Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In April 2018, a seventeen-year-old civilian called police and reported that she had saw a man, later identified as defendant William Gerena, exposing himself to a group of children at a playground. Police officers responded to the scene and saw defendant sitting on a bench facing the playground, with his penis exposed and erect. Defendant was charged with second-degree sexual assault by contact and fourth-degree lewdness, which both required the State to prove that at least one of the victims was under the age of thirteen. At trial, one of the police officers and the civilian eyewitness recounted to the jury what they had saw at the park. The officer estimated that the children were around three to thirteen years old and that the smallest child appeared to be no higher than his waist. The civilian testified that the children were approximately six to fifteen years old and that the shortest child appeared no taller than her hip. Over defendant’s objection, the trial court admitted the witnesses’ lay opinions about the children’s ages and heights. The State relied on that testimony to prove that one or more of the children was under the age of thirteen, and the jury found defendant guilty of fourth-degree lewdness. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the two witnesses had an adequate opportunity to view the physical characteristics and activities of the group of children to enable them to provide lay opinions about the perceived ranges of the children’s heights and ages. The issue presented on appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion in admitting the eyewitnesses' lay opinions. Finding no such abuse, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment. View "New Jersey v. Gerena" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ernest Bozzi requested copies of defendant Jersey City’s most recent dog license records pursuant to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) and the common law right of access. Plaintiff, a licensed home improvement contractor, sought the information on behalf of his invisible fence installation business. Plaintiff noted that Jersey City could redact information relating to the breed of the dog, the purpose of the dog, and any phone numbers associated with the records. He sought only the names and addresses of the dog owners. Jersey City denied plaintiff’s request on two grounds: (1) the disclosure would be a violation of the citizens’ reasonable expectation of privacy, contrary to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, by subjecting the dog owners to unsolicited commercial contact; and (2) such a disclosure may jeopardize the security of both dog-owners’ and non-dog-owners’ property. The trial court found the dog licensing records were not exempt and ordered Jersey City to provide the requested information. The New Jersey Supreme Court concurred, concluding that owning a dog was a substantially public endeavor in which people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that exempted their personal information from disclosure under the privacy clause of OPRA. View "Bozzi v. City of Jersey City" on Justia Law

Mark Melvin was indicted on nine counts in connection with a fatal shooting in a restaurant, including charges of murder, aggravated assault, and weapon possession and drug offenses. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Melvin guilty of unlawful possession of a handgun but remained deadlocked on the outstanding counts. The Appellate Division affirmed Melvin’s conviction but remanded the matter for resentencing, holding that the sentencing judge incorrectly applied State v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) . . . and that a judge cannot act as a “thirteenth juror” by “substitut[ing] his judgment for that of the jury.” At the retrial of the deadlocked counts, Melvin was acquitted of murder and aggravated assault, and the State dismissed the drug charges. The same judge who presided over the first trial and sentencing handled Melvin’s retrial and resentencing, and again cited Watts in his determination that “the evidence at the trial support[ed] a conclusion that [Melvin] was the shooter of the two individuals” at the restaurant, adding, contrary to the jury’s verdict, that Melvin “not only . . . possess[ed] said weapon, but he used it to shoot upon three other human beings.” The trial court resentenced Melvin to an extended term, which the Appellate Division affirmed on appeal. Michelle Paden-Battle was indicted in connection with the murder of Regina Baker for offenses including kidnapping, murder, felony murder, gang criminality, and weapons offenses. After a trial (before the same judge who presided over Melvin’s trials and sentencings) the jury convicted Paden-Battle of kidnapping, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, and felony murder, and acquitted Paden-Battle of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and both weapons offenses. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed Paden-Battle’s convictions but vacated her sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing. The court concluded that there was “no doubt that the sentence was enhanced because the judge believed defendant ordered Baker’s execution,” “despite the jury verdict, [and] enhanced the sentence imposed.” The New Jersey Supreme Court consolidated the cases for review, and reversed in Melvin and affirmed in Paden-Battle. The Court found the jury’s verdict should have ensured that Melvin retained the presumption of innocence for any offenses of which he was acquitted. In finding Paden-Battle not guilty of the remaining offenses, however, the jury rejected the charges that Paden-Battle was guilty of first-degree murder or first-degree conspiracy to commit murder. "The findings of juries cannot be nullified through lower-standard fact findings at sentencing." View "New Jersey v. Melvin, Paden-Battle" on Justia Law

Wildemar Dangcil’s contended the hybrid jury-selection process implemented by the New Jersey Judiciary in response to the COVID-19 pandemic: (1) deprived him of his rights to presence and representation; and (2) failed to ensure him a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. Jury selection for defendant’s trial was scheduled for April 20, 2020, but was adjourned in light of the pandemic. On July 22, 2020, in coordination with representatives from the Attorney General’s Office, Office of the Public Defender, County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey, and New Jersey State Bar Association, the New Jersey Supreme Court established a plan to resume criminal and civil jury selections using a hybrid process intended to maintain the core components of pre-pandemic jury operations modified to protect the health and safety of jurors, attorneys, parties, and all court users. Defendant’s trial was Bergen County’s first to utilize the hybrid process. During the virtual phase of jury selection, defense counsel filed an Order to Show Cause challenging the array as not being drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. The trial court rejected the challenge. After the Appellate Division affirmed and remanded for resumption of the trial, defendant was convicted of multiple offenses, including attempted aggravated arson. He was sentenced to an aggregate eighteen-year term of imprisonment. The Supreme Court granted direct certification to address the issues defendant raised about the jury selection process. Though the challenge was to the new hybrid process, it was also directed at pre-pandemic practices -- notably, pre-voir dire juror excusals and deferrals -- that remained largely unchanged during the COVID-19 crisis. The Supreme Court held that the pre-voir dire disqualification, excusal, or deferral of jurors was not a stage at which defendant was entitled to be present or be represented, and that defendant failed to support his representative-cross-section claim. Therefore, the Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Dangcil" on Justia Law

Rasheem McQueen was arrested after driving off when Piscataway police officers attempted to stop him for traffic violations. At police headquarters, McQueen was permitted to make a call on a landline in the “report writing room.” No one told him the call would be recorded: no sign was posted warning that all calls were recorded; no one stood over McQueen to listen to the conversation, and he “mumbled on the phone, hiding what his conversation was.” Later that day, a detective recovered a gun found outside the home near where McQueen had been stopped, and became “suspicious” about the call McQueen had made from headquarters. Without securing a warrant or a subpoena, or consent from McQueen, detectives listened to McQueen’s recorded conversation. The recording revealed that McQueen called Myshira Allen-Brewer and told her to look for his “blicky” (slang for a handgun) near where the gun was found. McQueen was transferred to the Middlesex County Adult Correction Center, from where he made further telephone calls to Allen-Brewer on a clearly designated recorded line. During telephone calls placed from the Correction Center, an automated message advised parties their conversation was being recorded, and inmates received written notification of the warning. In their conversations, McQueen again told Allen-Brewer to look for the “blicky.” A recording of those Correction Center conversations was secured through a grand jury subpoena. Both McQueen and Allen-Brewer were indicted on multiple counts, and both moved to suppress their telephone conversations recorded by the Piscataway Police Department and the Correction Center. The motion judge suppressed the recorded calls and dismissed the indictment against Allen-Brewer. The Appellate Division reversed the suppression of the Correction Center calls and reinstated the charges against Allen-Brewer. The panel, however, split on the legality of the seizure of the police station call, with the majority affirming the suppression of that call. Only Allen-Brewer’s appeal went before the New Jersey Supreme Court, who reversed the Appellate Division: McQueen and Allen-Brewer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their conversation in the absence of fair notice that their conversation would be monitored or recorded. The recorded stationhouse telephone conversation was not seized pursuant to a warrant or any justifiable exigency and therefore should have been suppressed. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. McQueen" on Justia Law

Defendant Bennie Anderson was employed by Jersey City in the Tax Assessor’s office. His position gave him the opportunity to alter property tax descriptions without the property owner filing a formal application with the Zoning Board. In December 2012, defendant accepted a $300 bribe in exchange for altering the tax description of a property from a two-unit dwelling to a three-unit dwelling. Defendant retired from his position in March 2017 and was granted an early service retirement pension. In November 2017, defendant pled guilty in federal court to violating 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), interference with commerce by extortion under color of official right. Defendant was sentenced to two years of probation and ordered to pay a fine. Based on defendant’s conviction, the Employees’ Retirement System of Jersey City reduced his pension. The State filed an action in state court to compel the total forfeiture of defendant’s pension pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1. The trial court entered summary judgment for the State, finding that the forfeiture of defendant’s pension did not implicate the constitutional prohibitions against excessive fines because the forfeiture of pension benefits did not constitute a fine. The Appellate Division affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the State, but on different grounds, concluding the forfeiture of defendant’s pension was a fine, but that requiring defendant to forfeit his pension was not excessive. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded forfeiture of defendant’s pension under N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1 did not constitute a fine for purposes of an excessive-fine analysis under the Federal or New Jersey State Constitutions. Because the forfeiture was not a fine, the Court did not reach the constitutional analysis for excessiveness. View "New Jersey v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In the twin cases before the New Jersey Supreme Court in consolidated appeals, officers engaged in pretextual stops: they stopped each defendant because part of the license plate was covered; as the arresting officer in Roman-Rosado candidly conceded, though, the purpose of the stop was to try to develop a criminal investigation. The police found contraband in both cases -- drugs in one matter and a gun in the other -- which formed the grounds for defendants’ convictions. Defendants argued that, if read expansively, statute at issue here, N.J.S.A. 39:3-33, prohibited drivers of motor vehicles with license plate frames or identification marker holders, that conceal or otherwise obscures any part of any marking imprinted on the vehicle’s registration plate. Defendants contended this statute was unconstitutionally vague and overly broad, and also invited discriminatory enforcement. The Supreme Court held that N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 required all markings on a license plate be legible or identifiable. If a frame conceals or obscures a marking in a way that it cannot reasonably be identified or discerned, the driver would be in violation of the law. In practice, if a registration letter or number was not legible, the statute would apply; but if a phrase like “Garden State” was partly covered but still recognizable, there would be no violation. Under that standard, defendant Darius Carter’s license plate frame, which covered the phrase “Garden State” entirely, violated the law, so the stop was lawful. In contrast, defendant Miguel Roman-Rosado’s plate frame did not cover “Garden State.” It partially covered only ten or fifteen percent of the slogan, which was still fully legible, so the stop was unlawful. Because there was no lawful basis to stop Roman-Rosado, evidence seized as a direct result of his stop had to be suppressed. View "New Jersey v. Carter" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review in this case was whether defendant Paulino Njango, whose time in prison exceeded the permissible custodial term authorized by his sentence, was entitled to have the excess prison time he served reduce the period of parole supervision he had to serve under the New Jersey No Early Release Act (NERA). The post-conviction relief court found that the excess time Njango served in custody was “unfortunate” but could not “be given back.” The Appellate Division affirmed, determining that the period of Njango’s NERA parole supervision could not be reduced, even though “[Njango] was imprisoned longer than he should have been due to a failure to properly award” him prior service credits. The Supreme Court reversed. "We do not agree that relief cannot be granted to Njango. The fundamental fairness doctrine is an integral part of the due process guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, which protects against arbitrary and unjust government action." The Court held that the excess time that Njango erroneously served in prison had to be credited to reduce the period of his parole supervision. The case was remanded to the New Jersey Parole Board for a calculation of the excess time Njango served in prison and a credit toward his period of parole supervision. View "New Jersey v. Njango" on Justia Law

Nicholas Mirov disappeared in 1975, and defendant Craig Szemple told members of Mirov’s family that he had driven Mirov to a bus station so that Mirov could go to New York City. Four months after Mirov disappeared, police discovered a body in the woods. Police did not identify the body until sixteen years later, when defendant’s brother, under questioning about a different homicide, revealed defendant’s prior admission to killing Mirov. The issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court centered on whether the State could be compelled to search its file to determine the existence of information in a post-conviction context, where defendant sought to obtain any statements or reports memorializing any interviews with his ex-wife, Theresa Boyle, that may have occurred after a letter admitting to the 1975 murder of Mirov, believed to be written by defendant, was produced by Theresa’s father in 1992, during defendant’s first trial for Mirov’s murder. Defendant’s first trial ended in a mistrial, and he was re-tried in 1994. The State admitted into evidence the letter, testimony by a handwriting expert that defendant authored the letter, the .32 caliber bullets found lodged in the victim’s neck and the base of the tree where the victim’s remains were found, and the testimony of defendant’s brother that (a) his family kept a .32 caliber handgun in the family store where defendant worked, and (b) that defendant confessed to shooting the victim. The Supreme Court held that because defendant was aware of the letter, and the circumstances relevant to this appeal for nearly twenty-five years, yet provided no evidence -- and made almost no effort to uncover evidence -- that police interviewed Theresa after production of the letter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s post-conviction discovery request. View "New Jersey v. Szemple" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether defendant Zakariyya Ahmad’s statement to police -- which occurred when defendant was 17 years old and without his being advised of his Miranda rights -- was properly admitted at his trial for multiple offenses related to the murder of a cafe owner in Newark, New Jersey. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that defendant was questioned as “part of an investigatory procedure rather than a custodial interrogation” and that Miranda was therefore not implicated. The Supreme Court found admission of the statement was harmful error: a reasonable 17-year-old in defendant’s position would have believed he was in custody and not free to leave, so Miranda warnings were required. View "New Jersey v. Ahmad" on Justia Law