Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Criminal Law
New Jersey v. Bass
In 2006, Jessica Shabazz was shot and killed, and James Sinclair was wounded at a motel. Defendant David Bass was arrested shortly thereafter. He admitted to police that, prior to the shooting, he had smoked crack cocaine with Shabazz and Sinclair in his motel room, that he and Shabazz had argued over money, and that he shot Shabazz and Sinclair with his handgun in self-defense. A jury convicted defendant of the knowing or purposeful murder of Shabazz, the attempted murder of Sinclair, and two weapons offenses. He was sentenced to a sixty-year aggregate term of incarceration. On appeal, defendant challenged three determinations by the trial court: (1) the trial court's limitation on the cross-examination of the State's lead witness, Sinclair; (2) the trial court's admission of the expert testimony of a medical examiner, who testified as a surrogate for another medical examiner who had conducted the autopsy of Shabazz, because that medical examiner died prior to defendant's trial; and (3) the trial should have charged the jury regarding the permissible use of force against an intruder. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Division. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's limitations on defendant s cross-examination of Sinclair constituted reversible error. The Court also reversed the Appellate Division's judgment affirming the trial court's admission of the expert testimony of a substitute medical examiner regarding the autopsy of Shabazz. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Bass" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Acoli v. New Jersey Parole Board
Sundiata Acoli had been convicted for murder. He was denied parole twice. Acoli filed an internal administrative appeal, which entitled him to a review by the full Parole Board of the record that had been developed before the Board panel, as well as any additional material submitted by Acoli. Because he had not been recommended for parole, the full Board did not conduct an in-person assessment of Acoli consistent with its regulations governing the parole process. The Parole Board affirmed the denial of parole and the extended future parole eligibility date established for Acoli. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the Parole Board. The Supreme Court granted the Parole Board's petition for certification, which argued only that it was error, under the statutory process governing parole, for the Appellate Division to have proceeded directly to ordering Acoli's parole. Construction of the statutes governing the parole process lead the Supreme Court to conclude that the Appellate Division acted prematurely in ordering Acoli's parole release. The Appellate Division was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Acoli v. New Jersey Parole Board" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New Jersey v. Goodwin
A jury found defendant Robert Goodwin guilty of second-degree insurance fraud. In doing so, the jury concluded that defendant knowingly made or caused to be made false statements of material fact concerning an insurance claim for damage to his girlfriend's sport utility vehicle (SUV). The heart of the State's case was that defendant falsely reported the theft of the vehicle, which was found severely damaged as the result of arson. The insurance company discovered the lie during an investigation when defendant recanted his earlier story that the SUV had been stolen. As a result, the carrier did not reimburse the loss. The Appellate Division overturned defendant's conviction because the jury was not told that a finding of insurance fraud could be returned only if the carrier actually relied on defendant's false statements. In the Appellate Division's view, the trial court erred by charging a relaxed standard: that guilt could be found if the false statements had the capacity to influence the insurance company s decision to pay the claim. The Supreme Court reversed: a person violates the insurance fraud statute even if he does not succeed in duping an insurance carrier into paying a fraudulent claim. Because the Court concluded that the trial court did not err in its charge to the jury, defendant's conviction was reinstated. View "New Jersey v. Goodwin" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New Jersey v. Jones
Defendant Howard Jones was charged with third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, and fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, arising from events that took place one morning in the spring of 2009 involving C.W., a fourteen-year-old girl. According to C.W.'s testimony, she was on her way to school when she saw a man standing there with his penis out. C.W. ran toward her school, and quickly encountered Leonard Wimbush. According to Wimbush, he saw a man emerge from the bushes and followed after him, but was unable to continue his pursuit after the man jumped a fence. Wimbush returned to the front of the building and waited for the police. When officers arrived, Wimbush joined police to search for the suspect. During the search, the responding officer came upon an individual wearing a gray sweatshirt, and asked the man (later identified as defendant) if he had seen anyone suspicious in the area. The man responded, "The gentleman who was exposing himself is on the track bed." Because the officer had not mentioned that he was looking for an individual who had exposed himself, he became interested. Defendant started to walk toward the back of the house to obtain his identification, and then ran away. Wimbush tackled the man, and the officer placed defendant under arrest. Following the close of the State's case, defendant moved to strike C.W.'s identification, arguing that it was tainted. Defense counsel noted that C.W. did not see defendant's face, that she recognized defendant only once the jacket was placed on him, that the officers never showed her any other suspects, and that Wimbush and the officer were standing next to defendant when he was identified. The trial court denied the motion, noting that, although one-on-one showup identifications are inherently suggestive, C.W.'s testimony was reliable because it was corroborated by Wimbush, who identified defendant and who provided a description that was essentially the same as the one provided by C.W. Defendant appealed, contending that [b]y placing the incriminating jacket on defendant after C.W. failed to identify defendant without the jacket, the police violated defendant's [due process] right to be free from suggestive police identification procedures that create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Defendant also challenged his sentence and the trail court's failure to charge lewdness as a lesser-included offense. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the State's argument that what occurred at this showup was an identification of an inanimate object. Here, C.W. was not simply identifying a jacket being shown to her by the police because it had been found near where defendant was located. "Placing a jacket on a person after his arrest and using that item of clothing during the eyewitness identification procedure when a witness is having difficulty identifying the suspect raises due process concerns." The case was remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Jones" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New Jersey v. Baum
While driving from his residence to his mother's home one night in 2006, defendant Eugene Baum struck and killed two teenage girls who were walking in a bike lane of a major thoroughfare in Kinnelon. The responding officers found two beverage containers in defendant's car, one of which contained a liquid that was 7.7 percent ethyl alcohol (15 proof). Defendant could not maintain his balance, his speech was slurred, and he smelled strongly of alcohol. He told the police that he thought he had hit a deer, but was not sure. At the time of the incident, defendant's blood alcohol level was determined to be between .327 and .377, four times the legal limit. Defendant had taken a prescribed anti-depressant the night before, and Librium that morning to control his symptoms of alcohol withdrawal. Although he knew that Librium would intensify his intoxication, defendant stated that he consumed more than two alcoholic beverages, but did not know how much he actually consumed, before driving. Defendant stated that he drank because he was an alcoholic, and has struggled with alcoholism for approximately seven years. Defendant argued at trial that he lacked the mental capacity to act recklessly because of his intoxication, which he claimed was involuntary due to his mental diseases or defects of alcoholism and depression. The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree aggravated manslaughter and two counts of second-degree death by auto. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive twenty-year prison terms subject to eighty-five percent parole ineligibility. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction, but remanded for resentencing based on a reevaluation of the aggravating factors relied on by the sentencing court. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, alleging errors at trial constituted reversible error. Finding none, however, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Baum" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New Jersey v. Smith
During an encounter that lasted ten seconds, a woman was robbed at gunpoint. She surrendered her purse with her cell phone inside it, and the robber drove away in a car. She later identified defendant Julius Smith as her assailant. Six weeks after the robbery, the State Police recovered the victim's cell phone when they arrested a third person. Law enforcement officers contacted the victim, but the prosecutor and local police did not learn about the discovery of the phone until the middle of defendant s trial -- fifteen months later. Defense counsel twice moved for a mistrial to investigate this critical information. The trial court took alternate measures to try to remedy the belated disclosure but denied defendant's motion. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court found that it was an abuse of discretion not to grant a mistrial, particularly in light of the materiality of the evidence that surfaced mid-trial, defendant's inability to investigate it while the short trial proceeded, and the nature and strength of the evidence against defendant. The Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division, which affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Jersey v. Smith" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New Jersey v. Pierre
In 1996, defendant Duquene Pierre was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree felony murder, and several other offenses, arising from a fatal shooting in Elizabeth. Defendant was one of several suspects arrested for the shooting. He maintained that when the crime occurred at 3:19 a.m. on March 20, 1994, he and one of his codefendants were not in New Jersey, but on their way to Florida to visit defendant's relatives. This appeal stems from the denial of defendant's application for post-conviction relief (PCR), based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. In evidentiary hearings before the PCR court, defendant presented evidence that, if called to testify, his brother Kirby Pierre and sister Astrid Pierre would have stated that in March 1994, Kirby did not know how to drive and did not travel to Florida. Defendant also presented evidence that the remainder of Reid s telephone bill, not offered into evidence at trial, would have supported his contention that he was in Florida in the days that followed the Elizabeth shooting. Finally, three of defendant's relatives testified that defendant visited each of them in Florida in March 1994, but defendant's trial counsel did not contact them to ascertain their knowledge of those visits. The PCR court denied defendant's PCR application, and the Appellate Division affirmed that determination. By virtue of the combined errors of his trial counsel, the Supreme Court reversed the PCR and the appellate courts' decisions denying relief, finding that defendant was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution. The Court concluded defendant was entitled to a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Pierre" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New Jersey v. R.P.
In June 2005, O.M. disclosed that her stepfather, defendant R.P., sexually abused her beginning when she was twelve years old. The abuse resulted in two pregnancies, one of which was terminated and one of which resulted in the birth of M.M. when O.M. was sixteen or seventeen years old. Following DNA testing of O.M., M.M., and defendant, M.M.'s DNA profile was consistent with that of an offspring of O.M. and defendant. A Grand Jury returned a superseding indictment charging defendant with first-degree aggravated sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while she was less than thirteen years old; first-degree aggravated sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while she was at least thirteen but less than sixteen years old, and defendant was related to O.M. by affinity; first-degree aggravated sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while using physical force or coercion, and O.M. sustained severe personal injury; and second-degree sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while she was at least sixteen but less than eighteen years old. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault (count two), first-degree aggravated sexual assault (count three), and second-degree sexual assault (count four); the jury was unable to reach a verdict on count one, first-degree aggravated sexual assault. Defendant was sentenced to a twenty-six-year aggregate term of imprisonment with a thirteen-year period of parole ineligibility. Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial court committed plain error by failing to charge the jury on second-degree sexual assault as a lesser-included offense of first-degree aggravated sexual assault (count three). The appellate panel determined that because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have convicted defendant of second-degree sexual assault, the trial court's failure to issue such an instruction on count three was plain error. The panel reversed the conviction on count three, remanded for a new trial on that charge, and vacated defendant's sentence. The panel did not comment on the State's request that the verdict be molded to reflect a conviction for second-degree sexual assault as to count three. The State then moved for reconsideration and clarification as to whether the Appellate Division considered the State's contention that the verdict on count three should be molded to a conviction for second-degree sexual assault. The Appellate Division denied reconsideration without explanation. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that defendant was "given his day in court," that all the elements of sexual assault were included in the crime of aggravated sexual assault, and that there was no prejudice to defendant. The Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the matter to the trial court for entry of judgment against defendant on the lesser-included offense of second-degree sexual assault (count three) and for resentencing. View "New Jersey v. R.P." on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New Jersey v. Watts
A warrant secured by the police authorized a no-knock entry and search of defendant Antoine Watts' apartment and a search of defendant for controlled dangerous substances. Before executing the search warrant, police officers waited until defendant left his apartment. The officers detained defendant one and one-half blocks away on a busy urban street, frisking him for weapons and taking his apartment keys to avoid a forced entry of his residence. The officers decided not to conduct a more intrusive search of his person in public view. Defendant was then placed in an unmarked police car and taken back to his apartment. After defendant exited the vehicle, four bundles of heroin fell from the leg of his pants. Defendant moved to suppress the drugs, claiming that the police were forbidden from conducting a second search of his person after the pat down on the street. After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion, finding that the police acted unreasonably, and therefore unconstitutionally, by exposing defendant to successive searches. The court suppressed the drugs, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether police acted unconstitutionally unreasonably. The Court held that the police did not act in an objectively unreasonable manner in violation of our Federal and State Constitutions. "The initial search was limited in scope and did not bar the police from moving defendant to a more controlled location to complete the search for drugs in accordance with the warrant. We therefore reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings." View "New Jersey v. Watts" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New Jersey v. Witt
Defendant William Witt was charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person. The police initiated a stop of defendant’s car because he did not dim his high beams when necessary, and a search of his vehicle uncovered the handgun. Defendant moved to suppress the gun on the ground that the police conducted an unreasonable search in violation of the New Jersey Constitution. Defendant’s sole argument was that the police did not have exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search of his car under “New Jersey v. Pena-Flores,” (198 N.J.6 (2009)). The Appellate Division granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal and affirmed the suppression of the gun because of the “utter absence” of any exigency to support the warrantless vehicle search that occurred, and because there was no justification for this motor vehicle stop. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed, holding that exigent-circumstances standard set forth in “Pena-Flores: was “unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.” View "New Jersey v. Witt" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law