Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1996, defendant Duquene Pierre was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree felony murder, and several other offenses, arising from a fatal shooting in Elizabeth. Defendant was one of several suspects arrested for the shooting. He maintained that when the crime occurred at 3:19 a.m. on March 20, 1994, he and one of his codefendants were not in New Jersey, but on their way to Florida to visit defendant's relatives. This appeal stems from the denial of defendant's application for post-conviction relief (PCR), based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. In evidentiary hearings before the PCR court, defendant presented evidence that, if called to testify, his brother Kirby Pierre and sister Astrid Pierre would have stated that in March 1994, Kirby did not know how to drive and did not travel to Florida. Defendant also presented evidence that the remainder of Reid s telephone bill, not offered into evidence at trial, would have supported his contention that he was in Florida in the days that followed the Elizabeth shooting. Finally, three of defendant's relatives testified that defendant visited each of them in Florida in March 1994, but defendant's trial counsel did not contact them to ascertain their knowledge of those visits. The PCR court denied defendant's PCR application, and the Appellate Division affirmed that determination. By virtue of the combined errors of his trial counsel, the Supreme Court reversed the PCR and the appellate courts' decisions denying relief, finding that defendant was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution. The Court concluded defendant was entitled to a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Pierre" on Justia Law

In June 2005, O.M. disclosed that her stepfather, defendant R.P., sexually abused her beginning when she was twelve years old. The abuse resulted in two pregnancies, one of which was terminated and one of which resulted in the birth of M.M. when O.M. was sixteen or seventeen years old. Following DNA testing of O.M., M.M., and defendant, M.M.'s DNA profile was consistent with that of an offspring of O.M. and defendant. A Grand Jury returned a superseding indictment charging defendant with first-degree aggravated sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while she was less than thirteen years old; first-degree aggravated sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while she was at least thirteen but less than sixteen years old, and defendant was related to O.M. by affinity; first-degree aggravated sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while using physical force or coercion, and O.M. sustained severe personal injury; and second-degree sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while she was at least sixteen but less than eighteen years old. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault (count two), first-degree aggravated sexual assault (count three), and second-degree sexual assault (count four); the jury was unable to reach a verdict on count one, first-degree aggravated sexual assault. Defendant was sentenced to a twenty-six-year aggregate term of imprisonment with a thirteen-year period of parole ineligibility. Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial court committed plain error by failing to charge the jury on second-degree sexual assault as a lesser-included offense of first-degree aggravated sexual assault (count three). The appellate panel determined that because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have convicted defendant of second-degree sexual assault, the trial court's failure to issue such an instruction on count three was plain error. The panel reversed the conviction on count three, remanded for a new trial on that charge, and vacated defendant's sentence. The panel did not comment on the State's request that the verdict be molded to reflect a conviction for second-degree sexual assault as to count three. The State then moved for reconsideration and clarification as to whether the Appellate Division considered the State's contention that the verdict on count three should be molded to a conviction for second-degree sexual assault. The Appellate Division denied reconsideration without explanation. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that defendant was "given his day in court," that all the elements of sexual assault were included in the crime of aggravated sexual assault, and that there was no prejudice to defendant. The Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the matter to the trial court for entry of judgment against defendant on the lesser-included offense of second-degree sexual assault (count three) and for resentencing. View "New Jersey v. R.P." on Justia Law

A warrant secured by the police authorized a no-knock entry and search of defendant Antoine Watts' apartment and a search of defendant for controlled dangerous substances. Before executing the search warrant, police officers waited until defendant left his apartment. The officers detained defendant one and one-half blocks away on a busy urban street, frisking him for weapons and taking his apartment keys to avoid a forced entry of his residence. The officers decided not to conduct a more intrusive search of his person in public view. Defendant was then placed in an unmarked police car and taken back to his apartment. After defendant exited the vehicle, four bundles of heroin fell from the leg of his pants. Defendant moved to suppress the drugs, claiming that the police were forbidden from conducting a second search of his person after the pat down on the street. After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion, finding that the police acted unreasonably, and therefore unconstitutionally, by exposing defendant to successive searches. The court suppressed the drugs, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether police acted unconstitutionally unreasonably. The Court held that the police did not act in an objectively unreasonable manner in violation of our Federal and State Constitutions. "The initial search was limited in scope and did not bar the police from moving defendant to a more controlled location to complete the search for drugs in accordance with the warrant. We therefore reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings." View "New Jersey v. Watts" on Justia Law

Defendant William Witt was charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person. The police initiated a stop of defendant’s car because he did not dim his high beams when necessary, and a search of his vehicle uncovered the handgun. Defendant moved to suppress the gun on the ground that the police conducted an unreasonable search in violation of the New Jersey Constitution. Defendant’s sole argument was that the police did not have exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search of his car under “New Jersey v. Pena-Flores,” (198 N.J.6 (2009)). The Appellate Division granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal and affirmed the suppression of the gun because of the “utter absence” of any exigency to support the warrantless vehicle search that occurred, and because there was no justification for this motor vehicle stop. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed, holding that exigent-circumstances standard set forth in “Pena-Flores: was “unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.” View "New Jersey v. Witt" on Justia Law

Defendant Corey Morris appealed an order that denied his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Defendant was indicted on multiple counts of armed robbery, weapons offenses and eluding the police. At his first trial, defendant was convicted of eluding, but the jury deadlocked on all other charges. Prior to retrial, defendant and the State reached a plea agreement where defendant pled guilty to three armed robbery charges, and received three sentences of twenty years (to run concurrent to the twenty-year sentence for eluding), subject to the No Early Release Act. Defendant was permitted to represent himself on appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that “defendant’s arguments [were] without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.” View "New Jersey v. Morris" on Justia Law

Defendants Donald Lindsey and Martin Pierce engaged in a shoot-out in a residential neighborhood of Camden. They were not injured, but a four-year-old boy, B.T., was killed in the cross-fire. Following a joint trial, the jury convicted Lindsey of passion/provocation manslaughter of B.T., as a lesser-included offense of murder, (count one); and convicted Pierce of aggravated manslaughter as charged, (count two). Defendants were convicted of attempted murder of each other (counts three as to Lindsey, and four as to Pierce). Defendants were also convicted of various weapons offenses. Lindsey and Pierce were each convicted of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (count five as to Lindsey and count six as to Pierce); and unlawful possession of a handgun, (count seven as to Lindsey and count eight as to Pierce). Lindsey was convicted of unlawful possession of an assault firearm (count nine). Lindsey received an aggregate term of thirty-three years, and Pierce forty-two years the disparity primarily due to the different verdicts related to B.T.'s homicide. Among their asserted claims on appeal, one or both defendants argued the court erred in various evidentiary rulings; the court gave incorrect jury instructions, generally raised as plain error; the verdicts regarding B.T. homicide were inconsistent; and the sentences were excessive. Having reviewed defendants' arguments in light of the record and applicable principles of law, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, but remanded for resentencing. View "New Jersey v. Lindsey" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether defendant's repeated requests to speak with a family member during interrogation was sufficient to invoke the right to remain silent and, if so, whether defendant's subsequent statements and physical evidence recovered as a result of those statements should be suppressed. The jury found defendant guilty of second-degree passion/provocation manslaughter of his father; first-degree murder of his mother; third-degree hindering prosecution; third-degree theft; third-degree fraudulent use of a credit card; fourth-degree tampering with evidence; fourth-degree false swearing; and second-degree disturbing, moving or concealing human remains. Defendant received an aggregate sentence of sixty-four years in prison, with an 85% period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act. The Appellate Division concluded that defendant initially invoked his right to remain silent by requesting to speak to his uncle, the police improperly recorded that conversation and, as such, the trial court properly suppressed the recorded conversation with defendant's uncle. The Appellate Division concluded, as did the trial court, that defendant's statement to police was obtained voluntarily after the police re-administered defendant's Miranda rights. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Maltese" on Justia Law

At the conclusion of the first day of jury deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court asking if a particular juror could be excused from the case. The court responded to the question appropriately, generally explaining that a juror could not be excused for reasons related to differences with other jurors, but could for personal reasons, such as illness. The court gave the jurors the opportunity to raise the issue the next day at sidebar. No one did. The following day, Juror Number 2 did not appear for service. Over the objection of defense counsel, the trial court impanelled an alternate juror. The court declined defense counsel's request that the jurors be questioned about whether Juror Number 2 was the subject of the previous day's note. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the juror substitution. That motion was denied. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that the trial court erred in making the substitution before exploring whether the juror's failure to return to court was for reasons personal to the juror or due to the juror's interaction with the jury. The Supreme Court did not agree with the Appellate Division that the trial court's decision to place an alternate juror on the panel, without inquiring of the jury about the reasons for Juror Number 2's absence, was a fatal error requiring that the jury's verdict be overturned. "The court was well within its discretion to make the juror substitution under Rule1:8-2(d)(1) - even without an inquiry of the jury. . . .A juror's unexplained absence from the courthouse on deliberation day cannot, alone, sabotage a trial." View "New Jersey v. Musa" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether evidence seized after defendant's arrest, made in the absence of a valid warrant or probable cause, was subject to exclusion without application of an exception based on the subjective good faith of the executing officers, who relied upon an arrest warrant that had been judicially vacated but had not been removed from the computer database showing active warrants. In 2009, a Municipal Court Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of defendant for non-payment of fines owed to the City of Asbury Park. Defendant learned of that warrant while incarcerated in Bayside State Prison on an unrelated charge. He sent a letter to the municipal court requesting that his fines in connection with two matters (a criminal conviction and a motor vehicle violation) be vacated due to hardship. In 2010, another Municipal Court Judge granted defendant's request. The Asbury Park Municipal Court Administrator explained that once the vacation of a fine is entered into the relevant database, the outstanding warrant in that database is also vacated. The municipal court employees, not the police department, are responsible for entering that information. With respect to defendant, the administrator stated that a deputy municipal court administrator properly vacated the traffic fines in the "ATS" system but failed to go into the "ACS" system and vacate the criminal fines there. Therefore, the ACS computer system did not reflect that the criminal fines were vacated, and, correspondingly, the arrest warrant associated with those fines was not vacated. Defendant was later indicted for third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), and second degree possession of a CDS with intent to distribute. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from the police vehicle, contending that the officer's questioning and warrant check were unconstitutional. Following a hearing at which only the arresting officer testified, the court denied defendant's motion. On the eve of trial, defendant asked the court to reopen his suppression motion, relying on a letter from the municipal court which indicated that his fines had been vacated. The court reopened defendant's motion, and, following a hearing at which the municipal court administrator testified, granted the motion to suppress. The court found that defendant was arrested unlawfully, the drugs seized from the vehicle were inadmissible fruits of an unlawful arrest, and that the lack of culpability of the police department was irrelevant. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division. "The arresting officer's good faith belief that a valid warrant for defendant's arrest was outstanding cannot render an arrest made in the absence of a valid warrant or probable cause constitutionally compliant." View "New Jersey v. Shannon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court consolidated two appeals in this opinion. J.S. was a thirty-four-year-old former New Jersey resident, who, in 2000, while a sophomore at Kean University, was arrested after twice selling marijuana to an undercover police officer during a five-day period. He pled guilty to a fourth-degree distribution charge arising from a June 16 sale, and a third-degree distribution charge arising from a June 21 sale. J.S. was sentenced to a three-year term of noncustodial probation. Five years after completing his sentence, he filed the expungement petition that was the subject of this appeal. The trial court granted J.S. s petition, reasoning that his two offenses were a single spree that constituted a solitary crime. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed. G.P.B. was a fifty-two-year-old New Jersey resident and business owner, who, in 1999, committed several offenses in support of a scheme to offer illegal gifts to local officials in a particular municipality, in order to obtain a public contract for his business and a specific vote on a municipal resolution. G.P.B. pled guilty to four offenses: one count of third-degree conspiracy to offer gifts to a public servant and three counts of third-degree offering gifts to a public servant. He was sentenced to a county correctional facility for thirty days and ordered to perform 100 hours of community service and pay a $10,000 fine. G.P.B. petitioned for expungement approximately ten years after his convictions. The trial court granted G.P.B. s petition, reasoning that his crimes were all part of a continuing conspiracy to influence a governing body and achieve a single aim, and that the conspiracy linked the charges together as one crime. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division reversed, noting that G.P.B. had pled guilty to four offenses committed on two separate days, the panel concluded that he was not entitled to expungement. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division in both appeals: "[t]he plain language of N.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a) precludes expungement of convictions when the petitioner has been convicted of multiple crimes, even when those crimes occurred within a short span of time. [. . .] We conclude that, as it is currently drafted, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) does not authorize expungement of the criminal records of individuals who are in the position of petitioners. If the Legislature determines that expungement should be available to such individuals, it can amend the statute to clarify its intent in that regard." View "In the Matter of the Expungement Petition of J.S." on Justia Law