Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In August 2018, Thomas Zingis was charged with careless driving and driving while under the influence (DWI). He had a prior DWI conviction from April 2012. In December 2018, the municipal court found Zingis guilty of DWI and sentenced him as a second offender, based on his 2012 conviction. Zingis argued that his first conviction should be disregarded because the State failed to prove it was not based on a Dennis-calibrated Alcotest, referencing the State v. Cassidy decision. The municipal court accepted the prosecutor's representation that Camden was not affected by Dennis's misconduct and sentenced Zingis as a second offender.On appeal, the Law Division also found Zingis guilty and upheld the second-offender sentence. However, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction but vacated the enhanced sentence, ruling that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Zingis’s 2012 conviction was not based on an inadmissible Alcohol Influence Report (AIR). The case was remanded to a Special Adjudicator to determine which counties were affected by Dennis’s conduct and what notification was provided to affected defendants.The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the case and adopted the Special Adjudicator’s findings with modifications. The Court held that in any case where the State seeks an enhanced sentence based on a prior DWI conviction during the period of Dennis’s misconduct, the State must provide discovery to the defendant, including data from Exhibit S-152 and the Dennis Calibration Repository. If the prior conviction involved a Dennis-calibrated Alcotest, the defendant must be given the opportunity to challenge the conviction through post-conviction relief (PCR). The Court also ordered that Exhibit S-152, redacted to exclude personal identifiers, be made publicly available. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed, and the case was remanded to the municipal court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "State v. Zingis" on Justia Law

In March 2019, emergency personnel responded to a call at Arlo's home, where they found his two-year-old son, Daniel, unresponsive. Daniel was taken to the hospital and underwent emergency surgery for severe injuries, including a skull fracture and subdural hemorrhage. Arlo and his girlfriend, Tiffany, claimed Daniel had tripped and fallen. However, medical professionals found the injuries inconsistent with their account. The Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) removed Daniel from Arlo's custody, and Arlo was charged with endangering the welfare of a child. A grand jury later declined to indict Arlo, and his criminal records were expunged.The Division filed a Title 9 action seeking custody of Daniel. During the proceedings, the Division sought to use Arlo's expunged criminal records, arguing they were essential for the abuse and neglect factfinding trial. The trial court granted the Division's motion, finding good cause and compelling need based on specific facts, and noting the confidential nature of the Title 9 trial. Arlo appealed, but the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the Division met the statutory requirements for using the expunged records.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the Division demonstrated good cause and compelling need based on specific facts, as the criminal and civil proceedings concerned the same incident, and the expunged records were crucial due to the lack of other witnesses and Daniel's inability to recount the incident. The Court also noted that the use of the records was limited to the Title 9 trial and subject to confidentiality protections. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. A.P." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a Megan's Law registrant, R.S., who was convicted of sexually molesting his granddaughter. R.S. was sentenced to four years at the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center at Avenel (Avenel) after a psychological examination concluded that his criminal sexual behavior was performed compulsively. In 2022, the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office sought to classify R.S. as a Tier Two offender (moderate risk of reoffense) and sought community notification with additional internet publication. R.S. challenged this proposal, arguing that he was never found to have engaged in “repetitive and compulsive” behavior by clear and convincing evidence as required for inclusion on the internet registry.The Megan’s Law judge ordered Tier Two community notification, including internet publication, stating that R.S. would not have been eligible to serve his sentence at Avenel if he was not found to be repetitive and compulsive. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, determining that the Megan’s Law judge correctly found, based on clear and convincing evidence, that R.S.’s conduct was compulsive and repetitive.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(b)(2), a Megan’s Law registrant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if the registrant demonstrates that there exists a genuine issue of material fact about whether the registrant’s conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior. The State may rely on an earlier psychological report that had been prepared pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3, but the independent findings by a Megan’s Law judge as to compulsivity and repetitiveness must be based on clear and convincing evidence. The judgment of the Appellate Division was vacated as to the single issue before the Court and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Registrant R.S." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Andrew Higginbotham, who was charged with sixteen counts of endangering the welfare of a child under a specific subsection of New Jersey law. This law makes it a crime to depict a child in a sexually suggestive manner for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification, where the depiction lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The charges arose from photographs Higginbotham had distributed of a five-year-old girl, over which he superimposed sexually explicit, obscene text. Higginbotham moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the law was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.The trial court denied Higginbotham's motion, but the Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that the definitions of "portray a child in a sexually suggestive manner" were unconstitutionally overbroad because they criminalized images that were neither child pornography nor obscenity. The case was then brought to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the specific subsection of the law under which Higginbotham was charged was unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalized a large amount of material that was neither obscenity nor child pornography. The court did not reach a decision on whether the law was also unconstitutionally vague. The court did not comment on the validity of other subsections of the law, as Higginbotham was not charged under those subsections and did not challenge them. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision as modified and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "State of New Jersey v. Higginbotham" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Kalil Cooper, who was charged with promoting organized street crime, among other offenses, after a wiretap investigation into a local gang's activities. He was charged with twelve separate counts, including two counts of racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering, and one count of promoting organized street crime. The promoting count charged that Cooper "purposefully conspire[d] with others... to commit a continuing series of crimes which constitute a pattern of racketeering activity." However, Cooper objected to this count, arguing that the "pattern of racketeering activity" was not a predicate offense under the promoting statute.The trial court agreed with Cooper's argument but instead of striking the charge, it amended the indictment to incorporate other offenses relevant to the racketeering charge as predicate offenses to the promoting charge. The jury found Cooper guilty of four counts, including the promoting charge, with conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) found as the predicate offense for promoting.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that conspiracy to distribute CDS is not a listed predicate offense under the promoting statute, and as such, Cooper's conviction for a crime that does not exist must be vacated. The court reasoned that the jury instruction in this case erroneously departed from the list of permissible predicate offenses in the promoting statute, leading the jury to convict Cooper for a crime that does not exist. This was deemed a manifest injustice. Hence, the court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and vacated the jury's verdict on the promoting count without a remand. View "State v. Cooper" on Justia Law

In this case, an eight-year-old child disclosed during an interview with a detective in 2016 that her music teacher, defendant Donnie E. Harrell, had touched her inappropriately on multiple occasions during school hours. In 2019, a grand jury indicted Harrell on charges of sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child, with additional official misconduct charges added in a superseding indictment later that year. In 2021, the trial court approved the admission of the child's entire recorded statement under the "tender years" hearsay exception. However, while preparing for trial in 2022, the child could not recall most of the events she had originally reported.The trial court decided to limit her trial testimony to the one incident she recalled, ruling that her lack of memory rendered her unavailable for cross-examination on the incidents she could not recall, which would violate the defendant's right of confrontation. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, stating that the defendant's right of confrontation was not dependent on the child's ability to recall the details, but on the defendant's opportunity to probe her lack of recollection on cross-examination.The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division, holding that the admission of the child's entire video-recorded statement does not violate the Confrontation Clause as long as the child testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination, even if she doesn't recall all the details. The court also emphasized that it is essential for the State to act expeditiously in investigating and prosecuting matters that rely heavily on a young child's ability to recall events, to avoid memory decay over time. View "State v. Harrell" on Justia Law

In 2017, defendant Shlawrence Ross was indicted for attempted murder and other offenses following an alleged exchange of gunfire with police officers. During the incident, he was wounded and a bullet lodged in his abdomen. In 2022, on advice of his counsel, he underwent elective surgery to remove the bullet. The state applied for a search warrant to obtain the removed bullet from the hospital and sought all medical records regarding the defendant’s treatment. The trial court denied the applications, reasoning that the bullet was shielded from the State’s access as it resulted from defence counsel’s “conscious litigation choice”. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision, stating that the Fourth Amendment, concerning search and seizure, rather than the Sixth Amendment and reciprocal discovery rules, was the appropriate legal framework.The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment. It held that the proper analysis for determining whether the State can obtain this physical evidence rests within the principles of search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Amendment would preclude issuing a valid search warrant for the bullet in this case, and the trial court should have determined whether there exists probable cause on which to issue such a warrant. The case was remanded back to the trial court for a determination of probable cause. View "State v. Ross" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in its decision, examined whether the State can obtain from defense counsel an affidavit that is physical evidence of a crime, under New Jersey discovery rules. The case revolves around a murder where two witnesses identified the defendant, Isaiah J. Knight, as the shooter. Later, one of the witnesses was allegedly kidnapped and forced to write an affidavit recanting his original statement. The prosecution believed the defendant's alleged co-conspirators gave this affidavit to the defense counsel. The State filed a motion to compel discovery of this document, which was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Appellate Division.The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the sought-after affidavit is physical evidence of the crimes of witness tampering and kidnapping for which the defendant and others have been charged. Therefore, it is subject to reciprocal discovery under Rule 3:3-13(b)(2)(B) and (D). The Court reasoned that the affidavit, allegedly the outcome of a kidnapping and witness intimidation plot, is not the product of the defense investigation or attorney work product and hence does not fall within the exception to the discovery obligations. The Court found that compelling defense counsel to turn over an item in his possession that is physical evidence of a crime does not trigger the same Sixth Amendment concerns. The Court also rejected the defendant's argument that compelling the discovery of this affidavit violates his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. View "State v. Knight" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that the State's witness tampering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a), is not unconstitutionally overbroad, but it may have been unconstitutionally applied to the defendant, William Hill, in this case. Hill was initially convicted of first-degree carjacking and third-degree witness tampering. While detained awaiting trial, Hill sent a letter to the carjacking victim, A.Z., asserting his innocence and asking her to reconsider her identification of him as the perpetrator. A.Z. reported the letter to the police, resulting in a charge of witness tampering. The court concluded that Hill's letter did not explicitly ask A.Z. to testify falsely or withhold testimony, leading the Supreme Court of New Jersey to rule that it may have been unconstitutionally applied in Hill's case. The court vacated Hill's witness tampering conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge, but did not vacate his carjacking conviction. View "State v. Hill" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Curtis Gartrell fled from police near Newark Penn Station, leaving behind a suitcase containing handguns, ammunition, illegal narcotics, and cash. Gartrell was later apprehended and charged with possessory offenses and resisting arrest. He filed a motion to suppress evidence recovered from the warrantless search of the suitcase, arguing that he did not abandon the suitcase and therefore maintained standing to challenge the search. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that Gartrell's flight did not indicate an intention to abandon the suitcase. The State appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, holding that Gartrell had abandoned the suitcase.The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court applied the three-factor test from State v. Carvajal, which assesses (1) whether a person has control or dominion over the property, (2) whether the person knowingly and voluntarily relinquishes any possessory or ownership interest in the property, and (3) whether there are other apparent or known owners of the property. The court found that Gartrell's flight from police and deliberate abandonment of the suitcase in a public place indicated a clear intent to relinquish his possessory interest in the bag. Furthermore, there was no evidence of anyone else's interest in the suitcase, including the person Gartrell referred to as "Spoon," who remained unidentified. Therefore, the court concluded that Gartrell lacked standing to challenge the seizure and search of the suitcase. View "State v. Gartrell" on Justia Law