Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration involved the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, as articulated in New Jersey v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409 (2015), and whether police could conduct a warrantless search of defendant Kyle Smart’s vehicle after an investigative stop. In particular, the Court considered whether the police actions giving rise to probable cause to search the vehicle were prompted by circumstances that were “unforeseeable and spontaneous,” as required under Witt. Officer Louis Taranto identified a 2017 GMC Terrain parked at a condo complex as a vehicle that had been involved in prior drug deals and that was used by a drug dealer known as “Killer.” Taranto conducted a database search and learned defendant had been listed with the moniker “Killer” and had multiple arrests and felony convictions involving controlled dangerous substances. Taranto surveilled the GMC. After about thirty minutes, he observed a female (the driver), defendant, and a child enter the GMC. Taranto followed them to a residence where he saw activity consistent with a drug transaction. At some point, Officer Samantha Sutter followed the GMC to the residence. Taranto and Sutter reasonably suspected that defendant had previously engaged in drug deals at the residence. Considering information from a confidential informant and a "concerned citizen," Taranto’s investigation, and the surveillance by Taranto and Sutter, Officers Taranto and Sutter determined they had reasonable and articulable suspicion to perform an investigative stop. The Supreme Court concluded the circumstances giving rise to probable cause in this case were not “unforeseeable and spontaneous.” The Court therefore affirmed the order suppressing the physical evidence seized from the vehicle. View "New Jersey v. Smart" on Justia Law

The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to decide “whether the testimony of an officer who is a certified Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) is admissible at trial and, if so, under what circumstances.” At the heart of the case was whether there was a reliable scientific basis for a twelve-step protocol that is used to determine (1) whether a person was impaired, and (2) whether that impairment was likely caused by ingesting one or more drugs. For decades, issues like this in criminal cases were analyzed under the test outlined in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). That standard turned on whether the subject of expert testimony was “generally accepted” in the relevant scientific community. The New Jersey Court moved away from the Frye test over time. In civil cases, New Jersey shifted toward an approach that focused directly on reliability by evaluating the methodology and reasoning underlying proposed expert testimony. After an extensive evidentiary hearing before a Special Master, the Court asked the parties and amici to submit their views on whether to depart from Frye and adopt the principles of Daubert in criminal cases. After review, the Court concluded Daubert offered a superior approach to evaluate the reliability of expert testimony. This case was remanded back to the Special Master to apply the standard announced here to the DRE evidence in the first instance. View "New Jersey v. Olenowski" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether people such as defendants Richard Gomes and Moataz Sheira, who received conditional discharges for marijuana offenses before the 2021 adoption of the Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMMA), were statutorily ineligible for admission into the pretrial intervention (PTI) program for new offenses. Both defendants received a previous conditional discharge stemming from a possessory marijuana offense that was no longer unlawful in New Jersey after CREAMMA. They were both charged with new offenses and applied for admission into PTI. A trial court concluded Sheira was statutorily ineligible for PTI because of his previous conditional discharge for marijuana possession, but a different trial court reached the contrary conclusion as to Gomes. Applying the “one diversion only” general limitation of the PTI statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(g)(1), and the terms of expungement statutes enacted before CREAMMA, the Appellate Division held that the defendants here were statutorily barred from PTI eligibility. The Supreme Court concluded persons who had pre-CREAMMA convictions for those marijuana offenses were no longer categorically precluded from future admission into PTI. Instead, prosecutors and reviewing courts must consider the merits of their PTI applications, without regard to the existence or circumstances of the earlier marijuana-related conditional discharges. "The holding harmonizes CREAMMA and its manifest legislative intent with the pre-existing general language of the PTI and expungement statutes, including the Legislature’s command in CREAMMA to apply its reforms to 'any case' that arose before its enactment." View "New Jersey v. Gomes" on Justia Law

Defendant Terrell Chambers was indicted and charged with second- degree sexual assault following a victim’s allegation that he performed non-consensual oral sex upon her several times over the course of a night when they drank alcohol at a gathering with friends and family. Defendant and several witnesses spoke about the victim’s alleged pre-incident mental illness. Defendant stated that the victim “was in the psychiatric home before, she went crazy before,” implying that she suffered from an illness that impaired her ability to recount the incident, or at a minimum, that she imagined or fabricated the incident. Defense counsel moved to compel the State to obtain and produce the victim’s pre-incident mental health records. Alternatively, counsel requested that the State make such records available for an in camera inspection. The State opposed the motion and argued it was not in possession, custody, or control of the records, and that it was without knowledge of their existence. The judge granted defendant’s motion and ordered the State to obtain and produce, for an in camera inspection, the victim’s mental health records -- extending six months before the incident and six months after the incident. The judge accepted defense counsel’s argument that “[t]he possibility of mistaken perception or recollection of an incident presents a legitimate need for the information which outweighs any possible prejudice.” The victim had no notice of the motion and therefore had no opportunity to be heard. The Appellate Division denied the State’s emergent motion seeking leave to appeal and a stay, noting that the State could renew its motion after the judge “issues an order regarding the use of the victim’s psychiatric records” following the in camera inspection. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a heightened discovery standard governed a defendant’s motion for pre-incident mental health records from a sexual assault victim. The Court established the standard applicable to a formally filed motion and also outlined a less formal process through which defendants could make requests for discovery of the pre-incident mental health records of an alleged sexual assault victim by letter to the prosecutor’s office. So that the new procedural and analytical framework could be applied in this case, the Court vacated the orders appealed here and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Chambers" on Justia Law

A.M. fatally shot her husband in May 2010 and was convicted of first-degree murder and a weapons offense. In March 2021, following diagnoses of end-stage multiple sclerosis by two physicians, the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections issued a Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release for A.M. A.M. filed a petition with the court, which the State opposed. The State advised the court that A.M.’s children intended to testify against her release at a hearing, as did the victim’s mother. The trial court denied A.M.’s petition for release. The court found that A.M.’s remaining period of parole ineligibility did not bar compassionate release under the Compassionate Release Act (CRA); that A.M. had established by clear and convincing evidence that she had a “permanent physical incapacity” within the meaning of the Act; and that conditions of release “likely could be established” to assure that she “would not pose a risk to public safety.” The trial court, however, concluded that compassionate release was not mandatory when those conditions were met. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that once those factors are met, a trial court has no discretion to deny relief. In 1993, Eddie Oliver, now Al-Damany Kamu, shot and killed a detective in a courthouse to prevent him from testyfying in a criminal case. Defendant shot and wounded two other officers, attempted to kill a third official, and planned to kill the judge, He was convicted of first-degree murder and three counts of attempted murder. The Department of Corrections issued a Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release for Kamau in November 2021. The State and the victims opposed release. Based on the text of the new statute and its legislative history, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded the Compassionate Release Act afforded judges discretion to deny relief, in exceptional circumstances, even if the law’s medical and public safety conditions are satisfied. In individual cases, when the medical and public safety factors are met, courts can assess whether extraordinary aggravating factors exist that justify the denial of compassionate release. Absent any such circumstances, petitions for relief should be granted. The Court found the record in A.M.'s case did not present extraordinary aggravating circumstances. The Court therefore modified and affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment to release A.M. The appeal in Oliver/Kamu involved the kind of extraordinary aggravating circumstances that justified denying relief. The Court modified and affirmed the trial court's judgment denying defendant's petition for release. View "New Jersey v. A.M." on Justia Law

In January 2013, defendant Timothy Canfield shot and killed K.P., his sister-in-law’s former boyfriend. Defendant claimed that he acted in self-defense. He testified that K.P., who was HIV-positive, came towards him during their argument while holding an object that defendant believed to be a hypodermic syringe. Defendant was charged with first-degree murder. At the charge conference, defendant objected to giving any instruction on lesser-included offenses, but the trial court charged the jury on aggravated and reckless manslaughter. Defendant did not request an instruction on passion/provocation manslaughter, and the court did not instruct the jury, sua sponte, on that lesser-included offense. The jury acquitted defendant of murder but convicted him of the lesser-included offense of aggravated manslaughter, among other offenses. The Appellate Division held that it was not plain error for the trial court not to give the passion/provocation manslaughter instruction because even accepting defendant’s version of the fatal confrontation, that instruction was not clearly indicated. The Appellate Division recommended a new procedural rule: “when, in a murder prosecution, the trial court determines to instruct the jury on self-defense at the charge conference . . . , the court should also consider and make specific findings on the record as to whether to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of passion/provocation manslaughter, regardless of whether either party has requested that instruction.” The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons stated in Judge Susswein’s published opinion. The Court did not believe the Appellate Division’s proposed procedural rule was necessary. View "New Jersey v. Canfield" on Justia Law

Sometime after 1:00 a.m. on November 2, 2017, New Jersey State Police officers were deployed to arrest Julian Bell on a four-month-old failure to appear warrant. When the officers arrived at Bell’s home, he was standing outside with defendant Steven Bookman. Bell and Bookman fled into a row house next door to Bell’s residence, and officers pursued Bookman to a second-floor bedroom. After an officer informed Bookman he did not have legal grounds to detain him, Bookman voluntarily told the officer he had a revolver inside his jacket pocket. The officer retrieved the handgun and arrested Bookman. Following his indictment for weapons offenses, Bookman moved to suppress the handgun based on the warrantless entry into the row house. The trial court denied the motion, finding officers were permitted to enter the residence without a warrant under the hot pursuit doctrine. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that under the totality of the circumstances reviewed here, the State Police detectives who entered the neighboring residence without a warrant did not have grounds to invoke the hot pursuit doctrine. The warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. Although the Court was “disturbed” by the manner of execution of this warrant, it declined to adopt a rigid, one-size-fits-all approach to the execution of all Automated Traffic System arrest warrants. View "New Jersey v. Bookman" on Justia Law

Defendant A.L.A. was the legal guardian of her four grandchildren, who ranged in age from three to seventeen years old. In August 2016, the oldest grandchild reported that defendant physically abused them. After an investigation, the New Jersey Division of Child Protection & Permanency initiated an emergency removal of all four grandchildren. Defendant was tried for multiple counts of endangering the welfare of a child. The parties agreed that the court would instruct the jury on second-degree endangering, and what the parties termed a lesser included disorderly persons offense of simple assault. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the jury could have understood the affirmative defense of reasonable corporal punishment applied to both the child endangerment charge and the simple assault chard, where the reasonable corporal punishment instruction was provided only in the instructions for the child endangerment charge. The Supreme Court determined after review that the jury could not have understood the language in the instruction applied to both charges. Therefore, the Supreme Court held the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, in the context of the simple assault charge, that reasonable corporal punishment was not prohibited. Because that error in instructions could have led the jury to an unjust result, the conviction was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. A.L.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Crystal Point Condominium Association, Inc. obtained default judgments against two entities for construction defect claims. Kinsale Insurance Company was alleged to have insured those entities, under the Direct Action Statute, N.J.S.A. 17:28-2. The relevant policies both contained an arbitration agreement providing in part that “[a]ll disputes over coverage or any rights afforded under this Policy . . . shall be submitted to binding Arbitration.” Crystal Point filed a declaratory judgment action against Kinsale, alleging that it was entitled to recover the amounts owed by the entities under the insurance policies issued by Kinsale. Kinsale asserted that Crystal Point’s claims were subject to binding arbitration in accordance with the insurance policies. Kinsale argued that the Direct Action Statute did not apply because Crystal Point had not demonstrated that neither entity was insolvent or bankrupt. In the alternative, Kinsale contended that even if the statute were to apply, it would not preclude enforcement of the arbitration provisions in the policies. The trial court granted Kinsale’s motion to compel arbitration, viewing the Direct Action Statute to be inapplicable because there was no evidence in the record that either insured was insolvent or bankrupt. An appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment, finding the evidence that the writs of execution were unsatisfied met the Direct Action Statute’s requirement that the claimant present proof of the insured’s insolvency or bankruptcy and determining that the Direct Action Statute authorized Crystal Point’s claims against Kinsale. The appellate court concluded the arbitration clause in Kinsale’s insurance policies did not warrant the arbitration of Crystal Point’s claims, so it reinstated the complaint and remanded for further proceedings. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined Crystal Point could assert direct claims against Kinsale pursuant to the Direct Action Statute in the setting of this case. Based on the plain language of N.J.S.A. 17:28-2, however, Crystal Point’s claims against Kinsale were derivative claims, and were thus subject to the terms of the insurance policies at issue, including the provision in each policy mandating binding arbitration of disputes between Kinsale and its insureds. Crystal Point’s claims against Kinsale were therefore subject to arbitration. View "Crystal Point Condominium Association, Inc. v. Kinsale Insurance Company " on Justia Law

In November 2017, Michele Yamakaitis, the nominee of the Democratic Party, was re-elected to a three-year term as the councilmember representing the 8th Ward to the City of Linden Municipal Council (City Council). One year later, Yamakaitis was elected council president, and she resigned as councilmember to assume her new role. On the day of her resignation, the Linden city clerk forwarded a letter to Nicholas Scutari, Chairman of the Linden Democratic Committee, alerting him to the process for filling the 8th Ward vacancy. Chairman Scutari advised the city clerk that the Democratic Committee had met and selected three candidates, including Paul Coates, Jr., to fill the vacant seat. The City Council rejected all three candidates submitted by the Linden Democratic Committee and adopted a Resolution to leave the 8th Ward seat vacant until the next general election, a position the mayor supported. The Democratic Committee voted and swore in Coates to serve as the councilmember representing the 8th Ward, citing N.J.S.A. 40A:16-11 as the authority for that action. The City Council then exercised “[its] right under [N.J.S.A. 40A:16-5(b)] to maintain a vacancy in the 8th Ward,” and declined to recognize Coates as councilmember. In February 2019, Coates and the Democratic Committee filed suit alleging that defendants -- the City and City Council -- had violated the Municipal Vacancy Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:16-1 to -23, by refusing to seat Coates as councilmember. The Chancery Court agreed and voided the Resolution to keep the seat vacant and directed that Coates be seated as the 8th Ward councilmember. Defendants appealed, challenging the court’s findings under both the Vacancy Law, and Coates and the Democratic Committee cross-appealed to uphold the Chancery Court's decision. The Appellate Division reversed the Chancery Division’s orders, determining that the City Council had the authority under N.J.S.A. 40A:16-5 to decline to fill the vacancy. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that in amending in 1990 Sections 11 and 13 of the Municipal Vacancy Law, the Legislature removed the governing body’s discretion to keep vacant a seat previously occupied by a nominee of a political party. "Section 11 mandates that the governing body choose one of the municipal committee’s three nominees." View "Linden Democratic Committee v. City of Linden " on Justia Law