Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants William Roseman and Lori Lewin were married from 1992 until 2000, during which time Roseman was the Mayor of Carlstadt. As his wife, Lewin was entitled to, and received, benefits under Carlstadt's health plan. After their divorce, each was responsible for their own health insurance pursuant to the divorce decree; Roseman and the son of the marriage would remain on Carlstadt's plan and Lewin was to be provided health insurance coverage through her employer. Roseman notified a Carlstadt payroll clerk, who also served as the Assistant to the Insurance Officer, of the divorce. At the direction of the clerk, Roseman changed his W-4 tax form to reflect that he was no longer married, but the clerk failed to remove Lewin's name from Carlstadt's plan. As a result, following the divorce, Lewin remained on Carlstadt's plan, in addition to her own employer-provided health insurance plan. In July 2009, Roseman and Lewin were indicted on one count each of third-degree conspiracy, third-degree theft by deception, and second-degree official misconduct. Even though other individuals also were eligible to improperly receive benefits under Carlstadt's plan, Roseman and Lewin were the only individuals prosecuted. Roseman and Lewin rejected a plea offer and applied for admission into Pretrial Intervention (PTI). Initially, Roseman was rejected, but after he informed the prosecutor that he would agree to resign and be subject to a lifetime disqualification from office in exchange for PTI, approval of the agreement was sought and obtained by the prosecutor from the Attorney General's office. The prosecutor also expressed his willingness to dismiss the indictment against Lewin if Roseman was admitted into PTI under those conditions. Subsequently, defendants reconsidered and rejected the conditioned PTI offer, and Roseman filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The trial court dismissed the official misconduct charges, but refused to dismiss the remaining charges. The State filed an interlocutory appeal. The Appellate Division reversed the trial judge and reinstated the official misconduct counts of the indictment.. Defendants' efforts to resolve the matter failed because Roseman refused to resign and agree never to pursue public office in the future as conditions to any agreement. As a result, the prosecutor rejected in writing both defendants PTI applications, citing the presumption against PTI for second-degree offenses under the Guidelines for PTI provided in Rule 3:28 and eleven of the seventeen factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). The trial judge, over the objection of the prosecutor, ordered that Roseman and Lewin be admitted into PTI without conditions, finding that the prosecutor s decision to deny PTI was a patent and gross abuse of discretion. The State appealed. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed, finding that Roseman failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the prosecutor patently and grossly abused his discretion. As to Lewin, the panel remanded the matter for an individualized assessment. After review, the Supreme Court concluded defendants demonstrated extraordinary circumstances to overcome the presumption against Pretrial Intervention (PTI) for second-degree offenses and there was no factual justification for the application of the factors set forth by the prosecutor under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). "Denial of defendants' applications to Pretrial Intervention (PTI) by the prosecutor was plainly a patent and gross abuse of discretion." View "New Jersey v. Roseman" on Justia Law

In 2007, Camden police officers arrived at the scene of a shooting where they found the body of Edwin Torres on the sidewalk. Torres had suffered multiple gunshot wounds to the head and neck. An eyewitness identified defendant, who was a juvenile, as the shooter. Three days later, defendant Edwin Urbina surrendered, and, subsequently, he voluntarily elected to have his case transferred from the Family Part to the Law Division. In order to avoid an indictment for first-degree murder, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement, agreeing to proceed as an adult and plead guilty to one count of aggravated manslaughter in exchange for the State's recommendation of a sentence not to exceed seventeen and a half years' incarceration, subject to an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier and five years of post-release parole supervision. Nearly three years after his sentencing, defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea because the factual basis elicited for the plea indicated that he was asserting a complete defense to the charge. In a split decision, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The majority held that, although defendant testified to facts that raised the possibility of self-defense, when considered in light of the surrounding circumstances, his testimony did not constitute a contemporaneous claim of innocence requiring vacation of the plea. The Supreme Court reversed, however, finding that after defendant stated during the plea colloquy that he pulled his handgun after the victim and his cousin pulled their guns, and said "I ain't mean to kill him, your Honor. I just wanted to have him back up[,]" the trial court should have explored whether defendant was claiming he acted in self-defense. The Court found that the plea judge did not ensure that defendant truly understood the law of self-defense, including the requirement of a reasonable and honest belief in the necessity of using force, or that he understood that the State had the burden to disprove self-defense once asserted. "Absent such an inquiry on the record, it is unclear whether defendant's plea was truly knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." View "New Jersey v. Urbina" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the third-party intervention or private search doctrine applied to a warrantless search of a home. Co-defendant Evangeline James and her young children lived in an apartment on the first floor of a two-family home in Asbury Park. Defendant Ricky Wright, James' boyfriend, stayed at the apartment about three to four nights per week. James called her landlord, Alfred Santillo, and reported a major water leak in the kitchen ceiling. Santillo told James to shut off the main water valve and said that he would stop by with a plumber the next morning. Santillo and the plumber, Nicholas Alexo, arrived at the apartment before noon on Monday. Because no one was home, Santillo called James, who did not answer her phone. After waiting about a half hour, Santillo let himself into the apartment, as he had done on prior occasions. Santillo and Alexo saw water and sewage leaking from the kitchen ceiling. Because the water pipes in the kitchen led to the back of the apartment, Alexo went to the rear bedroom to check for other leaks. Alexo saw a small bag of marijuana on top of a nightstand. Inside an open drawer of the nightstand, he also saw a small box that he believed contained powder or crack cocaine. Alexo called Santillo into the bedroom and showed him the items. They then called the police. Police ultimately James based on what they saw in the apartment. Defendant Wright arrived as they were leaving the apartment, and the police arrested him too. A grand jury indicted Wright and James on various drug offenses, second-degree possession of a firearm in the course of committing a drug offense, second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, and fourth-degree possession of a prohibited weapon, namely, body armor piercing bullets. Wright moved to suppress the evidence. After review, the Supreme Court held that the third-party intervention or private search doctrine does not exempt law enforcement's initial search of defendant's home from the warrant requirement. Absent exigency or some other exception to the warrant requirement, the police must get a warrant to enter a private home and conduct a search, even if a private actor has already searched the area and notified law enforcement. "The proper course under the State and Federal Constitutions is the simplest and most direct one. If private parties tell the police about unlawful activities inside a person's home, the police can use that information to establish probable cause and seek a search warrant. In the time it takes to get the warrant, police officers can secure the apartment or home from the outside, for a reasonable period of time, if reasonably necessary to avoid any tampering with or destruction of evidence." View "New Jersey v. Wright" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of December 16, 2010, defendant Timothy Adkins was involved in a single-car accident that resulted in injuries to his two passengers. Based on his performance on a series of field sobriety tests conducted at the scene of the accident, defendant was arrested on suspicion of Driving While Intoxicated (DWI). Defendant was transported to the Police Department and was advised of his Miranda rights. Defendant invoked his right to counsel. Although Alcotest equipment was present, no breathalyzer test was administered at headquarters. Police conveyed defendant to the hospital, and the police obtained defendant s BAC test results from a sample, drawn by hospital personnel at police direction, without the police first having secured a warrant or defendant s prior written consent. Defendant was issued summonses for DWI, careless driving, and possession of an open container in a motor vehicle. Subsequently, a grand jury also charged him with fourth-degree assault by auto for recklessly operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury. Following issuance of the United States Supreme Court's decision in "McNeely," which held that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant, defendant sought suppression of his BAC results. After a hearing, the court applied "McNeely" and excluded defendant's blood test results. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, declining to apply the exclusionary rule when officers relied on pre-McNeely New Jersey case law that had permitted warrantless blood draws based on the exigency inherent in the human body s natural dissipation of alcohol. Consistent with its decision in "New Jersey v. Wessells," (209 N.J. 395 (2012)), the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that McNeely's pronouncement on the Fourth Amendment's requirements applied retroactively to cases that were in the pipeline when McNeely was issued. Because McNeely applied, the Court reversed the Appellate Division judgment. However, the case was remanded to allow the State and defendant the opportunity to re-present their respective positions on exigency in a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the admissibility of the blood test results. View "New Jersey v. Adkins" on Justia Law

Defendant agreed to take an Alocotest (breathalyzer), in which a certified operator performed. At trial an Alcotest expert testified that the tests were done improperly and that the State had failed to enter the right simulator solution Certificate of Analysis and the most recent Calibrating Unit New Standard Solution Report into evidence. The court admitted the Drinking Driving Questionnaire (DDQ) and Drinking Driving Report (DDR) into evidence as business records. The court also admitted Alcotest Operator's Certification, in addition to several other documents relating to the unit's Calibration Certificates and test results. In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered the admissibility of the Alcotest evidence in the prosecution of driving while intoxicated (DWI) cases. The Court held that in this case, it was error to admit the Alcotest results without the foundational documents required by "New Jersey v. Chun," (194 N.J. 54, cert. denied (2008)). Further, although the Court found no violation of the Confrontation Clause with respect to the admission of two of the reports, the Court determined that those reports constituted inadmissible hearsay. Therefore, consideration of this improperly admitted evidence may have unduly influenced the municipal court's credibility findings. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Kuropchak" on Justia Law

Atlantic City police responded to reports of a domestic disturbance between defendant Kingkamau Nantambu and his girlfriend, Crystal Aikens. Aikens told police that defendant had threatened her with a gun. After police located a hidden handgun in defendant's apartment, defendant was charged with fourth-degree possession of a defaced firearm and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person. Subsequently, Aikens called the Atlantic County Prosecutor's Office alleging that defendant had engaged in witness tampering. She agreed to call defendant on her cell phone and allow detectives to record the conversation. During a discussion about the gun, defendant insisted that "[n]obody seen the gun that day". Aikens disagreed, claiming that she saw defendant put the gun in a case. Immediately after that statement, a beeping sound interrupted the conversation. According to one of the detectives, Aikens had moved the phone, causing the recording device to fall and the wires to disconnect. The detective picked up the recorder, removed and replaced its batteries, and replaced the wires. By the time recording resumed, approximately two minutes had passed and Aikens and defendant were concluding their conversation. Based on the conversation, charges of third-degree bribery of a witness, third-degree witness tampering and fourth-degree tampering with physical evidence were added to defendant s existing weapons charges. The recording was offered as evidence demonstrating defendant's intent to tamper with the State's witness and showing that defendant possessed the gun for which he was charged with unlawful possession. Defendant moved to suppress the recording, asserting that the two-minute gap rendered it inadmissible. The trial court granted defendant s motion, finding that the two-minute gap rendered the recording inadmissible as substantive evidence. The court determined that it was irrelevant whether the deletion was intentional; rather, it only mattered that the recording was interrupted following a very damaging statement regarding defendant s alleged possession of the gun. The Appellate Division granted the State's motion for leave to appeal, and reversed in an unpublished decision. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether an inadvertent omission that rendered a portion of a recording unreliable required suppression of the entire recording. "Nothing in our review of case law or evidentiary rules requires suppression of an entire recording when only part of that recording has been omitted or is found unreliable. Instead, the trial court should conduct an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to evaluate which portions of a recording are reliable, and which portions must be redacted. The trial court should admit the recording to the extent it is deemed reliable, redacting only the portion of the recording deemed unreliable due to an omission or defect." The Supreme Court therefore vacated the Appellate Division's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Nantambu" on Justia Law

Defendant K.P.S. was charged with numerous counts of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, child abuse, endangering the welfare of a child, and conspiracy to commit these crimes. Defendants Peter Lisa and Carmini Laloo were named as co-defendants in the indictment and charged with many of the same offenses as well as a number of additional ones. The charges against the three co-defendants arose from evidence discovered by the police during a series of searches of Lisa's residence (a home owned by Lisa's mother). Police were called to investigate a domestic violence dispute. During the search, the police seized guns, some of which they later learned were stolen, and observed in the garage a motorcycle trailer that fit the description of a trailer reported as stolen. Additionally, while conducting the search, the police saw Lisa in his bedroom quickly and suspiciously turning off his computer. The three co-defendants jointly filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the evidence seized during those searches was in violation of their rights under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. According to Lisa's mother, she did not give her consent to the police to conduct a further search of the garage, despite the presence of her signature on a consent-to-search form. The police executed two subsequent search warrants on Lisa's home, seizing the motorcycle trailer and other purportedly stolen items as well as Lisa's computer, a camcorder, videotapes, and digital photo flash cards. The evidence revealed that Lisa, Laloo, and defendant engaged in illicit sexual activities with defendant's minor son. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. In accordance with a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to a fifteen-year term of imprisonment subject to the No Early Release Act, to be followed by a five-year period of parole supervision and community supervision for life. The court also ordered that defendant comply with the registration requirements of Megan's Law. Lisa and Laloo also entered guilty pleas to first-degree aggravated sexual assault, pursuant to plea agreements with the State, and were sentenced to state prison terms. Defendant, Lisa, and Laloo appealed their sentences and the denial of their suppression motions. Lisa's appeal and defendant and Laloo's appeals were heard by two different panels of the Appellate Division. The issue in this appeal was whether the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded defendant's appellate panel from considering anew the issues that had been decided earlier by his co-defendant's panel. The Supreme Court held that the decision rendered by the appellate panel in Lisa's appeal was not the law of the case in defendant's later-heard appeal. Defendant had a due process right to have a meaningful opportunity to be heard on his appeal. View "New Jersey v. K.P.S." on Justia Law

Defendant "L.A." was employed by the Trenton Board of Education as an elementary school security guard. While at work, L.A. allegedly had unlawful sexual contact with two minor students, N.F. and K.O. The allegations were referred to the Institutional Abuse Investigation Unit (IAIU) of the Department of Children and Families (DCF) and defendant was subsequently indicted. In the N.F. indictment, L.A. was charged with third-degree aggravated criminal sexual contact and second-degree endangering the welfare of a minor. In the K.O. indictment, L.A. was charged with two counts of second-degree sexual assault and one count of second-degree endangering the welfare of a minor. L.A. pled guilty to one count of second-degree endangering the welfare of a minor (N.F.) in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges regarding N.F. and complete dismissal of the K.O. indictment. K.O. s guardian ad litem subsequently filed a civil complaint alleging that L.A. sexually assaulted K.O. and that the Board negligently hired L.A. The Board answered the complaint, taking no position with regard to the allegations against L.A. However, L.A. was assigned counsel by the Horace Mann Insurance Agency, pursuant to a private insurance policy maintained by the New Jersey Education Association. Ultimately, K.O.'s civil action was settled without any admission of wrongdoing by L.A. or the Board. After the settlement, L.A., through counsel provided by Horace Mann, filed a verified petition against the Commissioner of Education seeking reimbursement for the attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against K.O.'s civil action. The matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law and L.A.'s counsel and the Board filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted L.A.'s motion, denied the Board's, and awarded L.A. attorney's fees and costs pursuant to N.J.S.A.18A:16-6, the statute that addressed the right to indemnification for officers and employees of boards of education in civil actions. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 entitled a school board employee to indemnification for attorney's fees and costs spent in defense of a civil action arising from the same allegations contained in a dismissed criminal indictment. The Court concluded that in such circumstances N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 requires indemnification unless there was proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee's conduct fell outside the course of performance of his or her employment duties. Here, rather than conducting an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ disposed of the matter by way of summary judgment. Because there are disputed issues of material fact regarding whether L.A. was acting within the scope of the responsibilities of his employment, the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed. The matter was remanded to the Commissioner of Education for a hearing to determine whether L.A.'s conduct fell outside the course of performance of his employment duties. View "L.A. v. Board of Education of the City of Trenton" on Justia Law

A Bergen County Grand Jury charged Michael Sumulikoski with three counts of second-degree sexual assault (Counts 2, 3, and 4), one count of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual contact (Count 1), and two counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child by allowing Artur Sopel to perform unlawful acts in the victim's presence (Counts 5 and 6). The Grand Jury charged Sopel with six counts of second-degree sexual assault (Counts 8, 9, and 13 through 16) and two counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual contact (Counts 7 and 12). Sopel was also charged with several additional offenses that were not part of this appeal, including one count of endangering and six counts of sexual assault relating to acts from 2010 involving another seventeen-year-old victim (Counts 19-25), two counts of witness tampering (Counts 10 and 17), and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child with respect to the witness tampering (Counts 11 and 18). Defendants moved to dismiss the sexual assault and endangerment charges involving conduct in Germany, asserting that the State lacked territorial jurisdiction to prosecute the offenses in New Jersey. The trial court denied the motions, focusing on N.J.S.A.2C:1-3(a)(1), which allowed for jurisdiction in New Jersey when "[e]ither the conduct which is an element of the offense or the result which is such an element occurs within this State". The court concluded that material elements of both offenses having supervisory or disciplinary power over a victim (sexual assault), and assuming the responsibility for the care of a child (endangerment) occurred in New Jersey and constitute conduct sufficient to establish territorial jurisdiction. Defendants appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed substantially for the reasons set forth by the trial court. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the State could prosecute offenses that occurred in Germany in a New Jersey courtroom. After review, the Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and dismissed a number of counts in the indictment. The case proceeded on counts relating to witness tampering and a separate series of allegations of sexual assault against a victim in New Jersey. View "New Jersey v. Sumulikoski" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a)(3), a bias-crime statute that allows a jury to convict a defendant even when bias did not motivate the commission of the offense. Under the statute, a defendant may be convicted of bias intimidation if the victim reasonably believed that the defendant committed the offense on account of the victim's race. Unlike any other bias-crime statute in the country, N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a)(3) focuses on the victim's, not the defendant's, state of mind. Defendants David Pomianek, Jr. and Michael Dorazo, Jr., and Steven Brodie, Jr., worked for the Parks and Recreation Division of the Gloucester Township Department of Public Works. Defendants are Caucasian and worked as truck drivers. Brodie is African-American and worked as a laborer. The three men were assigned to work at an old garage used for storage by Public Works. In the garage was a sixteen-foot long and eight-foot wide steel storage cage, enclosed by a heavy chain-link fence on three sides and a cinder block wall on the fourth. The cage was secured by a sliding chain-link door with a padlock. A number of employees were horsing around in the building and wrestling in the cage. In a ruse, Dorazo approached Brodie and told him that their supervisor needed an item from the cage. Once inside the cage, Dorazo shut the cage door, locking Brodie inside. A number of Public Works employees began laughing, but Brodie found nothing funny about being locked in the cage. Brodie recalled defendant saying, "Oh, you see, you throw a banana in the cage and he goes right in," which triggered more laughter among the men. Brodie considered the remark to be racial in nature. From his perspective, the line about throwing the banana in there was like being called a monkey in a cage. Brodie admitted, however, that he never heard defendant call him a monkey. The cage door was unlocked after three to five minutes. Brodie felt humiliated and embarrassed. After his release, Dorazo was heard saying, "You all right, buddy? We were just joking around." Brodie replied, "Yeah, yeah, I'm fine." Defendant and Dorazo were charged in a sixteen-count indictment with two counts of second-degree official misconduct, twelve counts of fourth-degree bias intimidation, and two counts of third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution. The hindering charges were later dismissed. The court denied defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss the bias-intimidation counts based on a constitutional challenge to the bias-intimidation statute. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted defendant of all counts alleging that he falsely imprisoned or harassed Brodie either with the purpose to intimidate him or knowing that his conduct would cause Brodie to be intimidated because of his race, color, national origin, or ethnicity. In addition, defendant was acquitted of the lesser-included offense of false imprisonment. Defendant, however, was found guilty of two fourth-degree bias-intimidation crimes, one for harassment by alarming conduct and the other for harassment by communication. The jury also convicted defendant of official misconduct based in part on the finding that he committed the crime of bias intimidation. Last, the jury convicted defendant of the petty disorderly persons offenses of harassment by alarming conduct and harassment by communication. The Appellate Division reversed the bias-intimidation conviction, concluding that a conviction based on the victim's perception and not on the defendant's biased intent would violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. In affirming in part, and reversing in part, the Appellate Court's judgment, the Supreme Court held that N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a)(3), due to its vagueness, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "In focusing on the victim's perception and not the defendant's intent, the statute does not give a defendant sufficient guidance or notice on how to conform to the law." View "New Jersey v. Pomianek" on Justia Law