.C. The panel further reasoned that the word-for-word substitution of parole for community suggested that the amendment was a matter of form and not substance. This issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the sufficiency of the factual basis of defendant s guilty plea, in addition to the legality of the extended-term sentences imposed on defendant. The Court concluded that defendant's admissions during the plea colloquy, in combination with the text messages introduced at the hearing, established a sufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea to child luring. On the other hand, the imposed sentences were illegal. Defendant was subject to CSL at the time he committed both offenses. CSL and PSL are distinct special post-sentence supervisory schemes for certain sex offenders. The extended term authorized for those who commit statutorily designated offenses while serving the special sentencing condition of CSL does not preclude parole. The Court remanded the case for resentencing on both counts. View "New Jersey v. Perez" on Justia Law

Defendants Fuquan Cromwell and James Grate were stopped by police officers on the campus of Drew University during the attempted robbery of someone they knew. Defendants were charged with various offenses, including second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon at an educational institution. With regard to the latter, the trial judge instructed the jury that the State must prove the defendant possessed the firearm in or upon the buildings or grounds of any school, college, university, or other educational institution. The judge did not ask the jury to decide whether defendants were aware that they were on the property of an educational institution. The jury found defendants guilty of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon and third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon at an educational institution, and acquitted them of the remaining charges. On appeal, defendants contended, among other things, that the jury charge for unlawful possession of a weapon at an educational institution improperly failed to instruct the jury that the knowingly mens rea requirement applied to the locational element of the crime. The Appellate Division rejected defendants arguments and affirmed their convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court found that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the mens rea requirement was an error. The Court reversed with respect to that charge, and the case was remanded for a new trial on that issue. The Court affirmed the appellate court in all other respects. View "New Jersey v. Grate" on Justia Law

At the time of the events that led to the charges in this case, defendant lived with his girlfriend and her daughter "Chloe," the victim. Chloe testified that defendant first sexually abused her when she was approximately eight years old. In the years immediately afterward, Chloe performed poorly in school and had run-ins with the law, resulting in spending time in juvenile detention centers. Eventually, Chloe told her mother about the abuse and identified defendant as the abuser. Defendant was charged with two counts of second-degree sexual assault, one count of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, and one count of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court determined that defendant s six-year-old conviction for resisting arrest the result of a guilty plea would be admissible to impeach him. The trial court clarified that defense counsel would be limited in any cross-examination regarding Chloe's involvement with the juvenile justice system. Defense counsel also objected to the prosecutor asking the jurors whether they were surprised that Chloe was involved in the juvenile system. In response, the prosecutor noted that defense counsel had led off his closing argument by referring to Chloe as a troubled young lady. Following those arguments and prior to charging the jury on the law, the court instructed the jury regarding the prosecutor's remarks, stating that the jury's recollection of the evidence governed, not counsels' comments. The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of second-degree sexual assault and one count of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, and acquitted defendant of aggravated sexual assault. Defendant appealed, arguing that several prosecutorial and trial court errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial. A majority of an Appellate Division panel affirmed in an unpublished opinion: though the majority identified several prosecutorial improprieties, no issue convinced the majority that defendant's conviction should have been reversed. After its review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment. View "New Jersey v. T.J.M." on Justia Law