Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In April 2011, detectives were engaged in an undercover drug patrol in Woodbridge when they observed defendant Taiwan Bacome driving a blue Ford Bronco. S.R., the owner of the Bronco, was riding in the front passenger seat. Having previously encountered both men, detectives knew the men used and dealt narcotics. The police department had also received complaints from defendant's neighbors of a lot of traffic coming and going from [his] apartment, which, in the detectives' experience, is often indicative of narcotics activity. In their unmarked vehicle, the detectives followed the Bronco, losing sight of it shortly after arriving in an area of Newark known for crime and drug trafficking. In an attempt to pick up the Bronco's trail, the detectives drove back to Woodbridge, presuming that defendant and S.R. would return there with newly purchased drugs. About an hour later, the detectives observed the Bronco re-enter Woodbridge. The detectives resumed surveillance and, after they both observed S.R. in the passenger seat not wearing his seatbelt, they conducted a traffic stop. In this appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified the circumstances under which police officers may require a passenger in an automobile to exit a vehicle after a valid stop. The first detective reported that he saw defendant lean forward as if he were reaching under his seat and immediately ordered defendant to exit the vehicle. The second detective then ordered S.R. out of the passenger's seat. Both occupants complied. Defendant specifically challenged S.R.'s removal from the vehicle. The trial court found that defendant's reaching under the seat created the heightened caution that warranted S.R.'s removal. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the detectives failed to prove "heightened caution." The Supreme Court reversed, finding that while the heightened caution standard remained the proper test for determining the appropriateness of ordering a passenger from a car, defendant's movements inside the stopped car was an objectively reasonable basis to justify removal of the passenger. View "New Jersey v. Bacome" on Justia Law

Police detectives observed defendant DeShaun Wilson engage in the apparent sale of crack cocaine in a public park in Elizabeth. Wilson was charged with third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, and second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute in or within 500 feet of a public park. During trial, the State sought to admit into evidence three related documents: a map of the park with a legend noting that the map was certified in 1998 by a Union County Engineer ; an affidavit by an assistant Union County prosecutor stating that he had personally worked with the Engineer in contracting a third party to produce maps depicting each 500-foot zone within the county; and Resolution No. 1513-99, passed by the Union County Board of Chosen Freeholders, depicting the 500-foot areas for the purposed of introducing the map as evidence of the locations and boundaries of those areas within Union County in criminal prosecutions under N.J.S.A.2C:35-7.1. Wilson objected to the admission of the three documents, arguing that the map had not been properly authenticated and that the affidavit was inadmissible hearsay. Wilson emphasized that he never had an opportunity to cross-examine the Union County prosecutor. The trial court disagreed and admitted the documents into evidence. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, and the court declared a mistrial. When the State moved to enter the map at the retrial, defense counsel objected that the map was inadmissible. The trial court admitted all three documents into evidence. Wilson was convicted of all charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the map was nontestimonial and that its admission did not violate Wilson’s confrontation rights. The Supreme Court agreed that the map was nontestimonial and its admission therefore did not violate Wilson’s confrontation rights. Further, such maps are admissible, if properly authenticated and as public records. However, the Court found the map was not properly authenticated and the Supreme Court felt constrained to reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment that the map was properly admitted into evidence at trial. The matter was remanded for a new trial because defendant’s conviction depended on the map. View "New Jersey v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The defendants in these appeals committed very serious, violent crimes when they were juveniles. One was serving a sentence of 110 years imprisonment and would not be eligible for parole until he spent 55 years in jail. At that time, he would be about 72 years old. The second was serving a 75-year term and was ineligible for parole until he served 68 years and 3 months in jail. He would then be 85 years old. The United States Supreme Court recognized the mitigating qualities of youth and directed that judges in those cases consider a number of factors at sentencing, including immaturity and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; family and home environment; family and peer pressures; an inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors or the juvenile s own attorney; and the possibility of rehabilitation. The New Jersey Court found the same concerns applied to sentences that were the practical equivalent of life without parole, like the ones in these appeals. "The proper focus belongs on the amount of real time a juvenile will spend in jail and not on the formal label attached to his sentence. To satisfy the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 12 of the State Constitution, which both prohibit cruel and unusual punishment, we direct that defendants be resentenced and that the 'Miller' factors be addressed at that time. [. . .] In short, judges should exercise a heightened level of care before they impose multiple consecutive sentences on juveniles which would result in lengthy jail terms." Both cases were remanded for resentencing. View "New Jersey v. Zuber" on Justia Law

Defendant J.R. was convicted for several sexual offenses against his step-granddaughter, who was between ten and twelve years old when the alleged offenses took place. The child did not disclose defendant's conduct to any adult; she told only her brothers, one of whom revealed the allegations to their mother almost two years after the abuse began. At defendant’s trial, the State proffered the testimony of a Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) expert to opine that child victims of sexual offenses sometimes delay reporting sexual abuse and to explain other aspects of victims' behavior. The trial court denied defendant's motion to bar the testimony. Testifying as the State’s first witness, the expert properly refrained from discussing the specific victim in this case. She told the jury, however, that studies of confirmed child victims of sexual abuse have reported a broad array of behaviors, ranging from a cooperative demeanor and academic success to disruptive and sadistic conduct, including in that broad description behaviors exhibited by the alleged victim in this case. The expert also invoked a highly publicized child sexual abuse scandal in her testimony. Defendant testified on his own behalf. He was convicted of all charges. Defendant appealed his conviction, raising the CSAAS expert’s opinion as his primary issue on appeal. An Appellate Division panel reversed his conviction on the ground that the CSAAS expert exceeded the bounds of proper expert opinion on that subject. The panel remanded for a new trial. After its review, the Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division panel that the expert's testimony did not entirely conform to the limitations placed on CSAAS evidence in prior New Jersey Supreme Court holdings. However, the Court concluded that the error was harmless: "[v]iewed in the context of all of the trial evidence heard by the jury, the CSAAS expert's improper statements were not clearly capable of producing an unjust result and do not warrant a new trial." Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for the Appellate Division panel to consider issues raised by defendant that the panel did not reach. View "New Jersey v. J.R." on Justia Law

The Township of Bloomfield (Township) declined to release a day's worth of videotape footage from a security camera attached to the second story of Bloomfield Town Hall, adjacent to the police station. The request came from a citizen request pursuant to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA). According to the Township, allowing unrestricted access to security camera videotape -- which would reveal not only what is and is not captured by the security camera, but also when and how well it is captured -- would undermine the purpose of having a security camera system protecting the buildings and people within them. The Township asserted that the security exclusions of OPRA permitted withholding the videotape. The Supreme Court agreed with this assertion and held security exclusions precluded disclosure under OPRA of the videotape requested in this matter. View "Gilleran v. Township of Bloomfield" on Justia Law

Officers were dispatched to a report of domestic violence when a woman called 911 to report that she had been assaulted and that she was outside in her vehicle. The woman did not give her name or that of the attacker, but did supply an address. Two officers proceeded directly to the indicated address. When defendant-appellant Charles Bryant, Jr. answered, the officers told him to take a seat on the couch. Bryant complied, and the two officers entered his home. While one officer questioned Bryant, the other conducted a protective sweep of the apartment, searching any place that potentially could harbor a person. During the course of the protective sweep, the officer spotted what he believed to be marijuana sticking out of a box on a closet shelf. The item was seized, Bryant was arrested and removed from his apartment, and a search warrant was obtained. Officers searching pursuant to the warrant found an assault weapon, approximately fifty-five grams of marijuana, and marijuana packaging materials. Bryant was charged with fourth-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, third-degree possession with intent to distribute, second-degree unlawful possession of an assault firearm, and second-degree possession of a firearm. Bryant was separately charged with second-degree persons not to possess a firearm. Bryant moved to suppress all of the evidence seized from the apartment as fruit of an illegal search. The trial court denied this motion, finding that the officers were lawfully present in the apartment and that, because they did not know whether the man who answered the door was the suspect, or whether the suspect was elsewhere in the apartment, the officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the area could be harboring an individual posing danger. After determining that the protective sweep doctrine obviated the need for a warrant, the trial could found that the marijuana located during the sweep was in plain view. The Appellate Division affirmed on substantially the grounds stated by the trial court. The Supreme Court, in its review of this case, focused on the guidelines surrounding law enforcement’s use of a warrantless protective sweep when investigating allegations of criminal activity. Under the circumstances here, the Court found that the law enforcement officers did not “adhere to the rigorous standards for proceeding without a warrant under the protective sweep doctrine.” Accordingly, the evidence obtained because of their impermissible search had to be suppressed. The Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded this matter back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Defendant Xiomara Gonzales appealed the denial of her motion to suppress evidence seized by police from the vehicle she was driving. Pursuant to an ongoing investigation of a drug-distribution scheme, the police learned that Gonzales and a codefendant were going to retrieve a package that day that the Prosecutor’s Office suspected would contain a large quantity of heroin. After Gonzales and the codefendant made two stops in separate cars, the codefendant placed two blue plastic bags on Gonzales’s back seat, and Gonzales headed toward the Garden State Parkway. Two officers followed Gonzales. They saw her speed, turn left on a red light, and pass through a toll on the Parkway without paying. The officers pulled her over to the shoulder of the road. As an officer approached Gonzales’s car, he saw that items had spilled from the blue bags onto the rear floorboard. He immediately identified the spilled items as bricks of heroin. Gonzales was arrested and the bags sealed. At a secure site, it was determined that the bags contained 270 bricks of heroin. Gonzales was charged with first-degree distribution of more than five ounces of heroin, first-degree possession of heroin with the intent to distribute, third-degree possession of heroin, and second-degree conspiracy to commit racketeering. Gonzales moved to suppress the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, determining that the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless seizure of the heroin. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that though the motor-vehicle stop was constitutional and the police officer was lawfully in position to view the drugs inside the vehicle, the officer had advance knowledge that drugs would be in the vehicle, the discovery was not inadvertent. On that basis, the panel determined that the warrantless seizure of the drugs was not authorized under the plain-view exception. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding that the inadvertence requirement for a plain-view seizure was “at odds with the objective-reasonableness standard that governs our state-law constitutional jurisprudence:” “we now hold that an inadvertent discovery of contraband or evidence of a crime is no longer a predicate for a plain-view seizure. [If] a police officer is lawfully in the viewing area and the nature of the evidence is immediately apparent (and other constitutional prerequisites are met), the evidence may be seized. [. . .] the discovery of the drugs in this case was sufficiently inadvertent to satisfy the then existing plain-view standard.” View "New Jersey v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review was whether a trial court that found a defendant competent to stand trial on criminal charges could compel her to assert an insanity defense, based on the evidence presented, where she has refused to do so. Through persistent efforts over more than a decade, defendant June Gorthy attempted to commence a relationship with C.L., a mental health therapist residing in New Jersey whom she met only briefly in 1998 at a conference in California. Defendant would ultimately be charged under a superseding indictment with stalking and weapons offenses. After reviewing defendant's medical records and mental health evaluation, and questioning defendant, the trial court concluded that she was competent to stand trial. Defendant declined to raise the insanity defense, over the objection of her attorney. The trial court concluded that defendant's delusional condition had limited her ability to knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily determine whether to raise the defense, and then asserted the defense on her behalf on the stalking charge. Defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity on that charge, and convicted on the weapons charges. The court entered an order of civil commitment on the stalking charge, and probation on the weapons convictions. Defendant appealed her conviction, challenging the trial court's decision to assert the insanity defense on her behalf, and also raising several trial errors. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's judgment on the insanity defense, and remanded for a bifurcated hearing on the insanity defense and the substantive defenses. The Supreme Court summarily remanded for reconsideration as to the insanity defense in light of the Court's disapproval of bifurcated proceedings where an insanity defense was raised. On the remand, another panel of the Appellate Division, in a published opinion, affirmed the trial court's judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity on the stalking charge. The panel rejected defendant's contention that because she was found competent to stand trial, the court should have permitted her to decline to raise the insanity defense, holding that a defendant's determination not to raise a defense was subject to a higher standard than that set by the competency statute. The Supreme Court held that in light of the trial court's finding that defendant was competent to stand trial, and the court's detailed explanation of the potential benefits and risks of the insanity defense in a colloquy with defendant, the trial court should have permitted defendant to decide whether or not to assert the defense. "However unwise defendant's strategy may have been, it constituted a competent defendant's decision about the conduct of her defense." Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity on the stalking charge. The case was remanded for a new competency determination and, if appropriate, a new trial on that charge. Because defendant's delusion was unrelated to her conviction for the two weapons offenses, and the trial errors that she alleged did not deprive her of a fair trial, the Supreme Court affirmed her conviction for those offenses. View "New Jersey v. Gorthy" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Township of Franklin (the Township) adopted an ordinance revising its regulation of signs, including billboards. The ordinance permits billboards, subject to multiple conditions, in a zoning district proximate to an interstate highway but expressly prohibited digital billboards anywhere in the municipality. A company seeking to install a digital billboard challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance. The Law Division declared unconstitutional that portion of the ordinance barring digital billboards. The trial court viewed the Township's treatment of such devices as a total ban on a mode of communication. In a reported opinion, the Appellate Division reversed. Applying the "Central Hudson" commercial speech standard and the "Clark/Ward" time, place, and manner standard to content-neutral regulations affecting speech, the appellate panel determined that the ban on digital billboards passed constitutional muster. The Supreme Court disagreed: "simply invoking aesthetics and public safety to ban a type of sign, without more, does not carry the day." The Court declared the 2010 ban on digital billboards as unconstitutional and reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "E&J Equities v. Board of Adjustment of Franklin Township" on Justia Law

What began as a fight between two students, C.W. and D.W., ended in the death of one of them. N.H., who was seventeen years old at the time, attended the fight to support his friend, D.W. N.H. allegedly grabbed a handgun from another individual and shot C.W. four times, including once in the back of the head. A video captured parts of the incident, and several witnesses made statements to the police that implicated N.H. N.H. also spoke to the police and said that he had shot only at the ground. At oral argument before the New Jersey Supreme Court, the State explained that it had not disclosed certain items in its possession which it did not intend to rely on at the waiver hearing. Those materials included additional witness statements, other police reports, and other videos of the event taken from different angles. N.H. moved for full discovery before the waiver hearing, and the trial court granted the request. The court analogized the filing of a juvenile complaint to the filing of a criminal indictment, which would trigger full discovery under Rule 3:13-3(b). The trial court stayed its order pending the outcome of the State's motion for leave to appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's order. The issue raised by the State's appeal in this matter was whether a juvenile was entitled to full discovery when the State sought to waive jurisdiction and transfer a case from juvenile to adult court. The Supreme Court held the State is indeed required to disclose all discovery in its possession when it seeks to waive jurisdiction and transfer a case from juvenile to adult court. View "New Jersey in the Interest of N.H." on Justia Law