Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, defendant called 9-1-1 requesting assistance for his five-month old daughter, reporting that she was not breathing. When the police arrived, the infant was in an ambulance about to be taken to the hospital. Defendant told a detective that, upon observing his daughter lying in bed, he noticed that she was not breathing. Defendant acceded to the detective's request that he come to the police station to provide further information that may be helpful for his daughter s treatment. Defendant was at the police station for a total of three hours (including breaks), during which he was interviewed for some forty minutes. Defendant told the detective that, earlier in the day, his girlfriend told him that the baby was cranky, and he tried to calm her over several hours. At the conclusion of the interview, the detective drove defendant home. At no time prior to or while at the police station was defendant given Miranda warnings. Defendant's daughter was declared dead three days later. Approximately 7 months later, defendant was arrested, and after being read his Miranda rights, admitted that he tossed the baby toward the bed, causing her to hit the wall. Defendant was subsequently indicted for second-degree manslaughter and second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress his statement, concluding that defendant was in custody at the time of the interview and that his rights were violated when he was not administered Miranda warnings. The court relied on several key factors regarding the detective's interaction with defendant, including the detective's instruction that defendant sit in a certain chair to permit the video camera to obtain a full face view of defendant, the detective's physical proximity to defendant, and the probing nature of the questions that defendant was asked. The court also relied on testimony of witnesses at the evidentiary hearing demonstrating that the detective asked defendant to accompany him to the police station, defendant was placed in the back seat of the unmarked police car, defendant and the detective did not converse during the ride to the police station, and the house was secured to prevent entry by anyone. The trial court found that, under all of the circumstances, no reasonable person in defendant s position would have felt free to leave the room or the police station. The Appellate Division concluded that defendant had not been subjected to a custodial interrogation. The court held that the failure to provide Miranda warnings therefore did not require suppression of defendant's statement. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the interview conducted by the detective at the police station was a custodial interrogation and the failure to administer Miranda warnings prior to the interview required suppression of that recorded statement. View "New Jersey v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with murder, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, carjacking, kidnapping, felony murder, terroristic threats, tampering with physical evidence, hindering apprehension, and aggravated assault. At trial, Q.M. recanted his statement and claimed that he never witnessed the murder, did not help dispose of the gun, and that a police officer had coerced him into lying. D.C. testified unequivocally that he saw defendant order the victim into the dumpster and then shoot him. As a result of Q.M. s recantation, and the differing accounts D.C. offered in his pretrial statements, the court allowed videotapes of both pretrial statements to be played for the jury in the courtroom. The State suggested, without defense objection, that a DVD player be made available for jurors to view the videotaped statements during deliberations. The trial court granted the request and during summation, the prosecutor urged the jury to watch the videotaped statements of both witnesses. Two days into deliberations, defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that a juror was tainted and stated that he may have been mistaken when he declined to object to the State's proposal to give jurors access to those statements during deliberations. The court did not remove the DVDs from the jury room, suggesting that doing so after two days of deliberations could be prejudicial to both parties. The jury returned a partial verdict, convicting defendant of everything except murder, carjacking, felony murder and aggravated assault. At defendant s retrial on the remaining counts, the witnesses testified again. D.C. testified that he witnessed the murder and identified defendant as the shooter, but added new details. Q.M. testified that he never witnessed the murder, did not help dispose of the gun, and that police had coerced him into identifying defendant. The court denied the State's request to allow D.C.'s pretrial statements to be allowed into evidence, but allowed the recording of Q.M.'s pretrial statement to be played for the jury. The State later informed the court that it had arranged for the jury to have access to a DVD player in the jury room. Defendant did not object to that procedure. The State again urged the jury to watch the DVD and to note the inconsistencies between Q.M.'s pretrial statement and his testimony on the stand. The jury convicted defendant of murder, carjacking, and felony murder, but acquitted him of aggravated assault. The court imposed an aggregate term of life plus thirty-five years, with a total period of parole ineligibility of more than eighty-five years. An appellate panel reversed, holding that both trial courts committed plain error when they permitted the juries unrestricted access to videotaped statements during deliberations. Given the content of the statements, and the strength of the other evidence presented by the State, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial courts' decisions permitting the juries access to the pretrial statements did not constitute plain error. View "New Jersey v. Weston" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested at a locked, fenced-in parking lot used for storage by an adjoining warehouse operated by Domino Manufacturing. Domino Manufacturing used the lot to store equipment for printing presses, including metal shafts and printing rollers which were kept outside because they were too heavy to be moved inside the warehouse. Defendant was attempting to exit the main gate in a pick-up truck in which the police found bolt cutters, the padlock from the gate, and eleven metal printing rollers. Defendant was charged with third-degree burglary, and disorderly persons possession of a burglary tool. Defendant was tried only on the burglary charge; the charge under the disorderly persons statute was dismissed. At the close of the State's evidence at trial, defendant moved for acquittal on the ground that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the premises that defendant entered was a "structure" as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:18-1, contending that defendant entered a parking lot, which is not a "structure" within the statute. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the fenced-in area was a prohibited space not open to the public, as well as a place adapted for the conduct of Domino Manufacturing's business, and therefore it constituted a "structure." Defendant was convicted of third-degree burglary, and sentenced to five years in prison. He appealed, challenging the trial court's conclusion that the fenced-in parking lot was a "structure." Finding no error in the trial court's analysis, the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Olivero" on Justia Law

Two indictments were pending against defendant Aakash Dalal. The first charged defendant with a series of offenses directed against four synagogues and a Jewish community center. The second charged defendant with conspiracy to murder the assistant prosecutor, conspiracy to possess a firearm, and terroristic threats after a jailhouse informant's tip lead law enforcement to obtain a search warrant of his cell and found handwritten documents, including a chart of ENEMIES that listed the criminal presiding judge as a high profile enemy and the assistant prosecutor on defendant s case as a tactical enemy. Defendant moved to dismiss both indictments and sought to recuse the presiding judge. After the State observed that the evidence provided a significant reason for the court to recuse itself, the presiding judge transferred the proceedings to a third judge (the trial court). The trial court subsequently denied defendant's motions to recuse the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office and for a change of venue based on pretrial publicity. The Appellate Division granted defendant s motion for leave to appeal and reversed. Although the panel was "confident" the trial judge could actually preside fairly and impartially, it concluded that the appearance of fairness in the future proceedings will be impaired so long as a Bergen judge presided over the matter. The panel remanded the matter to the assignment judge to either transfer the matter to another vicinage or arrange to have a judge from another vicinage preside over the case. The assignment judge transferred the matter to an adjacent county. The Court granted the State's motion for leave to appeal. As part of its consideration, the Supreme Court noted two relevant developments since the motion was first addressed: neither the presiding judge nor the judge who ruled on defendant's bail served in the adjacent Bergen Vicinage. Effective May 1, 2015, the presiding judge was assigned to the Passaic Vicinage, Civil Division for reasons unrelated to this matter. The other judge retired in August 2014. "Not all threats or efforts to intimidate a judge will require recusal." But the Supreme Court felt that given the serious nature of the threat, the absence of any proof of manipulation, the potential introduction of the evidence in one of the trials, and the relationships among judges within the Bergen Vicinage, a reasonable, fully informed observer could have doubts about a Bergen County judge's impartiality. The matter was remanded to the Bergen County assignment judge for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Dalal" on Justia Law

Defendants William Roseman and Lori Lewin were married from 1992 until 2000, during which time Roseman was the Mayor of Carlstadt. As his wife, Lewin was entitled to, and received, benefits under Carlstadt's health plan. After their divorce, each was responsible for their own health insurance pursuant to the divorce decree; Roseman and the son of the marriage would remain on Carlstadt's plan and Lewin was to be provided health insurance coverage through her employer. Roseman notified a Carlstadt payroll clerk, who also served as the Assistant to the Insurance Officer, of the divorce. At the direction of the clerk, Roseman changed his W-4 tax form to reflect that he was no longer married, but the clerk failed to remove Lewin's name from Carlstadt's plan. As a result, following the divorce, Lewin remained on Carlstadt's plan, in addition to her own employer-provided health insurance plan. In July 2009, Roseman and Lewin were indicted on one count each of third-degree conspiracy, third-degree theft by deception, and second-degree official misconduct. Even though other individuals also were eligible to improperly receive benefits under Carlstadt's plan, Roseman and Lewin were the only individuals prosecuted. Roseman and Lewin rejected a plea offer and applied for admission into Pretrial Intervention (PTI). Initially, Roseman was rejected, but after he informed the prosecutor that he would agree to resign and be subject to a lifetime disqualification from office in exchange for PTI, approval of the agreement was sought and obtained by the prosecutor from the Attorney General's office. The prosecutor also expressed his willingness to dismiss the indictment against Lewin if Roseman was admitted into PTI under those conditions. Subsequently, defendants reconsidered and rejected the conditioned PTI offer, and Roseman filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The trial court dismissed the official misconduct charges, but refused to dismiss the remaining charges. The State filed an interlocutory appeal. The Appellate Division reversed the trial judge and reinstated the official misconduct counts of the indictment.. Defendants' efforts to resolve the matter failed because Roseman refused to resign and agree never to pursue public office in the future as conditions to any agreement. As a result, the prosecutor rejected in writing both defendants PTI applications, citing the presumption against PTI for second-degree offenses under the Guidelines for PTI provided in Rule 3:28 and eleven of the seventeen factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). The trial judge, over the objection of the prosecutor, ordered that Roseman and Lewin be admitted into PTI without conditions, finding that the prosecutor s decision to deny PTI was a patent and gross abuse of discretion. The State appealed. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed, finding that Roseman failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the prosecutor patently and grossly abused his discretion. As to Lewin, the panel remanded the matter for an individualized assessment. After review, the Supreme Court concluded defendants demonstrated extraordinary circumstances to overcome the presumption against Pretrial Intervention (PTI) for second-degree offenses and there was no factual justification for the application of the factors set forth by the prosecutor under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). "Denial of defendants' applications to Pretrial Intervention (PTI) by the prosecutor was plainly a patent and gross abuse of discretion." View "New Jersey v. Roseman" on Justia Law

In 2007, Camden police officers arrived at the scene of a shooting where they found the body of Edwin Torres on the sidewalk. Torres had suffered multiple gunshot wounds to the head and neck. An eyewitness identified defendant, who was a juvenile, as the shooter. Three days later, defendant Edwin Urbina surrendered, and, subsequently, he voluntarily elected to have his case transferred from the Family Part to the Law Division. In order to avoid an indictment for first-degree murder, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement, agreeing to proceed as an adult and plead guilty to one count of aggravated manslaughter in exchange for the State's recommendation of a sentence not to exceed seventeen and a half years' incarceration, subject to an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier and five years of post-release parole supervision. Nearly three years after his sentencing, defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea because the factual basis elicited for the plea indicated that he was asserting a complete defense to the charge. In a split decision, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The majority held that, although defendant testified to facts that raised the possibility of self-defense, when considered in light of the surrounding circumstances, his testimony did not constitute a contemporaneous claim of innocence requiring vacation of the plea. The Supreme Court reversed, however, finding that after defendant stated during the plea colloquy that he pulled his handgun after the victim and his cousin pulled their guns, and said "I ain't mean to kill him, your Honor. I just wanted to have him back up[,]" the trial court should have explored whether defendant was claiming he acted in self-defense. The Court found that the plea judge did not ensure that defendant truly understood the law of self-defense, including the requirement of a reasonable and honest belief in the necessity of using force, or that he understood that the State had the burden to disprove self-defense once asserted. "Absent such an inquiry on the record, it is unclear whether defendant's plea was truly knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." View "New Jersey v. Urbina" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the third-party intervention or private search doctrine applied to a warrantless search of a home. Co-defendant Evangeline James and her young children lived in an apartment on the first floor of a two-family home in Asbury Park. Defendant Ricky Wright, James' boyfriend, stayed at the apartment about three to four nights per week. James called her landlord, Alfred Santillo, and reported a major water leak in the kitchen ceiling. Santillo told James to shut off the main water valve and said that he would stop by with a plumber the next morning. Santillo and the plumber, Nicholas Alexo, arrived at the apartment before noon on Monday. Because no one was home, Santillo called James, who did not answer her phone. After waiting about a half hour, Santillo let himself into the apartment, as he had done on prior occasions. Santillo and Alexo saw water and sewage leaking from the kitchen ceiling. Because the water pipes in the kitchen led to the back of the apartment, Alexo went to the rear bedroom to check for other leaks. Alexo saw a small bag of marijuana on top of a nightstand. Inside an open drawer of the nightstand, he also saw a small box that he believed contained powder or crack cocaine. Alexo called Santillo into the bedroom and showed him the items. They then called the police. Police ultimately James based on what they saw in the apartment. Defendant Wright arrived as they were leaving the apartment, and the police arrested him too. A grand jury indicted Wright and James on various drug offenses, second-degree possession of a firearm in the course of committing a drug offense, second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, and fourth-degree possession of a prohibited weapon, namely, body armor piercing bullets. Wright moved to suppress the evidence. After review, the Supreme Court held that the third-party intervention or private search doctrine does not exempt law enforcement's initial search of defendant's home from the warrant requirement. Absent exigency or some other exception to the warrant requirement, the police must get a warrant to enter a private home and conduct a search, even if a private actor has already searched the area and notified law enforcement. "The proper course under the State and Federal Constitutions is the simplest and most direct one. If private parties tell the police about unlawful activities inside a person's home, the police can use that information to establish probable cause and seek a search warrant. In the time it takes to get the warrant, police officers can secure the apartment or home from the outside, for a reasonable period of time, if reasonably necessary to avoid any tampering with or destruction of evidence." View "New Jersey v. Wright" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of December 16, 2010, defendant Timothy Adkins was involved in a single-car accident that resulted in injuries to his two passengers. Based on his performance on a series of field sobriety tests conducted at the scene of the accident, defendant was arrested on suspicion of Driving While Intoxicated (DWI). Defendant was transported to the Police Department and was advised of his Miranda rights. Defendant invoked his right to counsel. Although Alcotest equipment was present, no breathalyzer test was administered at headquarters. Police conveyed defendant to the hospital, and the police obtained defendant s BAC test results from a sample, drawn by hospital personnel at police direction, without the police first having secured a warrant or defendant s prior written consent. Defendant was issued summonses for DWI, careless driving, and possession of an open container in a motor vehicle. Subsequently, a grand jury also charged him with fourth-degree assault by auto for recklessly operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury. Following issuance of the United States Supreme Court's decision in "McNeely," which held that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant, defendant sought suppression of his BAC results. After a hearing, the court applied "McNeely" and excluded defendant's blood test results. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, declining to apply the exclusionary rule when officers relied on pre-McNeely New Jersey case law that had permitted warrantless blood draws based on the exigency inherent in the human body s natural dissipation of alcohol. Consistent with its decision in "New Jersey v. Wessells," (209 N.J. 395 (2012)), the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that McNeely's pronouncement on the Fourth Amendment's requirements applied retroactively to cases that were in the pipeline when McNeely was issued. Because McNeely applied, the Court reversed the Appellate Division judgment. However, the case was remanded to allow the State and defendant the opportunity to re-present their respective positions on exigency in a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the admissibility of the blood test results. View "New Jersey v. Adkins" on Justia Law

Defendant agreed to take an Alocotest (breathalyzer), in which a certified operator performed. At trial an Alcotest expert testified that the tests were done improperly and that the State had failed to enter the right simulator solution Certificate of Analysis and the most recent Calibrating Unit New Standard Solution Report into evidence. The court admitted the Drinking Driving Questionnaire (DDQ) and Drinking Driving Report (DDR) into evidence as business records. The court also admitted Alcotest Operator's Certification, in addition to several other documents relating to the unit's Calibration Certificates and test results. In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered the admissibility of the Alcotest evidence in the prosecution of driving while intoxicated (DWI) cases. The Court held that in this case, it was error to admit the Alcotest results without the foundational documents required by "New Jersey v. Chun," (194 N.J. 54, cert. denied (2008)). Further, although the Court found no violation of the Confrontation Clause with respect to the admission of two of the reports, the Court determined that those reports constituted inadmissible hearsay. Therefore, consideration of this improperly admitted evidence may have unduly influenced the municipal court's credibility findings. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Kuropchak" on Justia Law

Atlantic City police responded to reports of a domestic disturbance between defendant Kingkamau Nantambu and his girlfriend, Crystal Aikens. Aikens told police that defendant had threatened her with a gun. After police located a hidden handgun in defendant's apartment, defendant was charged with fourth-degree possession of a defaced firearm and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person. Subsequently, Aikens called the Atlantic County Prosecutor's Office alleging that defendant had engaged in witness tampering. She agreed to call defendant on her cell phone and allow detectives to record the conversation. During a discussion about the gun, defendant insisted that "[n]obody seen the gun that day". Aikens disagreed, claiming that she saw defendant put the gun in a case. Immediately after that statement, a beeping sound interrupted the conversation. According to one of the detectives, Aikens had moved the phone, causing the recording device to fall and the wires to disconnect. The detective picked up the recorder, removed and replaced its batteries, and replaced the wires. By the time recording resumed, approximately two minutes had passed and Aikens and defendant were concluding their conversation. Based on the conversation, charges of third-degree bribery of a witness, third-degree witness tampering and fourth-degree tampering with physical evidence were added to defendant s existing weapons charges. The recording was offered as evidence demonstrating defendant's intent to tamper with the State's witness and showing that defendant possessed the gun for which he was charged with unlawful possession. Defendant moved to suppress the recording, asserting that the two-minute gap rendered it inadmissible. The trial court granted defendant s motion, finding that the two-minute gap rendered the recording inadmissible as substantive evidence. The court determined that it was irrelevant whether the deletion was intentional; rather, it only mattered that the recording was interrupted following a very damaging statement regarding defendant s alleged possession of the gun. The Appellate Division granted the State's motion for leave to appeal, and reversed in an unpublished decision. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether an inadvertent omission that rendered a portion of a recording unreliable required suppression of the entire recording. "Nothing in our review of case law or evidentiary rules requires suppression of an entire recording when only part of that recording has been omitted or is found unreliable. Instead, the trial court should conduct an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to evaluate which portions of a recording are reliable, and which portions must be redacted. The trial court should admit the recording to the extent it is deemed reliable, redacting only the portion of the recording deemed unreliable due to an omission or defect." The Supreme Court therefore vacated the Appellate Division's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Nantambu" on Justia Law