Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Lee Funderburg had a romantic relationship with Terra Andrews, which resulted in the birth of a son. After the relationship ended, defendant and Andrews shared parenting responsibilities for their child. Later, Andrews began dating Leno Parham. After Andrews and Parham had been dating for about one year, Parham and defendant developed a somewhat tense relationship, and the two exchanged angry words. Defendant and Parham did not interact again until early 2009, when Andrews and Parham arrived at defendant's house to pick up the baby. As Parham buckled the baby into his car seat, defendant reached into Andrews's parked car and took the keys out of the ignition. Andrews and defendant began arguing, and Parham intervened on Andrews's behalf. Parham chased defendant for ten to fifteen minutes in an effort to reclaim the keys. At some point, defendant brandished a knife. After giving up the chase, Parham leaned against the car, at which point defendant lunged at him and punched him several times in the chest. Defendant's father and brother (who were nearby) intervened to separate the men. When Parham stepped away, he realized he had been stabbed and immediately sought medical attention. He sustained life-threatening injuries and underwent major surgery but survived. Defendant was arrested and charged with attempted murder and aggravated assault, as well as related weapons charges. At trial, defense counsel's theory of the case was that defendant pulled out a knife after Parham began chasing him because defendant was fearful and wanted the chase to stop. Defense counsel asserted that defendant did not intentionally stab Parham when he lunged at him; rather, he contended that Parham was accidentally stabbed during a chaotic struggle for control of the knife. The jury found defendant guilty on all counts. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted passion/provocation manslaughter, and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that defendant was not entitled to the lesser-included jury instruction. In particular, the Court found insufficient evidence before the jury to demonstrate that a reasonable person in Funderburg's position would have been adequately provoked by Parham's behavior. View "New Jersey v. Funderburg" on Justia Law

Defendant Demetrius Cope lived in a second-floor apartment with a back porch adjacent to its living room. Three officers positioned themselves behind the building, while Sergeant Brintzinghoffer and two other officers knocked on the front door. After knocking, the sergeant heard a commotion inside the apartment. He announced that he had a warrant, and seconds later, an officer guarding the rear called out that defendant had run into the apartment from the back porch. April Grant, defendant's adult daughter, opened the door. Sergeant Brintzinghoffer and another officer climbed the stairs, walked into the living room, and arrested defendant. Sergeant Brintzinghoffer conducted a protective sweep of the bedroom, bathroom, and back porch to ensure that no one could launch a surprise attack. When he stepped onto the porch, he saw a bag on the floor next to a storage bin in which he feared someone might be hiding. He picked up the bag and knew by its weight and feel that a rifle was inside. He opened the bag and found an assault-type rifle, a banana clip, and numerous rounds of ammunition. The bag and its contents were seized as evidence. The trial court found the sergeant credible and denied defendant's motion to suppress the contents of the bag on the basis that the officer conducted a permissive protective sweep, during which he discovered the rifle. The Appellate Division reversed defendant's conviction, concluding that the rifle should have been suppressed because the police did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of danger that justified the protective sweep. The panel also found that the trial court improperly denied defendant the right to advance a third-party-guilt defense. The Supreme Court agreed that defendant's conviction should have been reversed because defendant was denied the right to present a full third-party-guilt defense. The witness' account of having placed the rifle in defendant s apartment was not factually impossible, however implausible it may have seemed to the trial court. The final arbiter of the witness' credibility should have been the jury, not the court. The Supreme Court disagreed, however, with the Appellate Division's conclusion that the trial court erred in not suppressing the rifle. After arresting defendant in his living room, the police conducted a protective sweep of an adjoining porch to ensure that no individuals posing a safety risk were on the premises. The protective sweep did not violate constitutional standards. View "New Jersey v. Cope" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Patrick McFarlane of first-degree murder, felony-murder, and armed robbery, and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. During sentencing, the State requested an aggregate term of eighty years, subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act (NERA). Defendant requested a thirty-year term with thirty years parole ineligibility on the murder count, and a concurrent ten-year term on the robbery count, subject to NERA. After mentioning his assessment of the aggravating and mitigating factors and merging the felony murder and unlawful gun possession charges, the judge imposed a sixty-year sentence on the first-degree murder count and a concurrent twenty-year term on the first-degree armed robbery count, both subject to NERA. Defendant appealed and moved to supplement the record with a transcript of a status conference in "New Jersey v. Brown," a different murder case involving the same judge that took place thirteen months after defendant's sentencing, as well as three judgments of conviction (JOC) by the same judge involving other defendants convicted of murder following jury trials. The transcript of the Brown status conference showed that, after the defendant rejected the State's plea offer of forty-five years for first-degree murder, the trial judge stated: "I always give defendants convicted by a jury [of first-degree murder] a minimum of 60 years NERA, and you can check my record." The three JOCs showed that the same judge sentenced three other defendants convicted by juries of first-degree murder to sixty-year terms of imprisonment, subject to NERA. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant McFarlane's s conviction and sentence, concluding that the trial judge adequately explained his reasons for finding the aggravating and mitigating factors. The Supreme Court vacated McFarlane's sentence and remanded for resentencing: "While we acknowledge the judge's subsequent explanation for his remarks, preservation of the public's confidence and trust in our system of criminal sentencing requires that the matter be remanded for resentencing by another judge of the same vicinage." View "New Jersey v. McFarlane" on Justia Law

In 2006, Jessica Shabazz was shot and killed, and James Sinclair was wounded at a motel. Defendant David Bass was arrested shortly thereafter. He admitted to police that, prior to the shooting, he had smoked crack cocaine with Shabazz and Sinclair in his motel room, that he and Shabazz had argued over money, and that he shot Shabazz and Sinclair with his handgun in self-defense. A jury convicted defendant of the knowing or purposeful murder of Shabazz, the attempted murder of Sinclair, and two weapons offenses. He was sentenced to a sixty-year aggregate term of incarceration. On appeal, defendant challenged three determinations by the trial court: (1) the trial court's limitation on the cross-examination of the State's lead witness, Sinclair; (2) the trial court's admission of the expert testimony of a medical examiner, who testified as a surrogate for another medical examiner who had conducted the autopsy of Shabazz, because that medical examiner died prior to defendant's trial; and (3) the trial should have charged the jury regarding the permissible use of force against an intruder. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Division. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's limitations on defendant s cross-examination of Sinclair constituted reversible error. The Court also reversed the Appellate Division's judgment affirming the trial court's admission of the expert testimony of a substitute medical examiner regarding the autopsy of Shabazz. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Bass" on Justia Law

Sundiata Acoli had been convicted for murder. He was denied parole twice. Acoli filed an internal administrative appeal, which entitled him to a review by the full Parole Board of the record that had been developed before the Board panel, as well as any additional material submitted by Acoli. Because he had not been recommended for parole, the full Board did not conduct an in-person assessment of Acoli consistent with its regulations governing the parole process. The Parole Board affirmed the denial of parole and the extended future parole eligibility date established for Acoli. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the Parole Board. The Supreme Court granted the Parole Board's petition for certification, which argued only that it was error, under the statutory process governing parole, for the Appellate Division to have proceeded directly to ordering Acoli's parole. Construction of the statutes governing the parole process lead the Supreme Court to conclude that the Appellate Division acted prematurely in ordering Acoli's parole release. The Appellate Division was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Acoli v. New Jersey Parole Board" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Robert Goodwin guilty of second-degree insurance fraud. In doing so, the jury concluded that defendant knowingly made or caused to be made false statements of material fact concerning an insurance claim for damage to his girlfriend's sport utility vehicle (SUV). The heart of the State's case was that defendant falsely reported the theft of the vehicle, which was found severely damaged as the result of arson. The insurance company discovered the lie during an investigation when defendant recanted his earlier story that the SUV had been stolen. As a result, the carrier did not reimburse the loss. The Appellate Division overturned defendant's conviction because the jury was not told that a finding of insurance fraud could be returned only if the carrier actually relied on defendant's false statements. In the Appellate Division's view, the trial court erred by charging a relaxed standard: that guilt could be found if the false statements had the capacity to influence the insurance company s decision to pay the claim. The Supreme Court reversed: a person violates the insurance fraud statute even if he does not succeed in duping an insurance carrier into paying a fraudulent claim. Because the Court concluded that the trial court did not err in its charge to the jury, defendant's conviction was reinstated. View "New Jersey v. Goodwin" on Justia Law

Defendant Howard Jones was charged with third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, and fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, arising from events that took place one morning in the spring of 2009 involving C.W., a fourteen-year-old girl. According to C.W.'s testimony, she was on her way to school when she saw a man standing there with his penis out. C.W. ran toward her school, and quickly encountered Leonard Wimbush. According to Wimbush, he saw a man emerge from the bushes and followed after him, but was unable to continue his pursuit after the man jumped a fence. Wimbush returned to the front of the building and waited for the police. When officers arrived, Wimbush joined police to search for the suspect. During the search, the responding officer came upon an individual wearing a gray sweatshirt, and asked the man (later identified as defendant) if he had seen anyone suspicious in the area. The man responded, "The gentleman who was exposing himself is on the track bed." Because the officer had not mentioned that he was looking for an individual who had exposed himself, he became interested. Defendant started to walk toward the back of the house to obtain his identification, and then ran away. Wimbush tackled the man, and the officer placed defendant under arrest. Following the close of the State's case, defendant moved to strike C.W.'s identification, arguing that it was tainted. Defense counsel noted that C.W. did not see defendant's face, that she recognized defendant only once the jacket was placed on him, that the officers never showed her any other suspects, and that Wimbush and the officer were standing next to defendant when he was identified. The trial court denied the motion, noting that, although one-on-one showup identifications are inherently suggestive, C.W.'s testimony was reliable because it was corroborated by Wimbush, who identified defendant and who provided a description that was essentially the same as the one provided by C.W. Defendant appealed, contending that [b]y placing the incriminating jacket on defendant after C.W. failed to identify defendant without the jacket, the police violated defendant's [due process] right to be free from suggestive police identification procedures that create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Defendant also challenged his sentence and the trail court's failure to charge lewdness as a lesser-included offense. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the State's argument that what occurred at this showup was an identification of an inanimate object. Here, C.W. was not simply identifying a jacket being shown to her by the police because it had been found near where defendant was located. "Placing a jacket on a person after his arrest and using that item of clothing during the eyewitness identification procedure when a witness is having difficulty identifying the suspect raises due process concerns." The case was remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Jones" on Justia Law

While driving from his residence to his mother's home one night in 2006, defendant Eugene Baum struck and killed two teenage girls who were walking in a bike lane of a major thoroughfare in Kinnelon. The responding officers found two beverage containers in defendant's car, one of which contained a liquid that was 7.7 percent ethyl alcohol (15 proof). Defendant could not maintain his balance, his speech was slurred, and he smelled strongly of alcohol. He told the police that he thought he had hit a deer, but was not sure. At the time of the incident, defendant's blood alcohol level was determined to be between .327 and .377, four times the legal limit. Defendant had taken a prescribed anti-depressant the night before, and Librium that morning to control his symptoms of alcohol withdrawal. Although he knew that Librium would intensify his intoxication, defendant stated that he consumed more than two alcoholic beverages, but did not know how much he actually consumed, before driving. Defendant stated that he drank because he was an alcoholic, and has struggled with alcoholism for approximately seven years. Defendant argued at trial that he lacked the mental capacity to act recklessly because of his intoxication, which he claimed was involuntary due to his mental diseases or defects of alcoholism and depression. The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree aggravated manslaughter and two counts of second-degree death by auto. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive twenty-year prison terms subject to eighty-five percent parole ineligibility. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction, but remanded for resentencing based on a reevaluation of the aggravating factors relied on by the sentencing court. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, alleging errors at trial constituted reversible error. Finding none, however, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Baum" on Justia Law

During an encounter that lasted ten seconds, a woman was robbed at gunpoint. She surrendered her purse with her cell phone inside it, and the robber drove away in a car. She later identified defendant Julius Smith as her assailant. Six weeks after the robbery, the State Police recovered the victim's cell phone when they arrested a third person. Law enforcement officers contacted the victim, but the prosecutor and local police did not learn about the discovery of the phone until the middle of defendant s trial -- fifteen months later. Defense counsel twice moved for a mistrial to investigate this critical information. The trial court took alternate measures to try to remedy the belated disclosure but denied defendant's motion. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court found that it was an abuse of discretion not to grant a mistrial, particularly in light of the materiality of the evidence that surfaced mid-trial, defendant's inability to investigate it while the short trial proceeded, and the nature and strength of the evidence against defendant. The Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division, which affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Jersey v. Smith" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review concerned a challenge to the validity of a municipal ordinance authorizing the issuance of $6,300,000 in bonds to finance a redevelopment project in the Township of West Orange. Plaintiffs filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs claiming that the Township failed to secure the statutorily required approval for the bond ordinance from the Local Finance Board, which is a part of the Division of Local Government Services within New Jersey's Department of Community Affairs. As a result, plaintiffs claim the bond ordinance was invalid. The trial court dismissed the action because plaintiffs filed their complaint fifty-three days after final publication of the bond ordinance (well outside the twenty-day period permitted by Rule 4:69-6(b)(11)). The Appellate Division affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court held that because plaintiffs did not present any extraordinary circumstances to allow the trial and appellate courts to consider their claims, those courts properly dismissed plaintiffs' petition. View "In re Petition for Referendum to Repeal Ordinance 2354-12 of the Twp. of W. Orange" on Justia Law