Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Officers were dispatched to a report of domestic violence when a woman called 911 to report that she had been assaulted and that she was outside in her vehicle. The woman did not give her name or that of the attacker, but did supply an address. Two officers proceeded directly to the indicated address. When defendant-appellant Charles Bryant, Jr. answered, the officers told him to take a seat on the couch. Bryant complied, and the two officers entered his home. While one officer questioned Bryant, the other conducted a protective sweep of the apartment, searching any place that potentially could harbor a person. During the course of the protective sweep, the officer spotted what he believed to be marijuana sticking out of a box on a closet shelf. The item was seized, Bryant was arrested and removed from his apartment, and a search warrant was obtained. Officers searching pursuant to the warrant found an assault weapon, approximately fifty-five grams of marijuana, and marijuana packaging materials. Bryant was charged with fourth-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, third-degree possession with intent to distribute, second-degree unlawful possession of an assault firearm, and second-degree possession of a firearm. Bryant was separately charged with second-degree persons not to possess a firearm. Bryant moved to suppress all of the evidence seized from the apartment as fruit of an illegal search. The trial court denied this motion, finding that the officers were lawfully present in the apartment and that, because they did not know whether the man who answered the door was the suspect, or whether the suspect was elsewhere in the apartment, the officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the area could be harboring an individual posing danger. After determining that the protective sweep doctrine obviated the need for a warrant, the trial could found that the marijuana located during the sweep was in plain view. The Appellate Division affirmed on substantially the grounds stated by the trial court. The Supreme Court, in its review of this case, focused on the guidelines surrounding law enforcement’s use of a warrantless protective sweep when investigating allegations of criminal activity. Under the circumstances here, the Court found that the law enforcement officers did not “adhere to the rigorous standards for proceeding without a warrant under the protective sweep doctrine.” Accordingly, the evidence obtained because of their impermissible search had to be suppressed. The Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded this matter back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Defendant Xiomara Gonzales appealed the denial of her motion to suppress evidence seized by police from the vehicle she was driving. Pursuant to an ongoing investigation of a drug-distribution scheme, the police learned that Gonzales and a codefendant were going to retrieve a package that day that the Prosecutor’s Office suspected would contain a large quantity of heroin. After Gonzales and the codefendant made two stops in separate cars, the codefendant placed two blue plastic bags on Gonzales’s back seat, and Gonzales headed toward the Garden State Parkway. Two officers followed Gonzales. They saw her speed, turn left on a red light, and pass through a toll on the Parkway without paying. The officers pulled her over to the shoulder of the road. As an officer approached Gonzales’s car, he saw that items had spilled from the blue bags onto the rear floorboard. He immediately identified the spilled items as bricks of heroin. Gonzales was arrested and the bags sealed. At a secure site, it was determined that the bags contained 270 bricks of heroin. Gonzales was charged with first-degree distribution of more than five ounces of heroin, first-degree possession of heroin with the intent to distribute, third-degree possession of heroin, and second-degree conspiracy to commit racketeering. Gonzales moved to suppress the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, determining that the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless seizure of the heroin. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that though the motor-vehicle stop was constitutional and the police officer was lawfully in position to view the drugs inside the vehicle, the officer had advance knowledge that drugs would be in the vehicle, the discovery was not inadvertent. On that basis, the panel determined that the warrantless seizure of the drugs was not authorized under the plain-view exception. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding that the inadvertence requirement for a plain-view seizure was “at odds with the objective-reasonableness standard that governs our state-law constitutional jurisprudence:” “we now hold that an inadvertent discovery of contraband or evidence of a crime is no longer a predicate for a plain-view seizure. [If] a police officer is lawfully in the viewing area and the nature of the evidence is immediately apparent (and other constitutional prerequisites are met), the evidence may be seized. [. . .] the discovery of the drugs in this case was sufficiently inadvertent to satisfy the then existing plain-view standard.” View "New Jersey v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review was whether a trial court that found a defendant competent to stand trial on criminal charges could compel her to assert an insanity defense, based on the evidence presented, where she has refused to do so. Through persistent efforts over more than a decade, defendant June Gorthy attempted to commence a relationship with C.L., a mental health therapist residing in New Jersey whom she met only briefly in 1998 at a conference in California. Defendant would ultimately be charged under a superseding indictment with stalking and weapons offenses. After reviewing defendant's medical records and mental health evaluation, and questioning defendant, the trial court concluded that she was competent to stand trial. Defendant declined to raise the insanity defense, over the objection of her attorney. The trial court concluded that defendant's delusional condition had limited her ability to knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily determine whether to raise the defense, and then asserted the defense on her behalf on the stalking charge. Defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity on that charge, and convicted on the weapons charges. The court entered an order of civil commitment on the stalking charge, and probation on the weapons convictions. Defendant appealed her conviction, challenging the trial court's decision to assert the insanity defense on her behalf, and also raising several trial errors. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's judgment on the insanity defense, and remanded for a bifurcated hearing on the insanity defense and the substantive defenses. The Supreme Court summarily remanded for reconsideration as to the insanity defense in light of the Court's disapproval of bifurcated proceedings where an insanity defense was raised. On the remand, another panel of the Appellate Division, in a published opinion, affirmed the trial court's judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity on the stalking charge. The panel rejected defendant's contention that because she was found competent to stand trial, the court should have permitted her to decline to raise the insanity defense, holding that a defendant's determination not to raise a defense was subject to a higher standard than that set by the competency statute. The Supreme Court held that in light of the trial court's finding that defendant was competent to stand trial, and the court's detailed explanation of the potential benefits and risks of the insanity defense in a colloquy with defendant, the trial court should have permitted defendant to decide whether or not to assert the defense. "However unwise defendant's strategy may have been, it constituted a competent defendant's decision about the conduct of her defense." Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity on the stalking charge. The case was remanded for a new competency determination and, if appropriate, a new trial on that charge. Because defendant's delusion was unrelated to her conviction for the two weapons offenses, and the trial errors that she alleged did not deprive her of a fair trial, the Supreme Court affirmed her conviction for those offenses. View "New Jersey v. Gorthy" on Justia Law

What began as a fight between two students, C.W. and D.W., ended in the death of one of them. N.H., who was seventeen years old at the time, attended the fight to support his friend, D.W. N.H. allegedly grabbed a handgun from another individual and shot C.W. four times, including once in the back of the head. A video captured parts of the incident, and several witnesses made statements to the police that implicated N.H. N.H. also spoke to the police and said that he had shot only at the ground. At oral argument before the New Jersey Supreme Court, the State explained that it had not disclosed certain items in its possession which it did not intend to rely on at the waiver hearing. Those materials included additional witness statements, other police reports, and other videos of the event taken from different angles. N.H. moved for full discovery before the waiver hearing, and the trial court granted the request. The court analogized the filing of a juvenile complaint to the filing of a criminal indictment, which would trigger full discovery under Rule 3:13-3(b). The trial court stayed its order pending the outcome of the State's motion for leave to appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's order. The issue raised by the State's appeal in this matter was whether a juvenile was entitled to full discovery when the State sought to waive jurisdiction and transfer a case from juvenile to adult court. The Supreme Court held the State is indeed required to disclose all discovery in its possession when it seeks to waive jurisdiction and transfer a case from juvenile to adult court. View "New Jersey in the Interest of N.H." on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Cushing was indicted on five counts: first-degree maintaining a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) production facility (count one); second-degree possession of marijuana with intent to distribute ten or more but less than fifty marijuana plants (count two); second-degree possession of marijuana with intent to distribute within 500 feet of a public park (count three); third-degree possession of marijuana with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property (count four); and fourth-degree failure to notify law enforcement of a change of employment as required under Megan's Law (count five). Lisa Mylroie called police to have defendant removed from the home of her 85-year-old mother, Betty Cushing. Ms. Cushing was not at home when police answered the call and arrived at her home; Mylroie invited the responding officer inside, and led the officer to defendant's bedroom where the marijuana was. After seeing the bedroom, the responding officer called the station to obtain a search warrant. In executing the search warrant, police seized from defendant's bedroom sixteen marijuana plants, several five-gallon buckets used to hold the plants, ventilation units, and drug paraphernalia. Officers also seized a Ziploc bag of marijuana that was discovered in a backyard shed. After the trial court conducted a hearing and denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his bedroom in his grandmother's home where he resided, defendant negotiated a plea agreement. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to counts two through five in exchange for the dismissal of count one. The trial court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed on the issue of suppression. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification on the validity of the third-party consent to search. The State argued that Betty Cushing had actual authority to consent to the search of defendant's room, which flowed to Mylroie through her power of attorney. The State also contended that Mylroie had apparent authority as well, on which the police reasonably relied under the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed: the record contained "ample evidence" to support the Appellate Division's conclusion that Betty Cushing did not have actual authority to consent to the search of defendant's room, and Betty could not have conferred through any power of attorney an authority that she did not possess herself. In addition, it was not objectively reasonable for the responding officer to rely on an apparent authority by Mylroie as the basis for valid third-party consent to his initial search of defendant's bedroom. View "New Jersey v. Cushing" on Justia Law

The police arrested defendant Gary Lunsford after they executed a search warrant at his home based on suspected criminal activity involving transactions in controlled dangerous substances (CDS). As part of its continuing investigation, the Monmouth County Grand Jury issued a subpoena duces tecum to a wireless telephone service provider requesting subscriber information associated with defendant's cell phone number, which was the contact for the controlled drug buys that led to defendant's arrest. Defendant filed a motion to quash, which the trial court granted, stating that a communications data warrant (CDW - the equivalent of a search warrant), was needed to obtain telephone billing records. The Attorney General, who superseded the Monmouth County Prosecutor s Office to litigate the constitutional question raised by the trial court's decision, sought leave to appeal, which the Appellate Division denied. On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Attorney General did not dispute that telephone billing records were entitled to protection under the State Constitution. He argued instead that a grand jury subpoena, based on a relevancy standard rather than probable cause, was sufficient to safeguard the privacy rights at stake here. "Using a cell phone to determine the location of its owner can be far more revealing than acquiring toll billing, bank, or Internet subscriber records. It is akin to using a tracking device and can function as a substitute for 24/7 surveillance without police having to confront the limits of their resources. It also involves a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not anticipate." Here, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of the motion to quash, noting that the State could apply for a court order to obtain defendant's cell phone records consistent with the Court's discussion of protected privacy interests in this opinion. View "New Jersey v. Lunsford" on Justia Law

Officer Cohen observed a vehicle approaching from about a quarter-mile away. The vehicle was traveling with its high beams on at a normal speed in a well-lit, residential area. The vehicle obeyed the stop sign at the intersection of New York Avenue and Adams Street. Using the strobe light attachment on his flashlight, Officer Cohen signaled to the driver to pull over. Officer Cohen intended to educate the driver on the proper use of high beams. As Officer Cohen approached the driver's side of the vehicle, and instead of a warning to turn off her high beams, instructed her to produce her license, registration, and insurance cards. With the driver's-side window down, Officer Cohen could smell burnt marijuana. He then walked around the vehicle, asked defendant, the front passenger, to roll down the window, and detected a stronger odor of burnt marijuana. Officer Cohen asked defendant and the rear passenger whether they had any controlled dangerous substance on them, and both replied, No. While engaged in this exchange, Officer Cohen noticed inside the vehicle a hollowed-out cigar, which, from his experience and training, he knew was used as a receptacle for marijuana. Based on this observation, Officer Cohen told defendant to step out of the car. In response, defendant indicated that he had a gun under his jacket. The officer ordered defendant to keep his hands up while he retrieved the weapon. Defendant was placed under arrest, and the driver was later issued a ticket for a violation of the high-beam statute. Defendant was later charged with unlawful possession of a .40 caliber handgun, receiving stolen property (the handgun), possession of hollow-nose bullets, and possession of a large-capacity magazine. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the handgun, the bullets, and the magazine on the ground that the police did not have a constitutionally permissible basis for stopping the car in which he was a passenger. The court granted the motion, observing that the high-beam statute presupposed that the offending driver's high beams were on when his vehicle approaches an oncoming vehicle. Here, Officer Cohen testified that he did not observe any other vehicle traveling in the opposite direction toward defendant's vehicle. The court also concluded that the stop could not be justified based on the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the State appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed both the trial court's and Appellate Division's judgments. View "New Jersey v. Scriven" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Stein was charged with DWI and careless driving after a motor vehicle accident in Wayne Township. The municipal court found defendant guilty of DWI and careless driving. The court based its DWI finding on breathalyzer readings and the arresting officers' observations of defendant at the time of his traffic stop. The court sentenced defendant, as a third-time DWI offender, to incarceration for a term of 180 days in the county jail and loss of his license for a period of ten years. After a trial de novo on the record, the Law Division also convicted defendant of DWI and careless driving, based on the breathalyzer readings and, separately, on observational evidence. The court imposed the same sentence as did the municipal court. Additionally, the Law Division ruled that the municipal prosecutor was not required to provide discovery of the names of the neighboring police officers or the videotapes that defendant requested. The Appellate Division affirmed. Defendant appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. In accordance with Rule 7:7-7(b), the municipal prosecutor was required to provide defendant with the names of the police officers from the adjacent jurisdiction who were present at the DWI accident scene. Defendant, however, did not seek relief from the court pursuant to Rule 7:7-7(j). Here, the discovery issue was never truly placed before the municipal court. The court could not grant relief on an issue of which it was unaware. Defendant could not raise the purported discovery violation for the first time on appeal and therefore the issue was waived. Furthermore, the Court held that pursuant to Rule 7:7-7(b), the municipal prosecutor was required to provide the requested videotapes that may have recorded defendant's appearance, behavior, and motor skills. Such information, if available, was clearly relevant to a DWI defense. The Court could not determine from the record whether any such videotape ever existed or existed at the time of defendant's discovery request. Therefore, the case was remanded to the Law Division to conduct a hearing to address that issue. View "New Jersey v. Stein" on Justia Law

Defendant Stephen Scharf was convicted of first-degree purposeful and knowing murder of his wife Jody, who fell to her death off a cliff at the Palisades. Defendant defended the charge by claiming the death was an accident. At trial, the court allowed the State to present, in rebuttal to the defense of accident, hearsay statements, under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3) and (c)(4), from Jody s friends and her therapist. The witnesses claimed that Jody repeatedly told them of her fear of defendant, particularly after she had served him with a divorce complaint, and told them that she had declined defendant's request to go to the Palisades cliffs with him shortly before her death. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction, concluding that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statements. The State appealed, raising the issue of whether the trial court erred in admitting the statements, and if the evidence was admissible, whether the evidence, cumulatively, constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion that caused defendant's trial to be unjust. Finding that the Appellate Division erred in reversing the trial court's judgment of conviction, the Supreme Court reversed, and the matter remanded for consideration of defendant's unaddressed appellate arguments. View "New Jersey v. Scharf" on Justia Law

Defendants Lixandra Hernandez and Jose G. Sanchez were charged in a State Grand Jury indictment with second-degree conspiracy to distribute more than five ounces of cocaine, first-degree distribution of more than five ounces of cocaine, second-degree distribution of cocaine within 500 feet of a public park, and third-degree possession of cocaine. The cooperating witness (the Witness) in defendants' case assisted the State in a number of drug investigations and prosecutions. In discovery, defendants were given the agreements between the State and the Witness in this case and in unrelated cases, and the State has represented that it would provide the defense with any known material false statements made by the Witness in those cases. Defendants nevertheless insisted that they were entitled to every statement made by the Witness in each case in which he has cooperated with the State, whether those statements are contained in a transcribed interview, recorded drug transaction, investigative report, or memorandum between members of the prosecutorial team. The trial court determined that such information, regardless of its lack of relevance, was discoverable under our court rules. The Appellate Division affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the discovery ordered by the trial court and Appellate Division exceeded the limits of Rule3:13-3(b) and was not supported by New Jersey jurisprudence. "Although our discovery rule generally requires that the State provide all evidence relevant to the defense of criminal charges, it does not open the door to foraging through files of other cases in search of relevant evidence. . . . The discovery order here requires disclosure of information not mandated by our discovery rule - information that has no ostensible relevance to the case to be tried." Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Hernandez" on Justia Law