Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

While surveilling a street corner in Newark, two detectives observed several men loitering in the area. A detective testified that one of the individuals, later identified as defendant Tywaun Hedgespeth, adjusted his clothes, at which point officers saw what looked like the butt of a gun. Backup units were told to apprehend the men and to be cautious with defendant. A detective apprehended defendant, ordered him to show his hands, took him to the ground, and then alerted fellow officers that he found a weapon. Defendant was searched by the arresting officers who discovered crack cocaine on his person. No fingerprints were found on the gun. Defendant went to trial on a drug possession charge and an unlawful possession of a weapon charge. The jury found defendant guilty on both counts, and he pleaded guilty to a certain-persons offense the same day. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions. Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court committed harmful error in permitting impeachment of defendant by his prior convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in admitting an affidavit by a non-testifying officer. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded after review of the record that the trial court erred in allowing the State to enter into evidence information set forth in the affidavit of a non-testifying officer concerning the no-permit results from a search of the State firearm registry, and that violation was not cured by testimony concerning the search of an Essex County firearm database. Further, the trial court’s incorrect N.J.R.E. 609 ruling constituted harmful error requiring reversal of the conviction. However, the Court declined to adopt the position that an evidentiary ruling that results in a defendant’s decision not to testify can never be harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed. View "New Jersey v. Hedgespeth" on Justia Law

Defendant Jose Carrion appealed his conviction by jury on weapons and drug offenses, as well as assault. Specifically he appealed the denial of his motion to suppress a statement that he made to law enforcement and for which he received Miranda warnings, but that he made after an earlier, unwarned statement. At trial, the prosecution sought to admit an affidavit of Brett Bloom of the State Firearms Investigative Unit, asserting that Bloom searched and found no record that Carrion had a firearm permit. The State asked the court to submit the affidavit as a self-authenticating document under N.J.R.E. 902(k) and under the absence-of-a-public-record exception to the hearsay rule, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(10). Defense counsel objected, arguing that there were hearsay and Confrontation Clause issues. The court found the document both reliable and admissible under N.J.R.E. 902(k) and exceptions to the hearsay rule. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the State’s reliance on an affidavit by a non-testifying witness to introduce over defendant’s objection the results of the database search violated defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. And, under the totality of the circumstances, Carrion’s second statement should have been suppressed because the Miranda warnings issued to Carrion prior to his second statement to police were insufficient in these circumstances to ensure that his waiver of rights was voluntary and knowing. Because of its holding on the suppression issue, the Court could not conclude that the denial of defendant’s right to confrontation constituted harmless error. View "New Jersey v. Carrion" on Justia Law

Around midnight on May 7, 2011, a 7-Eleven was robbed. Approximately three-quarters of a mile from the 7-Eleven, Sergeant Mark Horan saw a car approaching in the oncoming traffic lane. Using the spotlight mounted to his police vehicle to illuminate the inside of the car, he observed that the occupants were a man and a woman and let them pass. Sergeant Horan testified that as he continued on, a second set of headlights approached. He illuminated the inside of the vehicle and observed three Black males; “[t]he description of the suspects was two Black males so at that point I decided to issue a motor vehicle stop on the second vehicle.” Horan later explained that he was also struck by the lack of reaction to the spotlight by the occupants of the car, and that he “took into consideration the short distance from the scene, as well as the short amount of time from the call” as he made the stop. Horan radioed headquarters with the license plate number and a description of the car, and two more officers arrived. Defendant Peter Nyema was sitting in the passenger seat and Jamar Myers was in the rear passenger-side seat. The dispatcher advised Horan that the vehicle had been reported stolen. All three occupants were placed under arrest. The question this case presented was whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion existed when a police officer conducted an investigatory stop of the vehicle in which defendants Peter Nyema and Jamar Myers were riding with co-defendant Tyrone Miller. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded the only information the officer possessed at the time of the stop was the race and sex of the suspects, with no further descriptors. "That information, which effectively placed every single Black male in the area under the veil of suspicion, was insufficient to justify the stop of the vehicle and therefore does not withstand constitutional scrutiny." View "New Jersey v. Nyema" on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals presented an issue of first impression for the New Jersey Supreme Court: whether police have a right to conduct a protective sweep of a home when an arrest is made outside the home and, if so, the requisite justification for a warrantless entry and protective sweep. In doing so, the Court balanced two important values: an individual’s fundamental privacy right in the home and the significant state interest in officer safety. The Court concluded that when an arrest occurs outside a home, the police may not enter the dwelling or conduct a protective sweep in the absence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person or persons are present inside and pose an imminent threat to the officers’ safety. "This sensible balancing of the fundamental right to privacy in one’s home and the compelling interest in officer safety will depend on an objective assessment of the particular circumstances in each case, such as the manner of the arrest, the distance of the arrest from the home, the reasonableness of the officers’ suspicion that persons were in the dwelling and likely to launch an imminent attack, and any other relevant factors. A self-created exigency by the police cannot justify entry into the home or a protective sweep." In the case of Christopher Radel, a protective sweep was not warranted, but was constitutionally justified in Keith Terres' case. View "New Jersey v. Radel" on Justia Law

Defendant Cynthia Rivera admitted to planning and participating in the armed robbery of Justin Garcia, resulting in serious injuries to Garcia and the murder of his friend, Andrew Torres. At the time of the offenses, defendant was eighteen years old and in a relationship with Martin Martinez. Defendant pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter and assault and to conspiracy to commit robbery. At the time of sentencing, defendant was then nineteen years old with no prior criminal history, no juvenile record, and no arrests. Defendant expressed deep regret for her actions and told the court she had severed her relationship with Martinez, who defendant stated was physically, mentally, and emotionally abusive to her. The sentencing court applied two aggravating factors -- the risk defendant would commit another offense; and the need for deterrence-- and two mitigating factors -- the absence of a prior record, and willingness to cooperate with law enforcement. The court did not address mitigating factor nine -- unlikeliness to reoffend -- which the State had conceded. The court weighed aggravating factor three, the risk of reoffense, more heavily than the other factors, relying in large part on defendant’s youth. Thus, the court concluded that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced defendant in accordance with that finding. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted review here to consider whether a defendant’s youth could serve as an aggravating factor in sentencing. The Supreme Court reversed, vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing. "Consistent with both this Court’s precedent and the intent of the Legislature in recently adopting youth as a mitigating statutory factor, we hold that a defendant’s youth may be considered only as a mitigating factor in sentencing." Additionally, the Court held that on resentencing, the sentencing court should consider mitigating factor fourteen -- that “the defendant was under [twenty six] years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.” View "New Jersey v. Rivera" on Justia Law

In April 2018, a seventeen-year-old civilian called police and reported that she had saw a man, later identified as defendant William Gerena, exposing himself to a group of children at a playground. Police officers responded to the scene and saw defendant sitting on a bench facing the playground, with his penis exposed and erect. Defendant was charged with second-degree sexual assault by contact and fourth-degree lewdness, which both required the State to prove that at least one of the victims was under the age of thirteen. At trial, one of the police officers and the civilian eyewitness recounted to the jury what they had saw at the park. The officer estimated that the children were around three to thirteen years old and that the smallest child appeared to be no higher than his waist. The civilian testified that the children were approximately six to fifteen years old and that the shortest child appeared no taller than her hip. Over defendant’s objection, the trial court admitted the witnesses’ lay opinions about the children’s ages and heights. The State relied on that testimony to prove that one or more of the children was under the age of thirteen, and the jury found defendant guilty of fourth-degree lewdness. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the two witnesses had an adequate opportunity to view the physical characteristics and activities of the group of children to enable them to provide lay opinions about the perceived ranges of the children’s heights and ages. The issue presented on appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion in admitting the eyewitnesses' lay opinions. Finding no such abuse, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment. View "New Jersey v. Gerena" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ernest Bozzi requested copies of defendant Jersey City’s most recent dog license records pursuant to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) and the common law right of access. Plaintiff, a licensed home improvement contractor, sought the information on behalf of his invisible fence installation business. Plaintiff noted that Jersey City could redact information relating to the breed of the dog, the purpose of the dog, and any phone numbers associated with the records. He sought only the names and addresses of the dog owners. Jersey City denied plaintiff’s request on two grounds: (1) the disclosure would be a violation of the citizens’ reasonable expectation of privacy, contrary to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, by subjecting the dog owners to unsolicited commercial contact; and (2) such a disclosure may jeopardize the security of both dog-owners’ and non-dog-owners’ property. The trial court found the dog licensing records were not exempt and ordered Jersey City to provide the requested information. The New Jersey Supreme Court concurred, concluding that owning a dog was a substantially public endeavor in which people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that exempted their personal information from disclosure under the privacy clause of OPRA. View "Bozzi v. City of Jersey City" on Justia Law

Mark Melvin was indicted on nine counts in connection with a fatal shooting in a restaurant, including charges of murder, aggravated assault, and weapon possession and drug offenses. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Melvin guilty of unlawful possession of a handgun but remained deadlocked on the outstanding counts. The Appellate Division affirmed Melvin’s conviction but remanded the matter for resentencing, holding that the sentencing judge incorrectly applied State v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) . . . and that a judge cannot act as a “thirteenth juror” by “substitut[ing] his judgment for that of the jury.” At the retrial of the deadlocked counts, Melvin was acquitted of murder and aggravated assault, and the State dismissed the drug charges. The same judge who presided over the first trial and sentencing handled Melvin’s retrial and resentencing, and again cited Watts in his determination that “the evidence at the trial support[ed] a conclusion that [Melvin] was the shooter of the two individuals” at the restaurant, adding, contrary to the jury’s verdict, that Melvin “not only . . . possess[ed] said weapon, but he used it to shoot upon three other human beings.” The trial court resentenced Melvin to an extended term, which the Appellate Division affirmed on appeal. Michelle Paden-Battle was indicted in connection with the murder of Regina Baker for offenses including kidnapping, murder, felony murder, gang criminality, and weapons offenses. After a trial (before the same judge who presided over Melvin’s trials and sentencings) the jury convicted Paden-Battle of kidnapping, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, and felony murder, and acquitted Paden-Battle of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and both weapons offenses. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed Paden-Battle’s convictions but vacated her sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing. The court concluded that there was “no doubt that the sentence was enhanced because the judge believed defendant ordered Baker’s execution,” “despite the jury verdict, [and] enhanced the sentence imposed.” The New Jersey Supreme Court consolidated the cases for review, and reversed in Melvin and affirmed in Paden-Battle. The Court found the jury’s verdict should have ensured that Melvin retained the presumption of innocence for any offenses of which he was acquitted. In finding Paden-Battle not guilty of the remaining offenses, however, the jury rejected the charges that Paden-Battle was guilty of first-degree murder or first-degree conspiracy to commit murder. "The findings of juries cannot be nullified through lower-standard fact findings at sentencing." View "New Jersey v. Melvin, Paden-Battle" on Justia Law

Wildemar Dangcil’s contended the hybrid jury-selection process implemented by the New Jersey Judiciary in response to the COVID-19 pandemic: (1) deprived him of his rights to presence and representation; and (2) failed to ensure him a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. Jury selection for defendant’s trial was scheduled for April 20, 2020, but was adjourned in light of the pandemic. On July 22, 2020, in coordination with representatives from the Attorney General’s Office, Office of the Public Defender, County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey, and New Jersey State Bar Association, the New Jersey Supreme Court established a plan to resume criminal and civil jury selections using a hybrid process intended to maintain the core components of pre-pandemic jury operations modified to protect the health and safety of jurors, attorneys, parties, and all court users. Defendant’s trial was Bergen County’s first to utilize the hybrid process. During the virtual phase of jury selection, defense counsel filed an Order to Show Cause challenging the array as not being drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. The trial court rejected the challenge. After the Appellate Division affirmed and remanded for resumption of the trial, defendant was convicted of multiple offenses, including attempted aggravated arson. He was sentenced to an aggregate eighteen-year term of imprisonment. The Supreme Court granted direct certification to address the issues defendant raised about the jury selection process. Though the challenge was to the new hybrid process, it was also directed at pre-pandemic practices -- notably, pre-voir dire juror excusals and deferrals -- that remained largely unchanged during the COVID-19 crisis. The Supreme Court held that the pre-voir dire disqualification, excusal, or deferral of jurors was not a stage at which defendant was entitled to be present or be represented, and that defendant failed to support his representative-cross-section claim. Therefore, the Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Dangcil" on Justia Law

Rasheem McQueen was arrested after driving off when Piscataway police officers attempted to stop him for traffic violations. At police headquarters, McQueen was permitted to make a call on a landline in the “report writing room.” No one told him the call would be recorded: no sign was posted warning that all calls were recorded; no one stood over McQueen to listen to the conversation, and he “mumbled on the phone, hiding what his conversation was.” Later that day, a detective recovered a gun found outside the home near where McQueen had been stopped, and became “suspicious” about the call McQueen had made from headquarters. Without securing a warrant or a subpoena, or consent from McQueen, detectives listened to McQueen’s recorded conversation. The recording revealed that McQueen called Myshira Allen-Brewer and told her to look for his “blicky” (slang for a handgun) near where the gun was found. McQueen was transferred to the Middlesex County Adult Correction Center, from where he made further telephone calls to Allen-Brewer on a clearly designated recorded line. During telephone calls placed from the Correction Center, an automated message advised parties their conversation was being recorded, and inmates received written notification of the warning. In their conversations, McQueen again told Allen-Brewer to look for the “blicky.” A recording of those Correction Center conversations was secured through a grand jury subpoena. Both McQueen and Allen-Brewer were indicted on multiple counts, and both moved to suppress their telephone conversations recorded by the Piscataway Police Department and the Correction Center. The motion judge suppressed the recorded calls and dismissed the indictment against Allen-Brewer. The Appellate Division reversed the suppression of the Correction Center calls and reinstated the charges against Allen-Brewer. The panel, however, split on the legality of the seizure of the police station call, with the majority affirming the suppression of that call. Only Allen-Brewer’s appeal went before the New Jersey Supreme Court, who reversed the Appellate Division: McQueen and Allen-Brewer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their conversation in the absence of fair notice that their conversation would be monitored or recorded. The recorded stationhouse telephone conversation was not seized pursuant to a warrant or any justifiable exigency and therefore should have been suppressed. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. McQueen" on Justia Law