Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a thirteen-year-old's confession provided outside of the presence of his father should have been suppressed. After it was reported that thirteen-year-old A.W. sexually touched his five-year-old cousin K.P, A.W.'s father voluntarily brought him to the county child advocacy center for an interview. A.W. is bilingual, but because his father speaks very little English, the interview was conducted initially entirely in Spanish. A detective advised A.W. and his father of A.W.'s rights using a pre-printed juvenile rights form, written in Spanish. A.W. initially denied touching K.P. and blamed their other cousin J. At A.W.'s request, the detective permitted him to state what J. had said about touching K.P. in English, but then resumed the questioning in Spanish. Approximately twenty minutes into the interview, A.W. asked in English, "could I tell everything in private, like without my dad here, outside, it will be easier." The detective explained that to his father in Spanish. Although A.W.'s father immediately stood up to leave, the detective advised A.W.'s father that he would need to waive his right to be present during the interview before leaving and that he could return to the interview room at any time. A.W.'s father then signed the required parental waiver form without objection and left the interview room. Thereafter, A.W. continued to deny wrongdoing before eventually admitting that he had touched K.P. sexually. A.W. was charged as a juvenile with two counts of aggravated sexual assault. Considering the totality of the circumstances, A.W.'s father willingly and voluntarily left the interview room, the questioning comported with the highest standards of fundamental fairness and due process, and the confession was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; the Supreme Court concluded A.W.'s confession was admissible. View "In the Interest of A.W." on Justia Law

This case required the Court to address the standard to be applied by Family Part judges when they determine whether the prosecution has demonstrated probable cause under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a)(2). It arose from a 2009 shooting in which one victim was killed and one seriously injured, allegedly by a group of men led by Angel Ramos, the father of one of the two juveniles in this case -- A.D. #1. Ramos was alleged to be a leader in a street gang. The incident closely followed a fight in which A.D. #1 and A.D. #2 were beaten by an uncle of A.D. #2 and others. According to the prosecution, the two juveniles, motivated by a desire for revenge following the fight, contacted A.D. #1's father and participated in a conspiracy to murder A.D. #2's uncle and others, precipitating an assault in which the targeted uncle was unhurt, but another uncle of A.D. #2 was killed and A.D. #2's mother was severely wounded. The two juveniles, both approaching their eighteenth birthdays, were charged with murder, aggravated assault, conspiracy and attempted murder, among other offenses. The trial court denied the prosecution's application to waive the juveniles into adult criminal court, concluding that the State had not demonstrated probable cause under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a)(2). It found "no evidence" that the two juveniles had understood that their response to the fight would lead to murder. The State appealed, and an Appellate Division panel reversed the determination of the trial court, holding that the trial court had committed several legal errors in its application of the probable cause standard to the setting of this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision: "the probable cause standard that governs waiver of juvenile complaints into adult criminal court under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 is similar to the standard that guides a grand jury's determination whether or not to indict. If the trial court finds that the State has presented evidence which, combined with reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, leads to a well-grounded suspicion or belief that the juvenile has committed one or more crimes enumerated in the statute, the "probable cause" standard of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 is satisfied. " View "In the Interest of A.D." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether a plaintiff, who was removed from public employment after positing a claim of employer retaliation in a civil service disciplinary proceeding, should have been barred from seeking to circumvent that discipline through a subsequent Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) action also alleging retaliation. Plaintiff was terminated from his position following two close-in-time proceedings involving separate disciplinary matters before the Civil Service Commission (Commission). The first resulted in a demotion and the imposition of a sixty-day suspension. The second proceeding involved a distinct set of charges relating to plaintiff's abuse of sick leave. Following full discovery practice before the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) and the commencement of an evidential proceeding in the second matter, the employer moved for partial summary decision, which was granted by the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ found it significant that despite plaintiff's defensive theme of employer retaliation, he did not provide support for that claim in his response to the employer's motion seeking partial summary judgment, and plaintiff's termination, for sick-leave misuse. "This matter raises significant and practical concerns about the intersection of administrative disciplinary proceedings and the important protection provided to whistle-blowing employees through CEPA. Although this matter does not present a textbook record for transparent application of the elements required for application of collateral estoppel, [the Supreme Court was] persuaded that preclusion should apply to plaintiff's subsequently filed retaliation claims against his former employer." The Court reversed the appellate court and held that under the facts of this case, plaintiff's CEPA action was barred. View "Winters v. No. Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue" on Justia Law

Defendant Manaf Stas, was convicted of allowing an intoxicated person to operate a vehicle over which he had custody and control. Defendant and another individual, Joseph Putz, were involved in an automobile accident in a minivan owned by defendant's sister, minutes after leaving a bar where both had been drinking. After police arrived on the scene, Putz told the investigating police officer that he had been driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. After failing field sobriety tests, Putz was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI). Defendant stood nearby in silence as Putz told police that he had driven the car, failed field sobriety tests, and was arrested. He offered no comment on Putz's confession to being the driver at the time of the accident. Given Putz's admission that he was the driver, the police did not subject defendant to field sobriety tests or administer a breathalyzer. Instead, defendant was given a summons for allowing Putz, while intoxicated, to drive the minivan. Defendant and Putz were jointly tried in municipal court. Rejecting the proffered testimony, the municipal court found defendant and Putz guilty of different violations of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). Defendant appealed, and the Law Division also convicted defendant. The Law Division relied upon defendant’s silence while Putz was questioned and arrested, construing that silence to be "an admission on [defendant's] part." Defendant appealed, and an Appellate Division panel affirmed. The panel concluded that if the Law Division's invocation of defendant's silence constituted error, it was harmless. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the municipal court for a new trial. The Court concluded that defendant was entitled to the protection of the constitutional, statutory and common law privilege against self-incrimination in the quasi-criminal proceedings before the municipal court and the Law Division, and that the use of defendant's silence as substantive evidence of his guilt and for the purpose of assessing his credibility violated defendant's federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and his state statutory and common law privilege against self-incrimination. View "New Jersey v. Stas" on Justia Law

In this appeal the Supreme Court considered the extent to which the Board of Governors of Rutgers, the State University (University) complied with the requirements of the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA), and if its compliance was deficient, the extent to which plaintiff was entitled to a judicial remedy. Plaintiff Francis McGovern is an alumnus of the University who attended regularly the meetings of the University's Board of Governors. Concerned at what he perceived to be a persistent disregard on the part of the Board for OPMA's mandates, he filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs. The trial court ultimately granted defendants' motion to dismiss this complaint. Plaintiff appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the case for entry of an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint. View "McGovern, Jr. v. Rutgers, State University of New Jersey" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was convicted at trial of sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child, argued that the trial court and the Appellate Division, which affirmed his convictions and sentence, deprived him of a fair trial. Finding no merit to Defendant's arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "New Jersey v. J.D." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the nature and extent of fees that may be recovered from a litigant in a matrimonial dispute by an individual who has been appointed to serve as a parenting coordinator. More specifically, the Court addressed the circumstances under which and the basis upon which a litigant who raises a grievance against the parenting coordinator may be called upon to answer for fees incurred by the parenting coordinator in responding to a grievance; in resisting discovery demands relating to the grievance; in participating in discovery about the grievance; in pursuing enforcement of a fee award in the trial court; and in participating in the appellate process. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division to the extent that it affirmed the trial court's order awarding fees to the parenting coordinator for her work responding to the grievances and to the extent that it affirmed the trial court's rejection of the husband's argument that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his grievances; in all other respects the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed. View "Segal v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal concerned the validity of Chapter 37 of the Laws of 2009, "Kyleigh’s Law." Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that Chapter 37 is preempted by the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act; violates equal protection; and constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint and the Appellate Division affirmed. The panel found that the decal requirement was not preempted by the federal statute because disclosure of a person's age group is not "personal information" under the Act; that the decal requirement does not violate equal protection because it is a rational and suitable means of furthering a legitimate and appropriate government interest; and that the decal requirement does not give rise to an unreasonable search and seizure because a driver has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her age group and an officer's examination of the decal is not a "search." Upon review, the Supreme Court substantially affirmed the Appellate Division, holding that Chapter 37 is not preempted by federal law, does not violate equal protection, and does not give rise to an unconstitutional search and seizure. View "Trautmann v. Christie" on Justia Law

Police responded to an unverified 9-1-1 call reporting "a domestic dispute possibly involving a handgun" at a Carteret residence. Outside her apartment, Kamilah Richardson told the police that there was no problem in her home and that her eleven-year-old son was inside alone. Against her will, the police entered the apartment to assure the safety of the young boy. The police found him unharmed, without any visible injuries or signs of distress and no indication of a domestic disturbance inside the apartment. The police removed defendant Shareef Edmonds from an adjoining room, where he was watching television, and frisked him. Without evidence to corroborate the earlier domestic-violence report and without first securing a warrant, the police searched the area where defendant had been seated. A handgun was found under a pillow. Defendant, who was charged with the unlawful possession of the gun, claimed that the warrantless search yielding the weapon was unconstitutional. The trial court agreed, determining that the search of the home without a warrant was objectively unreasonable and could not be justified by either the emergency-aid or community-caretaking exception to the constitutional warrant requirement. The court suppressed the gun, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found credible evidence in the record to support the trial court's ruling. View "New Jersey v. Edmonds" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether defendants were entitled to racial profiling discovery to challenge their convictions for attempted murder. The convictions relate to defendants' attack on a law enforcement officer after a motor vehicle stop. A New Jersey State Trooper stopped two Hispanic men for speeding on the New Jersey Turnpike in 1992. As the officer questioned the men immediately after the stop, they tried to overpower him. One defendant grabbed the officer around the neck and began to choke him, while the other tried to get control of the officer's firearm. During that struggle, the officer ultimately broke the second defendant's grip, retrieved his weapon, and fired twice, hitting defendants. The police later obtained a search warrant for defendants' car and found about fourteen ounces of cocaine in it. Both defendants were convicted for drug charges as well as attempted murder and related offenses. Years later, in a motion for post-conviction relief, defendants sought racial profiling discovery to prove that the stop was racially motivated. After a series of rulings at the trial and appellate levels, the Attorney General dismissed the drug convictions, leaving only defendants' convictions for attempted murder and related offenses. Defendants pressed for profiling discovery to challenge the remaining convictions. They contended that they needed the discovery to demonstrate that the drug evidence should have been suppressed. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the exclusionary rule did not apply in this case, there was no need for further discovery to determine whether the stop was in fact illegal. Furthermore, the Court concluded that defendants offered no viable theory to use possible evidence of racial profiling at trial. The Appellate Division order directing that discovery be produced was reversed. View "New Jersey v. Herrerra" on Justia Law