Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The primary issue in this appeal involved the warrantless search of an apartment, where the police found drugs and evidence allegedly linking defendant to the apartment. Evidence seized from the apartment was the basis for multiple drug charges filed against defendant. At a suppression motion, the State argued that exigent circumstances and the need for a protective sweep justified the entry into the apartment and the seizure of evidence. The trial court upheld the search, apparently on standing grounds, finding that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment. A panel of the Appellate Division reversed and held that because defendant had automatic standing to challenge the search based on the possessory drug charges, defendant had no burden to establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment. The panel also rejected the State's assertion, raised for the first time on appeal, that the apartment was abandoned. The panel remanded to the trial court to determine whether the search was justified based on the protective-sweep or exigent-circumstances doctrine. The panel also reversed defendant s conviction based on the trial court s failure to give a mere presence charge. The Supreme Court affirmed the panel s determination that defendant had automatic standing to challenge the search of the apartment because he was charged with possessory drug offenses and because the State failed to show that the apartment was abandoned or that defendant was a trespasser. Additionally, although the Court found the better course would have been to give the jury an instruction on mere presence, the failure to do so was harmless error. The Court therefore vacated the panel's judgment requiring a new trial on that issue. View "New Jersey v. Randolph" on Justia Law

At a status conference, the State took issue with the witness list defendant produced because it listed the names of three men but did not provide identifiers, addresses, or synopses of their anticipated testimony which the State alleged was in violation of Rule3:13-3(b)(2)(C). In response, defendant agreed to produce identifiers and addresses but argued against providing synopses. Defendant asserted that the Rule required that synopses be produced only if they have already been reduced to writing. Defense counsel affirmed that no witness statement summaries had been prepared. The trial court ordered the defense to produce witness synopses and to create them if they had not been previously drafted. The court specifically ordered defense counsel to provide the State with the reason why the witnesses are on the list. The Appellate Division summarily reversed the trial court s order, reasoning that a criminal defendant s disclosures are carefully limited by the strictures of Rule3:13-3(b)(2). The Supreme Court found a plain reading of Rule3:13-3(b)(2)(C) required production of witness statements only if those statements have already been reduced to writing. Nothing in the rules precludes a trial court from ordering a defendant to designate witnesses as either character or fact witnesses, however. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division's reversal of the discovery order as it related to the witness statements and modify the panel's determination that the trial court improperly ordered defendant to designate fact and character witnesses. View "New Jersey v. Tier" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Supreme Court’s review was whether the protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement applied to a police officer’s search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment in the wake of a traffic stop. The officer conducted a brief conversation with defendant, who was the driver, and his three passengers; the vehicle’s occupants responded to the officer’s questions with confusing and evasive answers. The officer learned defendant and one passenger had outstanding warrants and were known to carry weapons. He requested backup and was promptly joined by four other officers. The five officers removed the four occupants from the vehicle and frisked them for weapons. They arrested and handcuffed defendant and one passenger and monitored the other passengers outside of the vehicle. None of the four resisted the officers or sought access to the vehicle. The police officer who had conducted the traffic stop then searched the interior of the vehicle. The officer lifted one passenger’s purse to search the seat, recognized that a weapon was contained in the purse, and retrieved a handgun. Charged with the unlawful possession of a handgun, defendant moved to suppress the weapon on the ground that it was the product of an unconstitutional search. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. A divided Appellate Division panel reversed the trial court’s judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that although the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that there was a weapon in the vehicle, the five officers’ swift and coordinated action eliminated the risk that any of the four occupants would gain immediate access to the weapon. Accordingly, the protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement did not govern this case. The Court concurred with the Appellate Division majority’s determination that the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement was irrelevant. However, because the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule could be pertinent to this case, the Court remanded for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a defendant seeking a waiver of the mandatory minimum sentence under the Graves Act was entitled to discovery of the prosecutor's files from cases in which other defendants were granted waivers of the mandatory minimum penalty. The Supreme Court determined defendants were not entitled to discovery of the prosecution's files for cases in which Graves Act waivers had been granted to other defendants. View "New Jersey v. Benjamin" on Justia Law

In consolidated sentencing appeals, the issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether an amendment to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A.2C:43-6.2 (section 6.2), which authorized a prosecutor to move before the assignment judge for a waiver of the Graves Act's mandatory minimum terms of incarceration for certain first-time offenders, was properly applied in defendants sentencing proceedings. The Court also considered whether sentencing judges have the discretion to elect one of the two alternative sentences set forth in section 6.2: to place the defendant on probation . . . or reduce to one year the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment during which the defendant will be ineligible for parole. After review, the Supreme Court concluded section 6.2 was misapplied in defendants' sentencing proceedings and therefore defendants should have been resentenced. The assignment judge, not the sentencing judge, has the authority to decide whether a defendant will be sentenced to a term of probation or a term of incarceration with a one-year period of parole ineligibility. If the defendant has been convicted of a first-degree or second-degree Graves Act offense, the assignment judge (or designee) must consider the presumption of incarceration prescribed by N.J.S.A.2C:44-1(d) when he or she chooses between the probationary and one-year mandatory minimum sentences envisioned by section 6.2. View "New Jersey v. Nance" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted defendant Carl Garrison on several counts of child sexual abuse. The charges stemmed from allegations of abuse against his girlfriend s daughter, Joan. Joan testified that defendant abused her throughout the summer of 2010, when she was eleven years old, both in Alabama and New Jersey. Prior to trial, defendant moved to exclude evidence of events that took place in Alabama as inadmissible other-crimes evidence under N.J.R.E.404(b). The State also presented an expert witness’ testimony who examined Joan and found no evidence of physical abuse. The trial court found that the evidence of what occurred in Alabama was admissible not as other-crimes evidence, but as intrinsic evidence of the charged crimes. The court provided limiting instructions to the jury at the time the evidence was introduced and in the final charge to the jury. The jury subsequently convicted defendant of three counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, two counts of second-degree sexual assault, and one count of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant received an aggregate sentence of fifty-two years in prison, with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility. Defendant appealed, arguing that evidence of events that allegedly took place in Alabama was improperly admitted. Although not raised below, defendant also contended that the admission of a portion of the expert’s statistics-based testimony was error. The Appellate Division reversed defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, rejecting the State’s contention that the Alabama evidence was intrinsic to the crimes charged and determined that this evidence should have been evaluated under N.J.R.E.404(b). The Appellate Division then concluded that the evidence failed to satisfy Rule404(b) and that its admission was not harmless error. In a footnote, the panel agreed that the expert’s testimony amounted to an improper opinion of Joan s credibility and constituted plain error. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the Alabama evidence was admissible and given an appropriate limiting instruction. View "New Jersey v. Garrison" on Justia Law

Before trial, defendant moved to exclude the results of a breath test in conjunction with a traffic stop, after which he was found to have been driving while intoxicated (DWI). His license was suspended. Defendant claimed that he was entitled to additional discovery, namely, more detailed repair records of the Alcotest device and data downloads of certain diagnostic tests. The municipal court judge found probable cause for the arrest and rejected defendant’s discovery arguments. The court found defendant guilty of DWI. The State dismissed the other charges. The court sentenced defendant to a total of $714 in fines and penalties, ordered him to serve twelve hours in the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center, and revoked his driving privileges for seven months, the minimum period for a first offender. Defendant requested, and without objection from the State, the municipal court judge stayed the license suspension for twenty days to allow defendant time to file an appeal. At a trial de novo before the Law Division, defendant again argued that the State failed to provide adequate discovery. The trial court rejected the claim, found defendant guilty, and imposed the same sentence. Defense counsel immediately moved to continue the stay of defendant’s license suspension, which the State opposed. The trial judge granted the request on the condition that defendant file an appeal within ten days. On appeal, defendant renewed his discovery argument. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division reviewed and rejected defendant s position. The Appellate Division also addressed an issue that the parties had not raised: both the municipal court and the Law Division stayed defendant’s license suspension pending appeal without providing any statement of reasons. Defendant filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court that did not challenge the conviction nor the sentence, only questioning the appropriate standards for a stay of judgment in a DWI case. Because defendant had completed his suspension, the standards outlined by the Supreme Court’s opinion did not apply. However, the standards announced by this opinion governed future requests for stay in a license suspension by municipal courts and the Law Division. View "New Jersey v. Robertson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged under separate indictments for multiple charges involving misconduct with two minors, D.H. and D.M. Defendant was arrested on November 19, 2009, and was confined until sentencing, which took place on August 22, 2012. In total, defendant spent 1007 days in pre-sentence custody. Defendant was sentenced on both indictments on August 22, 2012. For the aggravated sexual assault conviction, the court sentenced defendant to ten years imprisonment subject to an 85 percent parole ineligibility period. For the endangering the welfare of a child conviction, the court sentenced defendant to a concurrent term of three years imprisonment. The court applied 1007 days of jail credit to the sentences imposed under one of the indictments. The jail credits applied to the terms of imprisonment and to defendant's parole ineligibility period. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court was whether a defendant who was simultaneously sentenced to consecutive sentences on two separate indictments was entitled to the application of jail credit against both indictments. The Court held that a proper application the controlling caselaw entitled defendant to only 1007 total days of jail credit. Nothing warranted the application of double jail credit. "Instead, defendant's sentences should be viewed together and jail credit applied to the front end of the aggregate imprisonment term for both indictments." View "New Jersey v. C.H." on Justia Law

Although New Jersey prosecutors lodged an interstate detainer with New York officials on August 12, 2011, defendant William Joe was not transferred to New Jersey custody until after he was sentenced for the New York charges. Defendant pleaded guilty to the narcotics charges in New Jersey and sought jail credits for the time he spent in pre-sentence custody in New York. The trial court denied the credits sought, and sentenced defendant to two five-year prison terms subject to a twenty-one-month period of parole ineligibility. The sentences were to be served concurrently to each other and to any sentence defendant was serving outside of New Jersey. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether incarceration outside of New Jersey on out-of-state charges entitled defendant to jail credit. The Court answered that question in the negative. View "New Jersey v. Joe" on Justia Law

Defendant James Kucinski was arrested and taken to police headquarters for questioning about the bludgeoning death of his brother, John. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and he requested an attorney. The officers stopped the interrogation and met with their supervisor. After approximately eighty minutes they returned to the interview room and advised defendant that he was going to be charged with murder. Defendant then asked if he could speak with the officers. He was re-read his Miranda rights, which he waived. Defendant responded to a series of questions about events leading up to the fight and the injuries he sustained. As the interrogation went on, defendant continued to turn to other topics and to evade answering questions directly. Several times throughout the interrogation defendant answered questions with "I don't know." When asked how defendant felt about John's death, he said he would "rather just see a lawyer," and the interrogation ended. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statement to police and argued that the officers did not honor his invocation of the right to counsel. The court denied defendant's suppression motion, and the case proceeded to trial. The prosecutor asked one of the officers if defendant spoke in detail about the events on the day John died and if defendant was given an opportunity to explain what happened that day. When defense counsel objected, the trial judge sustained the objection but held that if defendant testified, the prosecutor would be permitted to cross-examine him on inconsistencies between his trial testimony and statements to police. Defendant elected to testify at trial and claimed to have acted in self-defense. On cross-examination, over defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor was permitted to question defendant about details defendant had testified to in his direct examination that contradicted what he said in his post-arrest statement to police. The prosecutor focused on details that defendant testified to but failed to mention to police during his interrogation. After further questioning by the prosecutor, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion but instructed the jury that defendant's right to remain silent should be limited to assessing defendant's credibility and may not be used to make the determination of guilt. Defense counsel did not object. The Appellate Division reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial, determining that the prosecutor's questions on cross-examination were improper. The panel found that defendant invoked his right to remain silent by telling the police that he did not want to talk about certain subjects and answer certain questions. The panel reasoned that, accordingly, the statements could not be used for any purpose, including impeachment. Further, the Appellate Division found the trial court's instructions to the jury were fatally flawed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division and affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Kucinski" on Justia Law