Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A grand jury indicted defendant Carl Garrison on several counts of child sexual abuse. The charges stemmed from allegations of abuse against his girlfriend s daughter, Joan. Joan testified that defendant abused her throughout the summer of 2010, when she was eleven years old, both in Alabama and New Jersey. Prior to trial, defendant moved to exclude evidence of events that took place in Alabama as inadmissible other-crimes evidence under N.J.R.E.404(b). The State also presented an expert witness’ testimony who examined Joan and found no evidence of physical abuse. The trial court found that the evidence of what occurred in Alabama was admissible not as other-crimes evidence, but as intrinsic evidence of the charged crimes. The court provided limiting instructions to the jury at the time the evidence was introduced and in the final charge to the jury. The jury subsequently convicted defendant of three counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, two counts of second-degree sexual assault, and one count of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant received an aggregate sentence of fifty-two years in prison, with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility. Defendant appealed, arguing that evidence of events that allegedly took place in Alabama was improperly admitted. Although not raised below, defendant also contended that the admission of a portion of the expert’s statistics-based testimony was error. The Appellate Division reversed defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, rejecting the State’s contention that the Alabama evidence was intrinsic to the crimes charged and determined that this evidence should have been evaluated under N.J.R.E.404(b). The Appellate Division then concluded that the evidence failed to satisfy Rule404(b) and that its admission was not harmless error. In a footnote, the panel agreed that the expert’s testimony amounted to an improper opinion of Joan s credibility and constituted plain error. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the Alabama evidence was admissible and given an appropriate limiting instruction. View "New Jersey v. Garrison" on Justia Law

Before trial, defendant moved to exclude the results of a breath test in conjunction with a traffic stop, after which he was found to have been driving while intoxicated (DWI). His license was suspended. Defendant claimed that he was entitled to additional discovery, namely, more detailed repair records of the Alcotest device and data downloads of certain diagnostic tests. The municipal court judge found probable cause for the arrest and rejected defendant’s discovery arguments. The court found defendant guilty of DWI. The State dismissed the other charges. The court sentenced defendant to a total of $714 in fines and penalties, ordered him to serve twelve hours in the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center, and revoked his driving privileges for seven months, the minimum period for a first offender. Defendant requested, and without objection from the State, the municipal court judge stayed the license suspension for twenty days to allow defendant time to file an appeal. At a trial de novo before the Law Division, defendant again argued that the State failed to provide adequate discovery. The trial court rejected the claim, found defendant guilty, and imposed the same sentence. Defense counsel immediately moved to continue the stay of defendant’s license suspension, which the State opposed. The trial judge granted the request on the condition that defendant file an appeal within ten days. On appeal, defendant renewed his discovery argument. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division reviewed and rejected defendant s position. The Appellate Division also addressed an issue that the parties had not raised: both the municipal court and the Law Division stayed defendant’s license suspension pending appeal without providing any statement of reasons. Defendant filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court that did not challenge the conviction nor the sentence, only questioning the appropriate standards for a stay of judgment in a DWI case. Because defendant had completed his suspension, the standards outlined by the Supreme Court’s opinion did not apply. However, the standards announced by this opinion governed future requests for stay in a license suspension by municipal courts and the Law Division. View "New Jersey v. Robertson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged under separate indictments for multiple charges involving misconduct with two minors, D.H. and D.M. Defendant was arrested on November 19, 2009, and was confined until sentencing, which took place on August 22, 2012. In total, defendant spent 1007 days in pre-sentence custody. Defendant was sentenced on both indictments on August 22, 2012. For the aggravated sexual assault conviction, the court sentenced defendant to ten years imprisonment subject to an 85 percent parole ineligibility period. For the endangering the welfare of a child conviction, the court sentenced defendant to a concurrent term of three years imprisonment. The court applied 1007 days of jail credit to the sentences imposed under one of the indictments. The jail credits applied to the terms of imprisonment and to defendant's parole ineligibility period. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court was whether a defendant who was simultaneously sentenced to consecutive sentences on two separate indictments was entitled to the application of jail credit against both indictments. The Court held that a proper application the controlling caselaw entitled defendant to only 1007 total days of jail credit. Nothing warranted the application of double jail credit. "Instead, defendant's sentences should be viewed together and jail credit applied to the front end of the aggregate imprisonment term for both indictments." View "New Jersey v. C.H." on Justia Law

Although New Jersey prosecutors lodged an interstate detainer with New York officials on August 12, 2011, defendant William Joe was not transferred to New Jersey custody until after he was sentenced for the New York charges. Defendant pleaded guilty to the narcotics charges in New Jersey and sought jail credits for the time he spent in pre-sentence custody in New York. The trial court denied the credits sought, and sentenced defendant to two five-year prison terms subject to a twenty-one-month period of parole ineligibility. The sentences were to be served concurrently to each other and to any sentence defendant was serving outside of New Jersey. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether incarceration outside of New Jersey on out-of-state charges entitled defendant to jail credit. The Court answered that question in the negative. View "New Jersey v. Joe" on Justia Law

Defendant James Kucinski was arrested and taken to police headquarters for questioning about the bludgeoning death of his brother, John. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and he requested an attorney. The officers stopped the interrogation and met with their supervisor. After approximately eighty minutes they returned to the interview room and advised defendant that he was going to be charged with murder. Defendant then asked if he could speak with the officers. He was re-read his Miranda rights, which he waived. Defendant responded to a series of questions about events leading up to the fight and the injuries he sustained. As the interrogation went on, defendant continued to turn to other topics and to evade answering questions directly. Several times throughout the interrogation defendant answered questions with "I don't know." When asked how defendant felt about John's death, he said he would "rather just see a lawyer," and the interrogation ended. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statement to police and argued that the officers did not honor his invocation of the right to counsel. The court denied defendant's suppression motion, and the case proceeded to trial. The prosecutor asked one of the officers if defendant spoke in detail about the events on the day John died and if defendant was given an opportunity to explain what happened that day. When defense counsel objected, the trial judge sustained the objection but held that if defendant testified, the prosecutor would be permitted to cross-examine him on inconsistencies between his trial testimony and statements to police. Defendant elected to testify at trial and claimed to have acted in self-defense. On cross-examination, over defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor was permitted to question defendant about details defendant had testified to in his direct examination that contradicted what he said in his post-arrest statement to police. The prosecutor focused on details that defendant testified to but failed to mention to police during his interrogation. After further questioning by the prosecutor, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion but instructed the jury that defendant's right to remain silent should be limited to assessing defendant's credibility and may not be used to make the determination of guilt. Defense counsel did not object. The Appellate Division reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial, determining that the prosecutor's questions on cross-examination were improper. The panel found that defendant invoked his right to remain silent by telling the police that he did not want to talk about certain subjects and answer certain questions. The panel reasoned that, accordingly, the statements could not be used for any purpose, including impeachment. Further, the Appellate Division found the trial court's instructions to the jury were fatally flawed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division and affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Kucinski" on Justia Law

In April 2011, detectives were engaged in an undercover drug patrol in Woodbridge when they observed defendant Taiwan Bacome driving a blue Ford Bronco. S.R., the owner of the Bronco, was riding in the front passenger seat. Having previously encountered both men, detectives knew the men used and dealt narcotics. The police department had also received complaints from defendant's neighbors of a lot of traffic coming and going from [his] apartment, which, in the detectives' experience, is often indicative of narcotics activity. In their unmarked vehicle, the detectives followed the Bronco, losing sight of it shortly after arriving in an area of Newark known for crime and drug trafficking. In an attempt to pick up the Bronco's trail, the detectives drove back to Woodbridge, presuming that defendant and S.R. would return there with newly purchased drugs. About an hour later, the detectives observed the Bronco re-enter Woodbridge. The detectives resumed surveillance and, after they both observed S.R. in the passenger seat not wearing his seatbelt, they conducted a traffic stop. In this appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified the circumstances under which police officers may require a passenger in an automobile to exit a vehicle after a valid stop. The first detective reported that he saw defendant lean forward as if he were reaching under his seat and immediately ordered defendant to exit the vehicle. The second detective then ordered S.R. out of the passenger's seat. Both occupants complied. Defendant specifically challenged S.R.'s removal from the vehicle. The trial court found that defendant's reaching under the seat created the heightened caution that warranted S.R.'s removal. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the detectives failed to prove "heightened caution." The Supreme Court reversed, finding that while the heightened caution standard remained the proper test for determining the appropriateness of ordering a passenger from a car, defendant's movements inside the stopped car was an objectively reasonable basis to justify removal of the passenger. View "New Jersey v. Bacome" on Justia Law

In 1991 and 1992, defendant Rodney Bull was sentenced to two extended-term sentences, the second of which was imposed for crimes that occurred before defendant’s first sentencing took place. In 2012, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the plain language of N.J.S.A.2C:44-5(b)(1) prohibited the imposition of a second discretionary extended-term sentence for an offense committed before entry of the first extended-term sentence. There is no question that defendant’s second extended-term sentence would have been illegal under “New Jersey v. Hudson,” (209 N.J.513 (2012)). The question this case presented for the Court’s review was whether “Hudson” should be applied retroactively. The Court found “Hudson” : “illuminated a longstanding rule of law rather than announce[d] a new one.” The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s determination that “Hudson” applied retroactively. Defendant’s second extended-term sentence was remanded for re-sentencing. View "New Jersey v. Bull" on Justia Law

Police detectives observed defendant DeShaun Wilson engage in the apparent sale of crack cocaine in a public park in Elizabeth. Wilson was charged with third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, and second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute in or within 500 feet of a public park. During trial, the State sought to admit into evidence three related documents: a map of the park with a legend noting that the map was certified in 1998 by a Union County Engineer ; an affidavit by an assistant Union County prosecutor stating that he had personally worked with the Engineer in contracting a third party to produce maps depicting each 500-foot zone within the county; and Resolution No. 1513-99, passed by the Union County Board of Chosen Freeholders, depicting the 500-foot areas for the purposed of introducing the map as evidence of the locations and boundaries of those areas within Union County in criminal prosecutions under N.J.S.A.2C:35-7.1. Wilson objected to the admission of the three documents, arguing that the map had not been properly authenticated and that the affidavit was inadmissible hearsay. Wilson emphasized that he never had an opportunity to cross-examine the Union County prosecutor. The trial court disagreed and admitted the documents into evidence. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, and the court declared a mistrial. When the State moved to enter the map at the retrial, defense counsel objected that the map was inadmissible. The trial court admitted all three documents into evidence. Wilson was convicted of all charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the map was nontestimonial and that its admission did not violate Wilson’s confrontation rights. The Supreme Court agreed that the map was nontestimonial and its admission therefore did not violate Wilson’s confrontation rights. Further, such maps are admissible, if properly authenticated and as public records. However, the Court found the map was not properly authenticated and the Supreme Court felt constrained to reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment that the map was properly admitted into evidence at trial. The matter was remanded for a new trial because defendant’s conviction depended on the map. View "New Jersey v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The defendants in these appeals committed very serious, violent crimes when they were juveniles. One was serving a sentence of 110 years imprisonment and would not be eligible for parole until he spent 55 years in jail. At that time, he would be about 72 years old. The second was serving a 75-year term and was ineligible for parole until he served 68 years and 3 months in jail. He would then be 85 years old. The United States Supreme Court recognized the mitigating qualities of youth and directed that judges in those cases consider a number of factors at sentencing, including immaturity and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; family and home environment; family and peer pressures; an inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors or the juvenile s own attorney; and the possibility of rehabilitation. The New Jersey Court found the same concerns applied to sentences that were the practical equivalent of life without parole, like the ones in these appeals. "The proper focus belongs on the amount of real time a juvenile will spend in jail and not on the formal label attached to his sentence. To satisfy the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 12 of the State Constitution, which both prohibit cruel and unusual punishment, we direct that defendants be resentenced and that the 'Miller' factors be addressed at that time. [. . .] In short, judges should exercise a heightened level of care before they impose multiple consecutive sentences on juveniles which would result in lengthy jail terms." Both cases were remanded for resentencing. View "New Jersey v. Zuber" on Justia Law

Defendant J.R. was convicted for several sexual offenses against his step-granddaughter, who was between ten and twelve years old when the alleged offenses took place. The child did not disclose defendant's conduct to any adult; she told only her brothers, one of whom revealed the allegations to their mother almost two years after the abuse began. At defendant’s trial, the State proffered the testimony of a Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) expert to opine that child victims of sexual offenses sometimes delay reporting sexual abuse and to explain other aspects of victims' behavior. The trial court denied defendant's motion to bar the testimony. Testifying as the State’s first witness, the expert properly refrained from discussing the specific victim in this case. She told the jury, however, that studies of confirmed child victims of sexual abuse have reported a broad array of behaviors, ranging from a cooperative demeanor and academic success to disruptive and sadistic conduct, including in that broad description behaviors exhibited by the alleged victim in this case. The expert also invoked a highly publicized child sexual abuse scandal in her testimony. Defendant testified on his own behalf. He was convicted of all charges. Defendant appealed his conviction, raising the CSAAS expert’s opinion as his primary issue on appeal. An Appellate Division panel reversed his conviction on the ground that the CSAAS expert exceeded the bounds of proper expert opinion on that subject. The panel remanded for a new trial. After its review, the Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division panel that the expert's testimony did not entirely conform to the limitations placed on CSAAS evidence in prior New Jersey Supreme Court holdings. However, the Court concluded that the error was harmless: "[v]iewed in the context of all of the trial evidence heard by the jury, the CSAAS expert's improper statements were not clearly capable of producing an unjust result and do not warrant a new trial." Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for the Appellate Division panel to consider issues raised by defendant that the panel did not reach. View "New Jersey v. J.R." on Justia Law