Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether defendant Aurelio Ray Cagno's 2004 conviction for racketeering conspiracy was time-barred under the general five-year statute of limitations governing criminal prosecutions. If not, the Court had to determine whether certain evidence was improperly introduced during defendant's 2004 trial to establish the continuation of the criminal conspiracy and whether that evidence was so prejudicial that defendant's murder conviction, achieved at the same trial that resulted in his RICO conviction, was "irremediably tainted" and should have been reversed. Defendant also challenged certain of the trial court's instructions that were provided to the jury that found defendant guilty of all the charges he faced. Finally, defendant raised an issue related to his sentence. After study of the extensive record of this case, the Supreme Court was satisfied that defendant presented no basis upon which his convictions or sentence should be reversed. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Cagno" on Justia Law

Defendant Barrington McDonald appealed a trial court's denial of his motion to vacate his plea of guilty to three offenses arising from an automobile accident. Defendant, driving under the influence of alcohol, struck and seriously injured a pedestrian. He was indicted for second-degree assault by automobile while driving in a school zone, and was issued summonses for several motor vehicle offenses. Several months after the accident, defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State. The plea agreement called for defendant to plead guilty to second-degree assault by auto in a school zone, driving while intoxicated (DWI), and driving with a suspended license. The prosecutor agreed to recommend a single, three-year sentence for all three offenses. The same day, defendant pled guilty to the three offenses, and the trial court found that he had knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Prior to sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that he had not entered into his plea agreement knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily. He challenged the State's contention that his motor vehicle accident occurred within 1,000 feet of school property. The trial court denied the motion, and sentenced defendant to a term of imprisonment, a license suspension and fines for the three offenses. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court should have permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea. An Appellate Division panel affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for the school-zone offense, merged defendant's DWI conviction into his conviction for assault by auto in a school zone, remanded for a determination of whether defendant should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea on the offense of driving with a suspended license, and corrected minor sentencing errors. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because his accident occurred within 1,000 feet of a school property used for school purposes that meets the statutory standard, and because the statute clearly applies at all times of the day and night, defendant could not present a colorable claim that he did not commit the offense of assault by auto in a school zone. Furthermore, the Court rejected defendant's argument with regard to withdrawing his guilty plea, and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "New Jersey v. McDonald" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the trial court erred in not sua sponte including the variation of the insanity-defense jury charge recognized in "State v. Worlock," (117 N.J. 596 (1990)), specifically including additional language to separate defendant's ability to appreciate legal wrong from moral wrong based on "deific commands" to kill. The trial testimony showed that defendant had developed a set of delusional religious beliefs derived from his interpretation of scripture. Both defendant's and the State's expert diagnosed him with schizoaffective disorder. Defendant's expert testified that defendant believed that he was supposed to kill because God was telling him to do it and he had to follow God's word. The State's expert emphasized that defendant admitted to not hearing voices at the time of the killing and opined that defendant was merely acting on his interpretation of what God wanted. According to the State's expert, defendant stated that he only heard the voices when sleeping, that the communications were not actual voices, but were rather subconscious thoughts, and that he had not heard any voices on the night of the incident. The State's expert also opined that other considerations indicated that defendant knew that killing was wrong, including a history of violence toward woman; that he stabbed his victim to put her out of her misery; that he drank alcohol and smoked marijuana afterwards; that his forensic evaluation test results indicated that he was trying to make himself look better by claiming that God had him do it; and that he decided to evade police. The court and all parties agreed to use the Model Jury Charge for the insanity defense. The jury rejected defendant's insanity defense and convicted him of murder and the other charges. In a motion for a new trial, defendant claimed for the first time that the jury should have been provided with the deific-command variant of the insanity-defense jury charge recognized in Worlock. The trial court denied defendant's motion. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to give, sua sponte, a Worlock charge as part of the insanity-defense jury instruction. The evidence did not clearly indicate defendant killed as a result of a deific command. View "New Jersey v. Singleton, Jr." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether weapons recovered from a defendant's premises during a search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued upon "reasonable cause" under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act could be admitted in a subsequent criminal prosecution of defendant for possession of those weapons consistent with Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendant moved to suppress, arguing that because the items were found during a search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued under the domestic violence statute, they could not be used as evidence in a later criminal case. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that a search under the domestic violence statute is constitutional only because it serves "a legitimate state interest," and thus evidence gathered during the search cannot have criminal repercussions. The Appellate Division affirmed the suppression of the handguns, noting that the warrant did not issue upon probable cause, but upon the lesser standard of reasonable cause; the purpose of the search had been to provide protection to the alleged victim, rather than to uncover evidence of criminal conduct; the handguns were not within the searching officers' plain view; and the fact that the Colt revolver was stolen was not immediately apparent but required further investigation through the State Police database. The panel recognized, however, that police may immediately have known it was illegal to possess an assault rifle and large capacity magazines. Thus, it reversed the suppression of those items and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that the items seized could serve as the basis for a subsequent criminal prosecution if their illegal nature is immediately apparent. A firearm's serial number is visible simply by looking at the weapon. Recording that number does not constitute a seizure, and entry of that number into the NCIC system and review of the results does not constitute a search. Whether the officers could recognize immediately that the assault rifle and large capacity magazines were illegal to possess were factual determinations that must be remanded to the trial court. View "New Jersey v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant Norman Jackson entered Murul Chowdhury's taxi through the front passenger door and demanded Chowdhury's money at gunpoint. Chowdhury handed over cash and his wallet. Defendant then ordered Chowdhury to drive him to a location blocks away. At gunpoint, Chowdhury drove defendant approximately eight-tenths of a mile. Defendant departed the taxi without injuring the driver. Defendant and was arrested shortly thereafter. No weapon was found at the scene of his arrest. At police headquarters, police attempted to conduct a more thorough search of defendant, which triggered an altercation that injured defendant and revealed a concealed gun. That night, the interrogating officer drafted a false report that did not reveal the failure to locate defendant's gun at the scene of his arrest. Later that same night, Of the officer prepared and filed a second report that made clear that defendant's weapon was not recovered until after they returned to police headquarters. Before a grand jury, the officer testified falsely based on his initial fabricated report, which later prompted the State to dismiss the indictment. Defendant filed a civil suit against the officer arising out of his altercation with defendant and his false grand jury testimony. Before a second grand jury, the officer testified based on the accurate police report. Defendant was indicted for first-degree robbery and second-degree kidnapping, in addition to other charges. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether comments made by the prosecutor during summation required a mistrial. The Court also determined whether the evidence supported defendant's conviction for kidnapping. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied defendant's motion for a mistrial because the prosecutor's improper comments did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Jersey v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Court determined whether N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 provided immunity to the Plainfield Rescue Squad as an entity, regardless of any negligent delay in transporting a gunshot victim to a hospital. According to the report of the Plaintiff's expert, the Rescue Squad members "wasted over 30 minutes" performing ineffective CPR, depriving the decedent of "any chance of surviving his injury." The decedent needed an immediate transport to the nearby emergency room, where a surgical trauma team could have opened his chest and taken him to the operating room for surgical repair. Had the decedent been transported promptly, he would have had a twenty to thirty percent chance of surviving. The expert concluded that the Squad members engaged in "significant deviations" from usual standards of practice that were significant contributing factors to the decedent's death. Plaintiffs filed a wrongful-death/survival action against the Plainfield Rescue Squad and others. Ultimately, the trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. With respect to the Rescue Squad, the trial court found immunity under both N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 and another statute. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, determining that only N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 shielded the Squad from civil liability. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed: "[a]lthough N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 provides immunity to 'officers and members' of a rescue squad for civil damages in rendering 'intermediate life support services in good faith,' the plain language of the statute does not provide immunity to a rescue squad as an entity. Thus, Plainfield Rescue Squad is subject to a civil suit for negligence based on the facts alleged by plaintiffs." View "Geraldine Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court clarified the factors that courts may consider as part of their review of petitions for expungment of a criminal record. The Court concluded that defendants seeking expungement have the burden of proof to demonstrate why their case warrants relief under the statute's public-interest prong. In early 2000, law enforcement officials investigated the sale of controlled dangerous substances (CDS) at a nightclub in Somers Point, New Jersey. Defendant was indicted for three counts of distribution of CDS, three counts of possession of CDS with intent to distribute, three counts of distribution of CDS within 500 feet of a public zone, and three counts of possession of CDS. The trial court sentenced Defendant to forty-five days in county jail (subject to daily reporting), a three-year period of probation, and various fines and penalties. After eighteen months, Defendant successfully completed all of the conditions of probation. Seven and one-half years later, Defendant filed a petition to expunge his conviction. In support of his application, he offered proof that he completed college and received a Bachelor of Science degree, and certified that he worked full-time while in school and had become active in various community service projects. The trial court in this case found that expungement was "not consistent with the public interest." Defendant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that balancing of the factors that remained in the record of this case suggested that expungement was in the public interest. "In an abundance of caution," the Court remanded the case to the trial court to weigh the relevant factors again in light of the above principles and to evaluate petitioner's conduct since the court denied his petition in 2010. View "In re Kollman, Jr." on Justia Law

The question raised in this appeal was whether records of a legal clinic at a public law school were subject to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA). The Rutgers Environmental Litigation Clinic represented a private group that opposed a plan to build an outlet mall. The mall's developer, Sussex Commons Associates, LLC (Sussex Commons or Sussex), sought documents from the Clinic under OPRA. The trial court concluded that the Clinic was exempt from OPRA requests, and the Appellate Division reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division and held that records related to cases at public law school clinics are not subject to OPRA. "[The Court found] no evidence that the Legislature intended to apply OPRA to teaching clinics that represent private clients, or that it meant to cause harm to clinical programs at public law schools when it enacted OPRA." The Court also concluded that the common law right of access does not extend to case-related records of law school clinics. View "Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers State Univ." on Justia Law

In September 2005, Defendant Leroy Munroe was charged with murder and weapons offenses for the shooting death of Christian Natal. In March 2007, he pled guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter in exchange for dismissal of the murder count and other charges. At the plea hearing, defendant admitted that he and Natal had a dispute, he shot Natal at close range, and Natal died. Also, defendant’s attorney stated: “I would stipulate that it’s circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.” Shortly after the plea hearing, a probation officer interviewed defendant to prepare the presentence investigation report. During the interview, defendant stated that he had been robbed by Natal more than once, so he armed himself with a gun for protection. Defendant further stated that on the day in question, Natal “pulled out a knife on him,” defendant backed up while Natal was swinging his knife, and, at a point when defendant was leaning on a car, he shot Natal in “self-defense.” Nothing in the presentence report, which included the State’s version of events, directly contradicted that account. Indeed, at the scene, police found a box cutter in Natal’s hand. Before sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that he had a viable affirmative defense of self-defense. The court did not accept defendant’s asserted justification for the use of deadly force and denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court mistakenly exercised its discretion and should have allowed defendant to withdraw his guilty plea in the interests of justice. "Defendant asserted a colorable claim of innocence based on a plausible defense of self-defense; there would not have been undue delay or prejudice had the case proceeded to trial; and the factual issues in dispute identified by the trial court should have been decided by a jury." View "New Jersey v. Munroe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kenneth Van Dunk and his wife filed this suit in the Law Division after he suffered serious injuries in a trench collapse at a construction site workplace. Following discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment to the employer-defendants Reckson Associates Realty Corporation and James Construction Company, Inc. Based on its assessment of the totality of circumstances, the court concluded that plaintiff did not demonstrate an intentional wrong within the meaning of the Act, notwithstanding that the employer was issued a federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) "willful violation" citation as a result of the incident. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, and returned the matter to the trial court. The Supreme Court granted the Defendants' petition for certification seeking review of that judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendants' conduct fell short of an intentional wrong creating a substantial certainty of bodily injury or death. Therefore the workers' compensation statutory bar against common-law tor actions precluded this suit, and the appellate court's ruling was reversed. View "Van Dunk v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp." on Justia Law