Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Erica Ortiz and a few friends went to a dance club in Newark. Defendant and her boyfriend, Oscar Rodriguez, went to the club that night as well. At about 1:35 a.m., while in the bathroom, defendant got into a fight with Ortiz and her friend, Jessica Machado. A security guard broke up the fight and escorted defendant and Rodriguez out of the club. Ortiz left the club at closing time, around 3:00 a.m., with two friends, Christina Gratacos and Nihar Patel. As the three walked to Patel's car, defendant and Rodriguez drove up to Ortiz and her friends. Rodriguez jumped out of the car and punched Ortiz in the face. Patel, who stepped in to help Ortiz, fought with Rodriguez. Meanwhile, defendant left the car and fought with Ortiz again. Bystanders eventually intervened and broke up the fight. Defendant and Rodriguez then got back in their car, and Rodriguez drove off. Minutes later, they returned. Rodriguez got out of the driver's side of the car and began to fight with Patel again; others also joined in the fight. Ortiz was not involved in this part of the brawl. From the sidewalk, she saw a jacket on the ground that she thought belonged to Patel. She went to pick up the jacket, which was in front of defendant's car. At that moment, defendant moved from the passenger's to the driver's seat, put the car into gear, turned the wheel, and drove into Ortiz. Ortiz became lodged under the car and was dragged about fifty feet. When defendant turned a corner, the back tire ran over Ortiz, who was dislodged from the car. Defendant drove off. A grand jury returned an indictment that charged defendant with several crimes, including first-degree attempted murder, fourth-degree aggravated assault by automobile, and third-degree endangering an injured victim. On appeal, for the first time, defendant argued that the trial judge omitted an element of the offense for endangering: that a defendant's flight increased the risk of further harm to the victim. The Appellate Division disagreed, concluding that the jury charge complied with the law and fully recited the three statutory elements of the offense. The panel found no fourth element under the statute. The panel also found sufficient evidence to support the endangering conviction. Agreeing with the Appellate Division's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Munafo" on Justia Law

Defendant Dontae Hathaway was charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon following the discovery of a handgun in his room at the Taj Mahal Hotel and Casino in Atlantic City. Defendant moved to suppress the gun, arguing that its discovery was the product of an unconstitutional search. At the suppression hearing, Officer James Armstrong of the Atlantic City Police Department testified that while providing additional security at the casino, he was called to the security podium. Several security officers conveyed that an unidentified hotel patron, who was no longer present at the podium, had reported that two black males robbed him at gunpoint in a room on the 70th floor. A four-member SWAT team arrived. Officer Armstrong was told that video footage showed the unidentified patron on an elevator with a white male, a black male, and two females. It was observed that the elevator stopped on the 70thfloor, and five individuals proceeded to Room 7023. An unidentified patron later left in what appeared to be a panicked state. Concerned that there could be an armed gunman in the casino or barricaded in the room, possibly with hostages or victims, Officer Armstrong, the SWAT team, and casino security officers set themselves up outside Room 7023. When calls to the room, via telephone and orally through the slightly open door, went unanswered, the officers entered with guns drawn. They found neither victims nor a gunman. However, an open duffel bag was on a cabinet by the bed, in which an automatic black Beretta handgun was readily visible. Security determined that the room was registered to defendant, whose name was found on documents inside the bag. The trial court suppressed evidence of the handgun, finding that Officer Armstrong should have viewed the footage himself prior to taking action. It also deemed the unidentified patron's report unreliable, and found that Officer Armstrong improperly relied on hearsay filtered through untrained security personnel. The State moved for leave to appeal, and the Appellate Division affirmed the suppression. Viewing the events as they appeared to an objectively reasonable police officer, and based on the evidence presented by the State at the suppression hearing, the Supreme Court concluded the police acted within the scope of the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement, and the gun should not have been suppressed. View "New Jersey v. Hathaway" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether an initiative petition filed under the Optional Municipal Charter Law (known as the Faulkner Act), requiring the City of Camden to create and maintain its own police force, and enjoining the municipality from replacing its police force with a countywide police force, unlawfully restricted the municipality's legislative authority or was preempted by state fiscal statutes. Defendants, a group of City voters acting as a Committee of Petitioners (Committee), attempted to block the regionalization of the City's police services. The Committee invoked the Optional Municipal Charter Law. The Committee submitted an initiative petition for the adoption of a proposed ordinance that would have required the City of Camden to create and maintain its own police force, and would have enjoined the City from disbanding its municipal police force and replacing it with a regionalized or countywide police force. The Committee obtained, on its petition, the number of voter signatures required by the Faulkner Act. It sought to have its initiated ordinance certified by the municipal clerk, considered by the City Council, and, if not enacted by the Council, placed on the ballot for voter approval in the 2012 General Election. Plaintiffs Mayor Dana L. Redd, Camden's Mayor, and Camden's Council President Francisco Moran filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the Committee's Faulkner Act initiative. The trial court found that the proposed ordinance constituted an invalid divestment of the City's legislative authority. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for a determination whether the state fiscal statutes preempt the proposed ordinance. Although the Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division that the proposed ordinance does not constitute an improper divestment of the municipal governing body's legislative power, it disagreed with the panel's remand of the case for further inquiry into the question of preemption. The Supreme Court found no evidence of a legislative intent to preempt the initiative and referendum procedure set forth in the Faulkner Act in either the municipal finance or police statutes cited in this appeal. Instead, the Court found a legislative intent in some of the statutes to retain the Faulkner Act's procedures, including its initiative and referendum provisions. Thus, the Committee's Faulkner Act initiative was not preempted. Notwithstanding the Court's holdings that the proposed ordinance neither effected an unlawful divestment of legislative power nor was preempted by state statutes, the relief sought by the Committee in its 2012 petition was not granted in a manner consistent with the Faulkner Act. Because the reorganization that the ordinance was intended to forestall was completed more than two years ago, the ordinance as drafted was inconsistent with then-current circumstances. Accordingly, the ordinance might no longer be supported by all of the citizens who backed it with their signatures, and it could not meaningfully be evaluated by the voters. The presence of an out-of-date ordinance on the ballot would contravene the Faulkner Act's objective that voters be presented with a clear, understandable proposed ordinance that they may accept or reject as they see fit. Accordingly, The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Appellate Division's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of a judgment barring the Camden Municipal Clerk from certifying the Committee's petition. View "Redd v. Bowman" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal were the circumstances under which a law enforcement officer may legally enter a disabled vehicle to obtain the driver's registration and insurance information without first requesting the driver's permission or allowing the driver the opportunity to retrieve the documents himself. This became an issue when the officer found a handgun and marijuana inside an open backpack inside the disabled vehicle. Defendant was arrested and subsequently charged with multiple weapons offenses The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence found in the car, finding that the trooper lawfully conducted a search for defendant's credentials and was therefore permitted to seize any evidence discovered in plain view. The Appellate Division disagreed, finding that the trooper never gave defendant the opportunity to present his credentials. Therefore, since the trooper was not lawfully in the viewing area of the contraband, the Appellate Division found that the plain view exception did not apply, and reversed the trial court. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division, finding that the trooper was required to provide defendant with the opportunity to present his credentials before entering the vehicle. "If such an opportunity is presented, and defendant is unable or unwilling to produce his registration or insurance information, only then may an officer conduct a search for those credentials." View "New Jersey v. Keaton" on Justia Law

Police arrived at defendant Evan Reece's home to investigate a dropped 9-1-1 call that originated there. Defendant denied making any such call, and insisted that he was alone in the home, although responding officer Sergeant Delagarza had observed three vehicles in the driveway. Defendant retrieved and displayed his cordless home phone to Delagarza, which did not show any call to 9-1-1 in its memory. Delagarza looked into the house through the front door that defendant had left open, and saw nothing unusual or suspicious. Nevertheless, Delagarza called for a backup, and with defendant present, confirmed with the police dispatcher that the originating number of the call was defendant's home phone number. During these communications, Delagarza noticed a small abrasion on the knuckle of defendant s hand, which Delagarza stated was similar to the result of punching something. Delagarza asked defendant if he was married, and defendant stated that he was, further stating that his marital status was none of Delagarza's business. Delagarza noticed that defendant's demeanor began to change at this point, and he became frustrated with Delagarza's presence and his questioning. Delagarza asked if he could enter the house and look around, but defendant refused consent. Delagarza then called for assistance and told defendant that he and the other officers needed to check the house. Defendant responded by slamming the door closed and attempting to lock it, while the officers pushed the door open. Delagarza announced that defendant was under arrest, and the officers entered defendant s residence. Defendant attempted to block their entry, and a struggle ensued. After being subdued, defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of simple assault, one count of resisting arrest, and one count of obstructing the administration of law. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge held that, under the emergency-aid doctrine, the officers were entitled to enter defendant's home without a warrant. Based on this finding, the court held that defendant's attempt to deny them access constituted obstruction. The court also made specific credibility findings. Defendant was found guilty of one count of simple assault, resisting arrest, and obstruction. Defendant was acquitted of the other count of simple assault. On appeal to the Law Division, defendant was found guilty of resisting arrest and obstruction, and not guilty of simple assault. In a split decision, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction for resisting arrest, and reversed the conviction for obstruction, a majority of the panel finding that the emergency-aid doctrine did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the emergency-aid doctrine justified the officers warrantless entry into defendant's home. Furthermore, because the credibility and factual findings of the municipal court and Law Division were supported by substantial evidence, the Court affirmed defendant's conviction for resisting arrest and reinstated defendant's obstruction conviction. View "New Jersey v. Reece" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant called 9-1-1 requesting assistance for his five-month old daughter, reporting that she was not breathing. When the police arrived, the infant was in an ambulance about to be taken to the hospital. Defendant told a detective that, upon observing his daughter lying in bed, he noticed that she was not breathing. Defendant acceded to the detective's request that he come to the police station to provide further information that may be helpful for his daughter s treatment. Defendant was at the police station for a total of three hours (including breaks), during which he was interviewed for some forty minutes. Defendant told the detective that, earlier in the day, his girlfriend told him that the baby was cranky, and he tried to calm her over several hours. At the conclusion of the interview, the detective drove defendant home. At no time prior to or while at the police station was defendant given Miranda warnings. Defendant's daughter was declared dead three days later. Approximately 7 months later, defendant was arrested, and after being read his Miranda rights, admitted that he tossed the baby toward the bed, causing her to hit the wall. Defendant was subsequently indicted for second-degree manslaughter and second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress his statement, concluding that defendant was in custody at the time of the interview and that his rights were violated when he was not administered Miranda warnings. The court relied on several key factors regarding the detective's interaction with defendant, including the detective's instruction that defendant sit in a certain chair to permit the video camera to obtain a full face view of defendant, the detective's physical proximity to defendant, and the probing nature of the questions that defendant was asked. The court also relied on testimony of witnesses at the evidentiary hearing demonstrating that the detective asked defendant to accompany him to the police station, defendant was placed in the back seat of the unmarked police car, defendant and the detective did not converse during the ride to the police station, and the house was secured to prevent entry by anyone. The trial court found that, under all of the circumstances, no reasonable person in defendant s position would have felt free to leave the room or the police station. The Appellate Division concluded that defendant had not been subjected to a custodial interrogation. The court held that the failure to provide Miranda warnings therefore did not require suppression of defendant's statement. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the interview conducted by the detective at the police station was a custodial interrogation and the failure to administer Miranda warnings prior to the interview required suppression of that recorded statement. View "New Jersey v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with murder, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, carjacking, kidnapping, felony murder, terroristic threats, tampering with physical evidence, hindering apprehension, and aggravated assault. At trial, Q.M. recanted his statement and claimed that he never witnessed the murder, did not help dispose of the gun, and that a police officer had coerced him into lying. D.C. testified unequivocally that he saw defendant order the victim into the dumpster and then shoot him. As a result of Q.M. s recantation, and the differing accounts D.C. offered in his pretrial statements, the court allowed videotapes of both pretrial statements to be played for the jury in the courtroom. The State suggested, without defense objection, that a DVD player be made available for jurors to view the videotaped statements during deliberations. The trial court granted the request and during summation, the prosecutor urged the jury to watch the videotaped statements of both witnesses. Two days into deliberations, defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that a juror was tainted and stated that he may have been mistaken when he declined to object to the State's proposal to give jurors access to those statements during deliberations. The court did not remove the DVDs from the jury room, suggesting that doing so after two days of deliberations could be prejudicial to both parties. The jury returned a partial verdict, convicting defendant of everything except murder, carjacking, felony murder and aggravated assault. At defendant s retrial on the remaining counts, the witnesses testified again. D.C. testified that he witnessed the murder and identified defendant as the shooter, but added new details. Q.M. testified that he never witnessed the murder, did not help dispose of the gun, and that police had coerced him into identifying defendant. The court denied the State's request to allow D.C.'s pretrial statements to be allowed into evidence, but allowed the recording of Q.M.'s pretrial statement to be played for the jury. The State later informed the court that it had arranged for the jury to have access to a DVD player in the jury room. Defendant did not object to that procedure. The State again urged the jury to watch the DVD and to note the inconsistencies between Q.M.'s pretrial statement and his testimony on the stand. The jury convicted defendant of murder, carjacking, and felony murder, but acquitted him of aggravated assault. The court imposed an aggregate term of life plus thirty-five years, with a total period of parole ineligibility of more than eighty-five years. An appellate panel reversed, holding that both trial courts committed plain error when they permitted the juries unrestricted access to videotaped statements during deliberations. Given the content of the statements, and the strength of the other evidence presented by the State, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial courts' decisions permitting the juries access to the pretrial statements did not constitute plain error. View "New Jersey v. Weston" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested at a locked, fenced-in parking lot used for storage by an adjoining warehouse operated by Domino Manufacturing. Domino Manufacturing used the lot to store equipment for printing presses, including metal shafts and printing rollers which were kept outside because they were too heavy to be moved inside the warehouse. Defendant was attempting to exit the main gate in a pick-up truck in which the police found bolt cutters, the padlock from the gate, and eleven metal printing rollers. Defendant was charged with third-degree burglary, and disorderly persons possession of a burglary tool. Defendant was tried only on the burglary charge; the charge under the disorderly persons statute was dismissed. At the close of the State's evidence at trial, defendant moved for acquittal on the ground that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the premises that defendant entered was a "structure" as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:18-1, contending that defendant entered a parking lot, which is not a "structure" within the statute. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the fenced-in area was a prohibited space not open to the public, as well as a place adapted for the conduct of Domino Manufacturing's business, and therefore it constituted a "structure." Defendant was convicted of third-degree burglary, and sentenced to five years in prison. He appealed, challenging the trial court's conclusion that the fenced-in parking lot was a "structure." Finding no error in the trial court's analysis, the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Olivero" on Justia Law

Two indictments were pending against defendant Aakash Dalal. The first charged defendant with a series of offenses directed against four synagogues and a Jewish community center. The second charged defendant with conspiracy to murder the assistant prosecutor, conspiracy to possess a firearm, and terroristic threats after a jailhouse informant's tip lead law enforcement to obtain a search warrant of his cell and found handwritten documents, including a chart of ENEMIES that listed the criminal presiding judge as a high profile enemy and the assistant prosecutor on defendant s case as a tactical enemy. Defendant moved to dismiss both indictments and sought to recuse the presiding judge. After the State observed that the evidence provided a significant reason for the court to recuse itself, the presiding judge transferred the proceedings to a third judge (the trial court). The trial court subsequently denied defendant's motions to recuse the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office and for a change of venue based on pretrial publicity. The Appellate Division granted defendant s motion for leave to appeal and reversed. Although the panel was "confident" the trial judge could actually preside fairly and impartially, it concluded that the appearance of fairness in the future proceedings will be impaired so long as a Bergen judge presided over the matter. The panel remanded the matter to the assignment judge to either transfer the matter to another vicinage or arrange to have a judge from another vicinage preside over the case. The assignment judge transferred the matter to an adjacent county. The Court granted the State's motion for leave to appeal. As part of its consideration, the Supreme Court noted two relevant developments since the motion was first addressed: neither the presiding judge nor the judge who ruled on defendant's bail served in the adjacent Bergen Vicinage. Effective May 1, 2015, the presiding judge was assigned to the Passaic Vicinage, Civil Division for reasons unrelated to this matter. The other judge retired in August 2014. "Not all threats or efforts to intimidate a judge will require recusal." But the Supreme Court felt that given the serious nature of the threat, the absence of any proof of manipulation, the potential introduction of the evidence in one of the trials, and the relationships among judges within the Bergen Vicinage, a reasonable, fully informed observer could have doubts about a Bergen County judge's impartiality. The matter was remanded to the Bergen County assignment judge for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Dalal" on Justia Law

Defendants William Roseman and Lori Lewin were married from 1992 until 2000, during which time Roseman was the Mayor of Carlstadt. As his wife, Lewin was entitled to, and received, benefits under Carlstadt's health plan. After their divorce, each was responsible for their own health insurance pursuant to the divorce decree; Roseman and the son of the marriage would remain on Carlstadt's plan and Lewin was to be provided health insurance coverage through her employer. Roseman notified a Carlstadt payroll clerk, who also served as the Assistant to the Insurance Officer, of the divorce. At the direction of the clerk, Roseman changed his W-4 tax form to reflect that he was no longer married, but the clerk failed to remove Lewin's name from Carlstadt's plan. As a result, following the divorce, Lewin remained on Carlstadt's plan, in addition to her own employer-provided health insurance plan. In July 2009, Roseman and Lewin were indicted on one count each of third-degree conspiracy, third-degree theft by deception, and second-degree official misconduct. Even though other individuals also were eligible to improperly receive benefits under Carlstadt's plan, Roseman and Lewin were the only individuals prosecuted. Roseman and Lewin rejected a plea offer and applied for admission into Pretrial Intervention (PTI). Initially, Roseman was rejected, but after he informed the prosecutor that he would agree to resign and be subject to a lifetime disqualification from office in exchange for PTI, approval of the agreement was sought and obtained by the prosecutor from the Attorney General's office. The prosecutor also expressed his willingness to dismiss the indictment against Lewin if Roseman was admitted into PTI under those conditions. Subsequently, defendants reconsidered and rejected the conditioned PTI offer, and Roseman filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The trial court dismissed the official misconduct charges, but refused to dismiss the remaining charges. The State filed an interlocutory appeal. The Appellate Division reversed the trial judge and reinstated the official misconduct counts of the indictment.. Defendants' efforts to resolve the matter failed because Roseman refused to resign and agree never to pursue public office in the future as conditions to any agreement. As a result, the prosecutor rejected in writing both defendants PTI applications, citing the presumption against PTI for second-degree offenses under the Guidelines for PTI provided in Rule 3:28 and eleven of the seventeen factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). The trial judge, over the objection of the prosecutor, ordered that Roseman and Lewin be admitted into PTI without conditions, finding that the prosecutor s decision to deny PTI was a patent and gross abuse of discretion. The State appealed. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed, finding that Roseman failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the prosecutor patently and grossly abused his discretion. As to Lewin, the panel remanded the matter for an individualized assessment. After review, the Supreme Court concluded defendants demonstrated extraordinary circumstances to overcome the presumption against Pretrial Intervention (PTI) for second-degree offenses and there was no factual justification for the application of the factors set forth by the prosecutor under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). "Denial of defendants' applications to Pretrial Intervention (PTI) by the prosecutor was plainly a patent and gross abuse of discretion." View "New Jersey v. Roseman" on Justia Law