Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jason O’Donnell was a candidate for mayor of Bayonne, New Jersey in 2018. During the campaign, he allegedly accepted $10,000 in cash in a paper Baskin- Robbins bag from an individual. The State argued that in exchange for the money, defendant promised to appoint the individual as tax counsel for the city. The State charged defendant under the bribery statute. Defendant did not win the election. He contended the applicable statute did not apply to him because it did not cover candidates who accepted improper payments but were not elected. The trial court dismissed the indictment, finding that N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2(d) did not apply to defendant. The Appellate Division reversed. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed: the bribery statute applied to any “person” who accepts an improper benefit -- incumbents, candidates who win, and candidates who lose. The statute also expressly states that it is no defense to a prosecution if a person “was not qualified to act.” View "New Jersey v. O’Donnell" on Justia Law

Leander Williams pled guilty to non-violent third- and fourth-degree drug offenses. His primary parole eligibility date was approximately eight months after the New Jersey Earn Your Way Out Act (EYWO Act) became effective. During his prison sentence, Williams successfully completed multiple alcohol and drug rehabilitation programs, including an 87-day Alcoholics Anonymous program and a residential program in the "Bo Robinson" for 187 days. After the Bo Robinson program and while remaining in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Williams resided at the Harbor Residential Community Release Program for 90 days for further rehabilitation. Approximately one month before his primary parole eligibility date, a panel of the Parole Board certified that Williams met the “criteria for administrative parole release” under the EYWO Act, which entitled him to automatic administrative parole release. The panel imposed 21 general parole conditions and the “special” condition that Williams participate in an RTP for a minimum term of 180 days. Williams administratively appealed to the Parole Board, arguing that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59 precluded the panel from requiring an RTP as a condition of his administrative parole release under the EYWO Act. The panel upheld the imposition of residential treatment but recommended that the Board reduce his mandated “term” of 180 days to 90 days. Williams appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the Parole Board’s determination. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Parole Board could not mandate participation in an RTP for inmates administratively paroled under the EYWO Act. "Although N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59 generally authorizes the Parole Board to impose parole conditions on adult inmates who have been administratively released under the EYWO Act, an RTP is not among the conditions that can be imposed in that setting." View "Williams v. New Jersey State Parole Board" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal before the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether defendant Dante Allen was denied a fair trial because the trial court permitted a detective to present lay opinion testimony in which he narrated a video recording. According to defendant’s trial testimony, he was carrying a handgun he had recently acquired after a confrontation with a gang member made him fear for his safety. Officer Terrence McGhee suspected defendant had a weapon based on his behavior when McGhee passed in a patrol car, approached defendant and asked to speak. According to McGhee, defendant ran into a vacant lot, turned around, raised his gun, and fired at McGhee. McGhee testified that he then fired at and wounded defendant. Defendant was ultimately arrested and taken to a hospital. Shortly thereafter, Detective Michael Campanella, the lead forensic detective in the case, arrived at the scene. He inspected the gun and reviewed two surveillance videos from nearby buildings. During defendant’s trial, McGhee testified, in part narrating the videos as they were played for the jury. Campanella testified later, describing the steps taken in the investigation. After the State indicated its intent to replay the surveillance videos that the jury had already viewed during McGhee’s testimony, defense counsel objected. The State countered that Campanella would explain how the video “led him [to find] evidence, such as the shell casings and the bullets.” The trial court overruled the objection. The jury convicted defendant of attempted murder and other offenses. The Appellate Division found that the trial court had abused its discretion when it permitted Campanella to narrate the surveillance video but held that the error was harmless and affirmed. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the trial court should have excluded all the detective’s narration of the surveillance video. The Supreme Court found the trial court properly permitted the detective to testify about the manner in which he used the surveillance video to guide his investigation. But the detective’s testimony opining that the video showed defendant turning and firing his weapon should have been excluded from evidence. However, the Court found that error was harmless given the strength of the State’s evidence. View "New Jersey v. Allen" on Justia Law

Rosette Martinez was home with her daughter and her daughter's friend on Christmas Day in 2015 when she heard footsteps coming up the stairs. A man opened the door and stated, “I’m here for your dad, George,” leading her to believe he was there to fix something at the house. Martinez believed she recognized the intruder as someone who had recently done contracting work on their house. He then pulled out a “long gun,” instructed the women to lay face down, tied their hands behind their backs, and began to rifle through possessions. At some point during the robbery, the women heard the intruder’s phone ring and announce a “[c]all from” a name. The daughter testified that she heard the intruder’s phone announce an “incoming text” message from a name she did not recognize, but the message was not read aloud. All three women testified that they heard clicking noises that indicated to them that the intruder was taking pictures with his phone. After the intruder left, the women untied themselves and called 911. In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether it was cumulative error for the trial court to admit two pieces of evidence: expert testimony that defendant Roberson Burney’s cell phone was likely near a crime scene based on a “rule of thumb” approximation for cell tower ranges in the area, and a first-time in-court identification of defendant by a witness who had previously identified another person as the perpetrator in a photo lineup. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in admitting both the testimony placing defendant’s phone at or near the crime scene and the first-time in-court identification. Those errors, in combination, deprived defendant of a fair trial. View "New Jersey v. Burney" on Justia Law

In January 2017, an individual wearing a baseball cap and gloves robbed a bank in North Brunswick, New Jersey. Bank surveillance footage captured the entire 57-second robbery. In November 2017, defendant was charged in three other robberies after his former girlfriend, “Joan,” identified him in a wanted photo from one of those robberies. After the office investigating the other robberies notified police about defendant, he became a suspect in the North Brunswick robbery as well. In September 2018, a detective showed the teller six photos, one at a time, and asked if he could identify the person who robbed the bank. The teller picked a photo of someone other than defendant and said at trial that he was 75-90 percent sure of the identification. At trial, the prosecutor asked the teller if he could identify the robber in court. The teller identified defendant, who was seated in between his lawyers at counsel table. The teller said he was “maybe like . . . 80 percent” sure. The prosecution did not provide advance notice of the in-court identification, and defense counsel did not object to it. During cross-examination, the teller revealed that he had met with the prosecutor prior to trial and that the prosecutor had “informed [him] that the individual who was accused of committing this robbery is in court seated at the defense table.” Joan also testified at trial. She was shown two still photos from the bank surveillance video and testified she was 100 percent positive that each depicted defendant. A police sergeant testified about the investigation, in which he was asked a series of questions while the video was played for the jury. The more open-ended questions invited and led to more open-ended narrative responses. A jury found defendant guilty of robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding: (1) the inherently suggestive nature of first-time in-court identifications, conducted in front of a jury, risks depriving defendants of their due process rights; and (2) narration evidence, or "running commentary" on video evidence by someone who has merely studied a recording, violated defendant's right to confrontation. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Watson" on Justia Law

Defendant Rami Amer moved to dismiss his New Jersey indictment for offenses related to a series of burglaries, alleging a violation of his speedy trial rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). Defendant was arrested in New Jersey in November 2016 in connection with seventeen burglaries. He was arrested the next month in Pennsylvania in connection with a series of burglaries committed in that state. In October 2017, defendant pled guilty to the charges pending against him in Pennsylvania and was incarcerated there. On February 23, 2018, the State received defendant’s notice under the IAD, in which he requested the prompt disposition of his New Jersey charges. Defendant was transported from Pennsylvania to New Jersey the same day. On May 21, defendant filed two motions to suppress, which were denied on July 13. During jury selection on July 24, the trial judge informed counsel that after July 31, the trial would resume on September 13. Neither party objected to that proposed schedule, but when jury selection resumed the next day, defense counsel stated that the IAD required the trial to begin on August 22, 2018, and argued that defendant’s rights under the IAD would be violated if, for example, the court began a trial but “put it off [for] six months.” The trial court ultimately entered an order stating that trial had commenced for IAD purposes on July 24, 2018, when jury selection began, and that the IAD’s 180-day time period had been tolled between the filing and the denial of defendant’s motions. In an August 28, 2018 letter, defendant contended that the trial court had violated his rights under the IAD. Treating defendant’s letter as a motion to dismiss his indictment, the trial court denied the motion. In October 2018, the jury convicted defendant on four counts. The Appellate Division affirmed on that issue. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the trial court did not violate defendant’s speedy trial rights under the IAD, and it properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment. The Court did not agree with the Appellate Division that defense counsel waived defendant’s rights under the IAD. But the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s other determinations: that the IAD’s 180-day time period was tolled during the pendency of defendant’s pretrial motions, and that defendant was “brought to trial” when jury selection began prior to the deadline. View "New Jersey v. Amer" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review centered on whether Facebook could be compelled to provide the contents of two users’ accounts every 15 minutes for 30 days into the future based only on probable cause, the ordinary standard for a search warrant, or whether the State must instead satisfy certain requirements and apply for a wiretap order, which required an enhanced showing -- one beyond probable cause -- because gaining access to private communications in real time is considerably more intrusive than a typical search. In the two matters under review, trial courts quashed the State’s request for prospective information based on a Communications Data Warrant (CDW), which was the equivalent of a search warrant and can be issued on a showing of probable cause. The Appellate Division consolidated the cases and held that the State could obtain prospective electronic communications with a CDW, reasoning that the wiretap statute applied to the contemporaneous interception of electronic communications, not efforts to access communications in storage. The Supreme Court concluded that based on the language and structure of the relevant statutes, the State’s request for information from users’ accounts invokes heightened privacy protections. "The nearly contemporaneous acquisition of electronic communications here is the functional equivalent of wiretap surveillance and is therefore entitled to greater constitutional protection. New Jersey’s wiretap act applies in this case to safeguard individual privacy rights under the relevant statutes and the State Constitution." View "Facebook, Inc. v. State of New Jersey" on Justia Law

After receiving a “be on the lookout” (BOLO) email based on a tip from a confidential informant (CI) that defendant Cornelius Cohen would be traveling to the Carolinas to pick up firearms and bring them back to New Jersey to sell, State Trooper Charles Travis noticed one of the cars described in the BOLO email traveling on the New Jersey Turnpike, and pulled the vehicle over for traffic violations. When Travis approached the vehicle, he noticed multiple air fresheners hanging from the rearview mirror. Travis testified that he smelled “a strong odor of raw marijuana” in the vehicle during the stop and observed “greenish-brown vegetation” on the driver’s beard and shirt, which the trooper identified as marijuana. With defendant and his passenger handcuffed and in separate patrol cars, Travis started searching the passenger compartment, where he recovered from the glove compartment a 9mm spent shell casing. The search of the passenger compartment did not reveal any marijuana. Travis did not apply for a search warrant based on the information supplied by the CI, but instead proceeded to the front of the vehicle where he opened the vehicle’s hood and searched the engine compartment. There he found a rifle and a revolver. Travis then searched the trunk, where he found a duffle bag containing hollow point bullets. No marijuana was recovered from the car, defendant, or the passenger. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the car search. The trial court held that “[t]he odor of raw marijuana emanating from a vehicle without a detectible pinpoint establishes probable cause to search the entire vehicle.” Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of unlawful possession of a weapon, and appealed his eventual conviction. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that expanding the search to the engine compartment and trunk went beyond the scope of the automobile exception. As a result, the seized evidence should be suppressed. View "New Jersey v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Defendant Andreas Erazo was convicted for the 2017 rape and murder of eleven-year-old A.S. The Appellate Division found that defendant’s confession, obtained during a second interview, five hours after his initial 90-minute interview, was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and should have been suppressed. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding defendant was not in custody at the time of the pre-confession interview, thus Miranda was not implicated. The Supreme Court also found that the detectives’ tactics during the Mirandized interrogation were not coercive, did not minimize the Miranda warnings, and were consistent with New Jersey v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189 (2022). Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress. View "New Jersey v. Erazo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC (Gannett) sought an award of attorneys’ fees from its common law right of access claim to Internal Affiars (IA) files pertaining to a former Neptune Township, New Jersey police officer. In 2015, the former officer, Philip Seidel, killed his former wife. After a local prosecutor’s office issued a report on the Seidel case that was based in part on Seidle’s IA files, Gannett submitted an Open Public Records Act (OPRA) request and one under the common law, seeking copies of those files. The Township denied the request. A trial court ultimately dismissed Gannett’s OPRA claim but ordered the release of the contested records, redacted in accordance with guidelines prescribed in the court’s opinion, on the sole basis of the common law right of access. The trial court granted a partial fee award. The Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part: (1) it affirmed the trial court’s determination that Gannett had no claim under OPRA but was entitled to a redacted version of Seidle’s IA files pursuant to the common law; and (2) it held that the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized a right to counsel fees in common law right of access cases under certain circumstances in Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 57 (2008). On the facts presented, however, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s partial award of counsel fees. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, the Appellate Division’s judgment. “Imposing fee-shifting in this category of cases would venture far beyond the narrow exceptions to the American Rule that New Jersey courts have adopted to date. Accordingly, Gannett is not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees in this appeal.” View "Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC v. Township of Neptune" on Justia Law