Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Corey Morris appealed an order that denied his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Defendant was indicted on multiple counts of armed robbery, weapons offenses and eluding the police. At his first trial, defendant was convicted of eluding, but the jury deadlocked on all other charges. Prior to retrial, defendant and the State reached a plea agreement where defendant pled guilty to three armed robbery charges, and received three sentences of twenty years (to run concurrent to the twenty-year sentence for eluding), subject to the No Early Release Act. Defendant was permitted to represent himself on appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that “defendant’s arguments [were] without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.” View "New Jersey v. Morris" on Justia Law

Defendants Donald Lindsey and Martin Pierce engaged in a shoot-out in a residential neighborhood of Camden. They were not injured, but a four-year-old boy, B.T., was killed in the cross-fire. Following a joint trial, the jury convicted Lindsey of passion/provocation manslaughter of B.T., as a lesser-included offense of murder, (count one); and convicted Pierce of aggravated manslaughter as charged, (count two). Defendants were convicted of attempted murder of each other (counts three as to Lindsey, and four as to Pierce). Defendants were also convicted of various weapons offenses. Lindsey and Pierce were each convicted of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (count five as to Lindsey and count six as to Pierce); and unlawful possession of a handgun, (count seven as to Lindsey and count eight as to Pierce). Lindsey was convicted of unlawful possession of an assault firearm (count nine). Lindsey received an aggregate term of thirty-three years, and Pierce forty-two years the disparity primarily due to the different verdicts related to B.T.'s homicide. Among their asserted claims on appeal, one or both defendants argued the court erred in various evidentiary rulings; the court gave incorrect jury instructions, generally raised as plain error; the verdicts regarding B.T. homicide were inconsistent; and the sentences were excessive. Having reviewed defendants' arguments in light of the record and applicable principles of law, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, but remanded for resentencing. View "New Jersey v. Lindsey" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether defendant's repeated requests to speak with a family member during interrogation was sufficient to invoke the right to remain silent and, if so, whether defendant's subsequent statements and physical evidence recovered as a result of those statements should be suppressed. The jury found defendant guilty of second-degree passion/provocation manslaughter of his father; first-degree murder of his mother; third-degree hindering prosecution; third-degree theft; third-degree fraudulent use of a credit card; fourth-degree tampering with evidence; fourth-degree false swearing; and second-degree disturbing, moving or concealing human remains. Defendant received an aggregate sentence of sixty-four years in prison, with an 85% period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act. The Appellate Division concluded that defendant initially invoked his right to remain silent by requesting to speak to his uncle, the police improperly recorded that conversation and, as such, the trial court properly suppressed the recorded conversation with defendant's uncle. The Appellate Division concluded, as did the trial court, that defendant's statement to police was obtained voluntarily after the police re-administered defendant's Miranda rights. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Maltese" on Justia Law

At the conclusion of the first day of jury deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court asking if a particular juror could be excused from the case. The court responded to the question appropriately, generally explaining that a juror could not be excused for reasons related to differences with other jurors, but could for personal reasons, such as illness. The court gave the jurors the opportunity to raise the issue the next day at sidebar. No one did. The following day, Juror Number 2 did not appear for service. Over the objection of defense counsel, the trial court impanelled an alternate juror. The court declined defense counsel's request that the jurors be questioned about whether Juror Number 2 was the subject of the previous day's note. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the juror substitution. That motion was denied. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that the trial court erred in making the substitution before exploring whether the juror's failure to return to court was for reasons personal to the juror or due to the juror's interaction with the jury. The Supreme Court did not agree with the Appellate Division that the trial court's decision to place an alternate juror on the panel, without inquiring of the jury about the reasons for Juror Number 2's absence, was a fatal error requiring that the jury's verdict be overturned. "The court was well within its discretion to make the juror substitution under Rule1:8-2(d)(1) - even without an inquiry of the jury. . . .A juror's unexplained absence from the courthouse on deliberation day cannot, alone, sabotage a trial." View "New Jersey v. Musa" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether evidence seized after defendant's arrest, made in the absence of a valid warrant or probable cause, was subject to exclusion without application of an exception based on the subjective good faith of the executing officers, who relied upon an arrest warrant that had been judicially vacated but had not been removed from the computer database showing active warrants. In 2009, a Municipal Court Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of defendant for non-payment of fines owed to the City of Asbury Park. Defendant learned of that warrant while incarcerated in Bayside State Prison on an unrelated charge. He sent a letter to the municipal court requesting that his fines in connection with two matters (a criminal conviction and a motor vehicle violation) be vacated due to hardship. In 2010, another Municipal Court Judge granted defendant's request. The Asbury Park Municipal Court Administrator explained that once the vacation of a fine is entered into the relevant database, the outstanding warrant in that database is also vacated. The municipal court employees, not the police department, are responsible for entering that information. With respect to defendant, the administrator stated that a deputy municipal court administrator properly vacated the traffic fines in the "ATS" system but failed to go into the "ACS" system and vacate the criminal fines there. Therefore, the ACS computer system did not reflect that the criminal fines were vacated, and, correspondingly, the arrest warrant associated with those fines was not vacated. Defendant was later indicted for third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), and second degree possession of a CDS with intent to distribute. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from the police vehicle, contending that the officer's questioning and warrant check were unconstitutional. Following a hearing at which only the arresting officer testified, the court denied defendant's motion. On the eve of trial, defendant asked the court to reopen his suppression motion, relying on a letter from the municipal court which indicated that his fines had been vacated. The court reopened defendant's motion, and, following a hearing at which the municipal court administrator testified, granted the motion to suppress. The court found that defendant was arrested unlawfully, the drugs seized from the vehicle were inadmissible fruits of an unlawful arrest, and that the lack of culpability of the police department was irrelevant. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division. "The arresting officer's good faith belief that a valid warrant for defendant's arrest was outstanding cannot render an arrest made in the absence of a valid warrant or probable cause constitutionally compliant." View "New Jersey v. Shannon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court consolidated two appeals in this opinion. J.S. was a thirty-four-year-old former New Jersey resident, who, in 2000, while a sophomore at Kean University, was arrested after twice selling marijuana to an undercover police officer during a five-day period. He pled guilty to a fourth-degree distribution charge arising from a June 16 sale, and a third-degree distribution charge arising from a June 21 sale. J.S. was sentenced to a three-year term of noncustodial probation. Five years after completing his sentence, he filed the expungement petition that was the subject of this appeal. The trial court granted J.S. s petition, reasoning that his two offenses were a single spree that constituted a solitary crime. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed. G.P.B. was a fifty-two-year-old New Jersey resident and business owner, who, in 1999, committed several offenses in support of a scheme to offer illegal gifts to local officials in a particular municipality, in order to obtain a public contract for his business and a specific vote on a municipal resolution. G.P.B. pled guilty to four offenses: one count of third-degree conspiracy to offer gifts to a public servant and three counts of third-degree offering gifts to a public servant. He was sentenced to a county correctional facility for thirty days and ordered to perform 100 hours of community service and pay a $10,000 fine. G.P.B. petitioned for expungement approximately ten years after his convictions. The trial court granted G.P.B. s petition, reasoning that his crimes were all part of a continuing conspiracy to influence a governing body and achieve a single aim, and that the conspiracy linked the charges together as one crime. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division reversed, noting that G.P.B. had pled guilty to four offenses committed on two separate days, the panel concluded that he was not entitled to expungement. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division in both appeals: "[t]he plain language of N.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a) precludes expungement of convictions when the petitioner has been convicted of multiple crimes, even when those crimes occurred within a short span of time. [. . .] We conclude that, as it is currently drafted, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) does not authorize expungement of the criminal records of individuals who are in the position of petitioners. If the Legislature determines that expungement should be available to such individuals, it can amend the statute to clarify its intent in that regard." View "In the Matter of the Expungement Petition of J.S." on Justia Law

In 2009, Erica Ortiz and a few friends went to a dance club in Newark. Defendant and her boyfriend, Oscar Rodriguez, went to the club that night as well. At about 1:35 a.m., while in the bathroom, defendant got into a fight with Ortiz and her friend, Jessica Machado. A security guard broke up the fight and escorted defendant and Rodriguez out of the club. Ortiz left the club at closing time, around 3:00 a.m., with two friends, Christina Gratacos and Nihar Patel. As the three walked to Patel's car, defendant and Rodriguez drove up to Ortiz and her friends. Rodriguez jumped out of the car and punched Ortiz in the face. Patel, who stepped in to help Ortiz, fought with Rodriguez. Meanwhile, defendant left the car and fought with Ortiz again. Bystanders eventually intervened and broke up the fight. Defendant and Rodriguez then got back in their car, and Rodriguez drove off. Minutes later, they returned. Rodriguez got out of the driver's side of the car and began to fight with Patel again; others also joined in the fight. Ortiz was not involved in this part of the brawl. From the sidewalk, she saw a jacket on the ground that she thought belonged to Patel. She went to pick up the jacket, which was in front of defendant's car. At that moment, defendant moved from the passenger's to the driver's seat, put the car into gear, turned the wheel, and drove into Ortiz. Ortiz became lodged under the car and was dragged about fifty feet. When defendant turned a corner, the back tire ran over Ortiz, who was dislodged from the car. Defendant drove off. A grand jury returned an indictment that charged defendant with several crimes, including first-degree attempted murder, fourth-degree aggravated assault by automobile, and third-degree endangering an injured victim. On appeal, for the first time, defendant argued that the trial judge omitted an element of the offense for endangering: that a defendant's flight increased the risk of further harm to the victim. The Appellate Division disagreed, concluding that the jury charge complied with the law and fully recited the three statutory elements of the offense. The panel found no fourth element under the statute. The panel also found sufficient evidence to support the endangering conviction. Agreeing with the Appellate Division's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Munafo" on Justia Law

Defendant Dontae Hathaway was charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon following the discovery of a handgun in his room at the Taj Mahal Hotel and Casino in Atlantic City. Defendant moved to suppress the gun, arguing that its discovery was the product of an unconstitutional search. At the suppression hearing, Officer James Armstrong of the Atlantic City Police Department testified that while providing additional security at the casino, he was called to the security podium. Several security officers conveyed that an unidentified hotel patron, who was no longer present at the podium, had reported that two black males robbed him at gunpoint in a room on the 70th floor. A four-member SWAT team arrived. Officer Armstrong was told that video footage showed the unidentified patron on an elevator with a white male, a black male, and two females. It was observed that the elevator stopped on the 70thfloor, and five individuals proceeded to Room 7023. An unidentified patron later left in what appeared to be a panicked state. Concerned that there could be an armed gunman in the casino or barricaded in the room, possibly with hostages or victims, Officer Armstrong, the SWAT team, and casino security officers set themselves up outside Room 7023. When calls to the room, via telephone and orally through the slightly open door, went unanswered, the officers entered with guns drawn. They found neither victims nor a gunman. However, an open duffel bag was on a cabinet by the bed, in which an automatic black Beretta handgun was readily visible. Security determined that the room was registered to defendant, whose name was found on documents inside the bag. The trial court suppressed evidence of the handgun, finding that Officer Armstrong should have viewed the footage himself prior to taking action. It also deemed the unidentified patron's report unreliable, and found that Officer Armstrong improperly relied on hearsay filtered through untrained security personnel. The State moved for leave to appeal, and the Appellate Division affirmed the suppression. Viewing the events as they appeared to an objectively reasonable police officer, and based on the evidence presented by the State at the suppression hearing, the Supreme Court concluded the police acted within the scope of the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement, and the gun should not have been suppressed. View "New Jersey v. Hathaway" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal were the circumstances under which a law enforcement officer may legally enter a disabled vehicle to obtain the driver's registration and insurance information without first requesting the driver's permission or allowing the driver the opportunity to retrieve the documents himself. This became an issue when the officer found a handgun and marijuana inside an open backpack inside the disabled vehicle. Defendant was arrested and subsequently charged with multiple weapons offenses The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence found in the car, finding that the trooper lawfully conducted a search for defendant's credentials and was therefore permitted to seize any evidence discovered in plain view. The Appellate Division disagreed, finding that the trooper never gave defendant the opportunity to present his credentials. Therefore, since the trooper was not lawfully in the viewing area of the contraband, the Appellate Division found that the plain view exception did not apply, and reversed the trial court. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division, finding that the trooper was required to provide defendant with the opportunity to present his credentials before entering the vehicle. "If such an opportunity is presented, and defendant is unable or unwilling to produce his registration or insurance information, only then may an officer conduct a search for those credentials." View "New Jersey v. Keaton" on Justia Law

Police arrived at defendant Evan Reece's home to investigate a dropped 9-1-1 call that originated there. Defendant denied making any such call, and insisted that he was alone in the home, although responding officer Sergeant Delagarza had observed three vehicles in the driveway. Defendant retrieved and displayed his cordless home phone to Delagarza, which did not show any call to 9-1-1 in its memory. Delagarza looked into the house through the front door that defendant had left open, and saw nothing unusual or suspicious. Nevertheless, Delagarza called for a backup, and with defendant present, confirmed with the police dispatcher that the originating number of the call was defendant's home phone number. During these communications, Delagarza noticed a small abrasion on the knuckle of defendant s hand, which Delagarza stated was similar to the result of punching something. Delagarza asked defendant if he was married, and defendant stated that he was, further stating that his marital status was none of Delagarza's business. Delagarza noticed that defendant's demeanor began to change at this point, and he became frustrated with Delagarza's presence and his questioning. Delagarza asked if he could enter the house and look around, but defendant refused consent. Delagarza then called for assistance and told defendant that he and the other officers needed to check the house. Defendant responded by slamming the door closed and attempting to lock it, while the officers pushed the door open. Delagarza announced that defendant was under arrest, and the officers entered defendant s residence. Defendant attempted to block their entry, and a struggle ensued. After being subdued, defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of simple assault, one count of resisting arrest, and one count of obstructing the administration of law. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge held that, under the emergency-aid doctrine, the officers were entitled to enter defendant's home without a warrant. Based on this finding, the court held that defendant's attempt to deny them access constituted obstruction. The court also made specific credibility findings. Defendant was found guilty of one count of simple assault, resisting arrest, and obstruction. Defendant was acquitted of the other count of simple assault. On appeal to the Law Division, defendant was found guilty of resisting arrest and obstruction, and not guilty of simple assault. In a split decision, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction for resisting arrest, and reversed the conviction for obstruction, a majority of the panel finding that the emergency-aid doctrine did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the emergency-aid doctrine justified the officers warrantless entry into defendant's home. Furthermore, because the credibility and factual findings of the municipal court and Law Division were supported by substantial evidence, the Court affirmed defendant's conviction for resisting arrest and reinstated defendant's obstruction conviction. View "New Jersey v. Reece" on Justia Law