Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009, a detective responded to a robbery call and met with S.T. (the victim) and defendant Gary Twiggs, who stated they had been robbed by a white male wearing a mask, later identified as Dillon Tracy. A police officer took the mask for DNA analysis. In July 2014, police collected DNA from Tracy. His DNA matched the sample found on the mask. Tracy later confessed, implicating Twiggs. Based on Tracy’s testimony, police arrested Twiggs for conspiracy and the robbery, and a grand jury returned an indictment. Twiggs moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the claim was barred by the general criminal statute of limitations. The State responded that the DNA exception within N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) tolled the statute of limitations. The trial court found the DNA-tolling provision inapplicable and dismissed the indictment. A divided panel of the Appellate Division affirmed.In 2002, ten-year-old Iyonna Jones found a note from her mother, Elisha Jones -- intended for Iyonna’s aunt, Likisha Jones -- explaining that Iyonna’s nine-year-old sister, Jon-Niece Jones, had stopped breathing and that Elisha went to “tak[e] care of it.” Likisha called her brother, James Jones, telling him that there was a family emergency. James and Iyonna’s uncle, Godfrey Gibson, traveled to Elisha’s home. James, Gibson, and Elisha drove to a wooded area in Upper Freehold, New Jersey. Elisha took the bin into the woods. Nearly four months later, Elisha died. Years later, in March 2005, a hunter found a child’s skeletal remains. In July 2012, Iyonna provided information relating to the disappearance of Jon-Niece. Law enforcement compared Iyonna’s DNA and the DNA of Jon-Niece’s father to the DNA generated from the skeletal remains. In January 2013, a grand jury returned an indictment, charging James, Likisha, and Gibson with third-degree conspiracy, as well as substantive tampering, obstruction, and hindering charges. James and Likisha moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed the denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss the tampering, obstruction, and hindering charges; affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the conspiracy charge; and remanded for resentencing on the conspiracy charge. The Court granted the State’s petition and defendants’ cross-petitions for certification.Both cases implicated the DNA-tolling exception. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined the exception applied only when the State obtained DNA evidence that directly matched the defendant to physical evidence of a crime. Because the DNA identifications at issue in these cases did not directly link defendants to the relevant offenses, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of the indictments against defendant Gary Twiggs in its entirety and against defendants James and Likisha Jones in relevant part. View "New Jersey v. Twiggs" on Justia Law

The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in this appeal centered on whether a homeowner, who challenged the issuance of a zoning permit allowing construction on neighboring property, had a statutory right to be heard before the Borough’s Planning Board, and if so, whether the violation of that right gave rise to an action under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2. In 2009, the Borough of Spring Lake’s then zoning officer issued a zoning permit (First Permit) to Thomas Carter to construct a two-and-a-half-story residence. Plaintiff Mary Harz owned adjoining residential property and brought to the attention of the new Borough zoning officer her concern that Carter’s foundation exceeded the height permitted by the Borough’s zoning ordinance. The Supreme Court found that the Borough’s zoning officer did not adhere to the precise statutory procedures for processing Harz’s appeal, and the Court did not take issue with Harz’s claims that the Borough could have responded in a more efficient way to her objections. In the end, however, Harz could not establish that the Borough denied her the right to be heard before the Planning Board. She therefore could not demonstrate that she was deprived of a substantive right protected by the Civil Rights Act. View "Harz v. Borough of Spring Lake" on Justia Law

The police spotted defendant Leo Pinkston in a car that matched the general description of a vehicle used in a shooting. The officers “activated their lights and sirens.” Defendant allegedly “disregarded” the lights and sirens and drove off. Ultimately, defendant struck another car, and both vehicles collided with a light pole and caught on fire. Defendant was charged with second-degree eluding and second-degree aggravated assault while eluding. Pretrial Services recommended against defendant’s release, and the State moved to detain defendant. Defense counsel asked for an adjournment to obtain additional discovery and subpoena police officers to testify at the hearing. The trial court denied defendant’s request. After considering the complaint, affidavit of probable cause, Public Safety Assessment, Preliminary Law Enforcement Incident Report, and the arguments of counsel, the court concluded that: (1) probable cause existed; and (2) clear and convincing evidence established that defendant should be detained. The Appellate Division affirmed the finding of probable cause and order of detention. Shortly before this appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court was argued, defendant pled guilty, and the State moved to dismiss as moot. The Supreme Court determined hat defendants have a qualified right to call adverse witnesses at detention hearings. However, Pinkston pled guilty; the Supreme Court did not review the trial court's decision to detain him pretrial. This appeal was dismissed as moot. View "New Jersey v. Pinkston" on Justia Law

The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in this matter centered on the admissibility of evidence procured from a home after police officers’ warrantless entry. A man was attacked at a bus stop in Willingboro and his cell phone was stolen. He and a police officer tracked the phone’s location to a nearby house using a phone tracking application. Several officers arrived at the house, and one spotted the stolen cell phone’s case through a window. When no one responded to their knocks on the door, the officers entered the house through an unlocked window. Once inside, they performed a protective sweep to determine whether the suspect was inside, and they found defendant, J.A., then seventeen years of age, under the covers of a bed. Shortly thereafter, defendant’s mother and brother arrived home. After the officers explained their investigation, defendant’s mother consented to a search of the house, and defendant’s brother voluntarily retrieved the stolen phone. Defendant was later charged with second-degree robbery for theft of the phone. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers’ entry into his home was unconstitutional because the officers entered without a warrant and there were no circumstances that would justify an exception to the warrant requirement. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that although the officers’ search procedure may have been imprudent, it was ultimately defendant’s brother - without any coercion or duress from law enforcement - who retrieved the cell phone. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate panel’s determination that the officers’ warrantless entry was justified by the claimed exigency faced by the officers. However, the Court agreed defendant’s brother’s actions did not constitute state action and were sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful police conduct. Because we find that the brother’s independent actions operated to preclude application of the exclusionary rule to the evidence, the Court did not reach the question of defendant’s mother’s consent to search. Accordingly, the Court modified and affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "New Jersey in the Interest of J.A." on Justia Law

As a result of their sex-offense convictions, all four defendants were required to serve a special sentence of community supervision for life ("CSL") after completion of their prison terms. The commission of their offenses, the judgments of their convictions, and the commencement of their sentences all preceded passage of the 2014 Amendment to the Violent Predator Incapacitation Act. Before the 2014 Amendment, a violation of the terms of CSL was punishable as a fourth-degree crime. The 2014 Amendment increased a CSL violation to a third-degree crime punishable by a presumptive term of imprisonment, and such a violation converted CSL to parole supervision for life (PSL). After enactment of the 2014 Amendment, all four defendants allegedly violated the terms of their CSL. They were indicted for committing third-degree offenses and faced the increased penalties provided by that Amendment. The trial courts presiding over defendants’ cases concluded that the 2014 Amendment’s enhanced penalties, as applied to defendants, violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions and dismissed the indictments. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court held the Federal and State Ex Post Facto Clauses barred the retroactive application of the 2014 Amendment to defendants’ CSL violations. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division dismissing defendants’ indictments. View "New Jersey v. Hester" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) required disclosure of the names and addresses of successful bidders at a public auction of government property. An auction was held at the Bergen County Law and Public Safety Institute to sell sports memorabilia seized by the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office. There were thirty-nine successful bidders. Plaintiff William Brennan submitted a request to the Prosecutor’s Office, based on OPRA and the common law, for “[r]ecords of payment received from all winning bidders” and “[c]ontact information for each winning bidder.” The Prosecutor’s Office offered redacted copies of receipts that did not include the buyers’ names or addresses. The Office explained that it had sent the buyers letters to ask if they would consent to disclosure of their personal information. For buyers who consented, the Office represented it would provide unredacted receipts. The trial court directed defendants to release the requested information under OPRA. The Supreme Court determined courts were not required to analyze the "Doe" factors each time a party asserts that a privacy interest exists. "A party must first present a colorable claim that public access to records would invade a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy." Here, defendants could not make that threshold showing. "It is not reasonable to expect that details about a public auction of government property -- including the names and addresses of people who bought the seized property -- will remain private. Without a review of the Doe factors, we find that OPRA calls for disclosure of records relating to the auction." The Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "Brennan v. Bergen County Prosecutor's Office" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) required disclosure of the names and addresses of successful bidders at a public auction of government property. An auction was held at the Bergen County Law and Public Safety Institute to sell sports memorabilia seized by the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office. There were thirty-nine successful bidders. Plaintiff William Brennan submitted a request to the Prosecutor’s Office, based on OPRA and the common law, for “[r]ecords of payment received from all winning bidders” and “[c]ontact information for each winning bidder.” The Prosecutor’s Office offered redacted copies of receipts that did not include the buyers’ names or addresses. The Office explained that it had sent the buyers letters to ask if they would consent to disclosure of their personal information. For buyers who consented, the Office represented it would provide unredacted receipts. The trial court directed defendants to release the requested information under OPRA. The Supreme Court determined courts were not required to analyze the "Doe" factors each time a party asserts that a privacy interest exists. "A party must first present a colorable claim that public access to records would invade a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy." Here, defendants could not make that threshold showing. "It is not reasonable to expect that details about a public auction of government property -- including the names and addresses of people who bought the seized property -- will remain private. Without a review of the Doe factors, we find that OPRA calls for disclosure of records relating to the auction." The Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "Brennan v. Bergen County Prosecutor's Office" on Justia Law

During the 2012 mayoral election in the City of Salem, New Jersey, defendant Isaac Young was the executive director of the city’s housing authority. Defendant’s friend and political ally, the incumbent-mayor Robert Davis, was defeated by then-councilman Charles Washington, who was eventually elected mayor. Defendant came into possession of documents sent by the Division of Youth and Family Services to the City’s police chief. The documents advised the chief that the Division had substantiated allegations of child abuse against Washington. The allegations were later deemed to be unsubstantiated. Defendant showed the documents to others in his office and gave copies to a police officer, Sergeant Leon Daniels, so that Daniels could distribute the documents to others for political purposes. Defendant was ultimately charged with permitting or encouraging the release of a confidential child abuse record, a fourth-degree offense; hindering his own apprehension or prosecution by giving a false statement to law enforcement; and fourth-degree false swearing by inconsistent statements. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge relating to the unlawful release of the confidential documents, arguing that N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b did not apply to his conduct. The court denied that motion. After a mistrial and retrial, defendant was convicted of the three offenses. An Appellate Division panel affirmed defendant’s convictions for hindering and false swearing. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Young" on Justia Law

Defendant Asher Adelman established eBossWatch.com, which published an article, “'Bizarre’ and hostile work environment leads to lawsuit.” The article detailed a gender-discrimination, workplace-harassment, and retaliation lawsuit brought against Petro-Lubricant Testing Laboratories, Inc., and its chief executive officer and co-owner, John Wintermute (collectively Wintermute), by a former employee, Kristen Laforgia. More than a year after the article’s publication, Wintermute’s attorney sent a letter to Adelman, contending that the article was false and defamatory, Laforgia’s complaint was baseless, and that Laforgia and Wintermute had settled the lawsuit. In an email response, Adelman defended the article, stating that it was a reporting of Laforgia’s complaint, with a few modifications that, by Adelman’s opinion, made clear the article reported on what was filed in Laforgia’s complaint. Wintermute still filed a defamation action. The trial court found the modified article fell within the ambit of the fair report privilege and dismissed the defamation lawsuit. The Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court, holding that under the single publication rule, a new statute of limitations began to run only “if a modification to an Internet post materially and substantially alters the content and substance of the article.” The panel reasoned that “if a minor modification diminishes the defamatory sting of an article, it should not trigger a new statute of limitations.” The panel therefore dismissed as untimely Wintermute’s defamation lawsuit filed more than one year following publication of the original article. The panel did not decide whether the fair report privilege barred the action. The Court granted Wintermute’s petition for certification. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined genuine issues of disputed fact remained concerning whether Adelman made a material and substantive change to the original article, and the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the defamation action based on the single publication rule. However, the Court found the modified article was entitled to the protection of the fair report privilege. The article was a full, fair, and accurate recitation of a court-filed complaint. The trial court properly dismissed the defamation action, and on that basis the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment. View "Petro-LubricantTesting Laboratories, Inc. v. Adelman" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review focused on state action based on, among other grounds, the Religious Aid Clause of Article I, Paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution, specifically its prohibition against the use of public funds “for the maintenance of any minister or ministry.” The challenge arose following the Secretary of Higher Education’s (Secretary) determination to award grant monies to a yeshiva and to a theological seminary as part of a state program to subsidize facility and infrastructure projects for higher education institutions. The Appellate Division determined that prior case law concerning the New Jersey Constitution’s Religious Aid Clause required invalidation of the grants to the yeshiva and theological seminary. The State maintained the proper constitutional analysis in this matter turned on the use to which these higher education institutions would put the monies, not the nature of the institutions themselves. The Supreme Court determined judicial review was premature because factual disputes required resolution before the Secretary could make a properly informed decision on the grant applications. Because an informed administrative decision could not have been made without the benefit of a proper record, the matter was remanded to the Secretary, in order that a contested case proceeding be conducted prior to the ultimate administrative decision of the Secretary concerning the challenged grants. View "American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Hendricks" on Justia Law