Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A Union County Grand Jury indicted the two defendants for first-degree murder, third-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit, and second-degree possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose. After closing his bar, Luis Lecaros proceeded to drive home several of his employees in his pickup truck, including Sandra Narvarro and his son Paul. At some point, Luis’ truck slid on the rain-slicked road and slammed into the rear of a black Honda, shattering its back window and causing its rear bumper to fall off. The State’s theory was that Defendant Timyan Cabbell was driving the Honda and that Defendant John Calhoun was a passenger. Immediately after the collision, Cabbell and Calhoun, armed with handguns, opened fire on the pickup truck, and then fled in the Honda. The central issue at trial was the identification of the shooters. Two key State witnesses gave statements to police about the shooting, but in front of the jury, neither wished to testify. Because the witnesses insisted they did not wish to testify, the trial court conducted a Rule 104 hearing outside the presence of the jury. At this point, neither Defendant was given an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses before the jury. The witnesses' out-of-court statements were deemed admissible under a hearsay exception. The primary issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether Defendants were provided an opportunity to cross examine the State's key witnesses consistent with the Confrontation Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that both defendants were denied their federal and state constitutional rights to confront one of the two key witnesses before the jury. For that reason, that witness' out-of-court statement to the police incriminating Defendants should not have been read to the jury and the admission of that statement was not harmless error. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Cabbell" on Justia Law

Defendant Marie Hess shot and killed her husband Jimmy Hess, a police officer. Defendant entered into a plea agreement in which she pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter; acknowledged that she would receive a thirty-year sentence; conceded that aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors as to make the term appropriate; agreed that neither she nor her attorney would affirmatively seek a lesser term of imprisonment; and agreed not to appeal her conviction. The plea agreement did not bind the court to give any particular sentence, and nothing in the plea agreement denied defense counsel the opportunity to provide mitigating evidence. Defendant did not pursue a direct appeal. Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) claiming that she was denied her constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. At the PCR hearing, Defendant’s PCR counsel alleged that trial counsel made numerous errors, including that he failed to argue mitigating factors and to bring to light evidence suggesting defendant was a battered woman. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant was denied her constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel because her attorney failed to present and argue mitigating evidence at her sentencing. The Court also held that Defendant's plea agreement provisions that restricted the right of counsel to argue for a lesser sentence were void. View "New Jersey v. Hess" on Justia Law

A mother and her adult son were found dead and bound together in the son's home. Each had been killed by a gunshot wound to the back of the head, and the son's throat had been slashed. An investigation lead police to three suspects: Keith Mercer, Defendant Dwayne Gillispie and Defendant Gregory Buttler. Before trial, the State moved to introduce evidence that Gillispie and Buttler had participated in a robbery and shooting that took place in a New York barbershop twenty days before the murders. The trial court conducted a joint hearing to determine whether "other-crimes" evidence was admissible under state law. The court found the evidence was probative to identify who committed the murders. Although the court acknowledged the evidence was prejudicial, it concluded that the probative value outweighed the prejudice and admitted it. Gillispie and Buttler were tried separately, and separate juries found Gillispie and Buttler guilty on all charges against them. In an unpublished decision, the appellate court reversed the convictions and remanded the cases for new trials. The appellate court found that the other-crimes evidence was too prejudicial, and that the probative value did not outweigh the prejudice. Upon consideration of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, and affirmed its decision. The Court held that the admission of this evidence was harmless error that ultimately would not have affected the outcome of the trials. The Court remanded the cases back to the appellate panel for disposition of other issues unanswered due to its "new trial" order. View "New Jersey v. Gillispie" on Justia Law

Defendant Zarik Rose was incarcerated in 1995 on charges relating to the to the attempted murder of Charles Mosely. While awaiting trial, Defendant allegedly told one of the State's witnesses against him that he wanted to have Mosely "whacked," and that Defendant solicited the witness to kill Mosely. The State moved to admit Defendant's comments at trial. The trial court found some of the evidence admissible as "res gestae." During the trial, the court provided instructions to guide the jury's use of that evidence. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that, among other things, all evidence relating to his incarceration on attempted murder charges was improperly admitted at trial. In this appeal, the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed Defendant's conviction, finding that the trial court appropriately instructed the jury on use of the admitted statements. However, by this case, the Court ended the practice of using "res gestae" as an explanation for the admission of evidence: "[e]vidence of uncharged misconduct that is not intrinsic evidence of the crime is inadmissible unless proffered for a proper purpose. ... The Court direct[ed] trial courts to make the Rules of Evidence the touchstone for the analysis of all bad acts categories of res gestae evidence, and disapproves further use of res gestae to support evidential rulings." View "New Jersey v. Rose" on Justia Law