Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

One week after defendants’ murder trial began, after counsel made opening statements and examined four of the State’s witnesses, the prosecutor turned over to defense counsel nineteen reports that were in the State’s possession but had not previously been provided to defendants. Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. The trial court did not resolve the dismissal motion, and the case continued. At trial, the court made several significant evidentiary rulings. One ruling reversed the pretrial holding of another judge by admitting the murder victim’s dying declaration heard by the victim’s wife. Another ruling excluded as unreliable a police officer’s affidavit used in four separate search warrant applications. The excluded affidavit was offered by defendants as evidence to impeach the victim’s wife and was relevant to a defense of third-party guilt. At the conclusion of the trial, a jury convicted defendants of murder. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the State’s failure to produce nineteen discovery items until one week after the beginning of defendants’ murder trial violated defendants’ due process rights under Brady. Though there was no evidence or allegation that the State acted in bad faith or intentionally in failing to timely produce the discoverable material, the Court nonetheless reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division, vacated defendants’ convictions, and remanded for a new trial because defendants were deprived of a fair trial. View "New Jersey v. Brown" on Justia Law

Police officers responded to a noise complaint at a motel room and determined not to issue a summons when the renter of the room immediately complied with their request to turn down the music. Police nevertheless conducted an investigatory detention on a group of ten people and ran warrant checks on them. More than twenty minutes into the detention, police arrested defendant Deyvon Chisum for an outstanding warrant and discovered a concealed firearm on him. They then conducted pat-down searches on the remaining occupants and found a firearm on defendant Keshown Woodard. The trial court denied defendants’ motions to suppress the firearms, finding the police entered the motel room lawfully, Chisum was properly arrested because he had an outstanding warrant, and the seizure of the firearm he possessed was obtained through a lawful search incident to arrest. The trial court also found that the police were justified in conducting pat-down searches of the remaining occupants in the room for the officers’ safety. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's findings. Once the renter of the motel room lowered the volume of the music and the police declined to issue summonses, the police no longer had any reasonable suspicion that would justify the continued detention of the room’s occupants. Once the noise was abated, the police no longer had an independent basis to detain the occupants, or a basis to run warrant checks on them. Such action was unlawful. And because the detention and warrant checks were unlawful, the subsequent pat-down of Woodard was also improper. Therefore, the Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded this case to the trial court for the withdrawal of defendants’ guilty pleas and further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Chisum" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers arrested defendant Laurie Wint on a New Jersey murder charge and brought him to the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office for questioning. Wint invoked his right to counsel after receiving Miranda warnings, and the interrogation ceased. Immediately afterwards, two detectives from Pennsylvania investigating an unrelated murder in Bucks County entered the interrogation room to question Wint. After receiving his rights for the second time, Wint again requested the presence of counsel, ending the interrogation. Wint remained in continuous pre-indictment custody in Camden County when, six months later, he was transported to Bucks County. There, Pennsylvania detectives again administered Miranda warnings but did not provide counsel as Wint had earlier requested. This time, Wint waived his rights and allegedly incriminated himself in the New Jersey murder. The trial court denied Wint’s motion to suppress his incriminating remarks believing that Wint reinitiated communication with the Pennsylvania detectives. With the admission of Wint’s incriminating statements at trial, a jury convicted Wint of passion/provocation manslaughter and other related offenses. The issues this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration centered on whether Pennsylvania detectives violated Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), by attempting to question defendant in Camden and later questioning him in Pennsylvania after he earlier requested counsel. The Court also considered the exceptions to the rule requiring the suppression of any statement secured during a subsequent custodial interrogation after a defendant requests counsel: whether (1) counsel was provided during the questioning, (2) defendant initiated the communication, or (3) a break in custody occurred. The Court concluded the Pennsylvania detectives violated Edwards by attempting to question Wint in Camden after his earlier request for counsel, and Wint did not initiate the interrogation that occurred in Bucks County. The giving of repeated Miranda warnings did not cure the Edwards violation. Pre-indictment, pretrial detainment did not qualify as a break in custody under Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010), and none of the exceptions set forth in Edwards applied here. Edwards required suppression of Wint’s incriminating statement concerning the shooting in Camden; the admission of that statement was not harmless error. View "New Jersey v. Wint" on Justia Law

In March 2017, police officers responded to a report of a shooting in a parking lot at Lafayette Gardens in Jersey City and found Terrel Smith’s body; he had been shot multiple times. The police identified “Michael Gregg” as a witness and interviewed him. Over time, he made two separate -- and inconsistent -- statements. Gregg identified defendant Shaquan Hyppolite from a photo array. Defendant was charged and arrested for murder and weapons offenses. The affidavit of probable cause in support of the complaint stated that “an eyewitness . . . positively identified Shaquan Hyppolite AKA Quan as the actor who” killed Terrel Smith. The State moved for pretrial detention the next day. Two days later, the State made available fifty-one pages of discovery materials and a DVD recording of Gregg’s interview. On the day of the detention hearing, the State also turned over a four-page written summary of that interview titled “Second Interview of [Gregg].” The State did not disclose Gregg’s first statement before the hearing. At the detention hearing, the court ordered that defendant be detained. Two months later, a grand jury indicted defendant. The State turned over additional discovery, including Gregg’s first statement to the police, recordings of interviews of "Bill" and "Frank," and an application for a communications data warrant for Gregg’s cell phone. This marked the first time defendant received Gregg’s initial statement to the police, in which he denied having seen the shooter. Bill’s statement revealed that he told the police he was in jail at the time of the homicide. Frank told the police that he was en route to Popeyes when he heard gunshots from Lafayette Gardens. The application for the communications data warrant noted that an eyewitness saw the victim engaged in a conversation with three men before the shooting, “which conflicts with [Gregg’s] version of events.” Based on the new discovery, defendant moved to reopen the detention hearing. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that when exculpatory evidence is disclosed after a detention hearing, judges should use a modified materiality standard to decide whether to reopen the hearing. "If there is a reasonable possibility that the result of the detention hearing would have been different had the evidence been disclosed, the hearing should be reopened." Applying that standard in this case, the Court reversed and remanded to the trial court to reopen the detention hearing. View "New Jersey v. Hyppolite" on Justia Law

Defendant Carlos Green Green struck and killed Billy Dudley, who was lying in the road on a late night in December 2014. A toxicology lab determined Green’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) to be 0.210% at the time of the accident. Green had two prior DWI convictions in 1998 and 2009, for which his sentences each required completion of an educational course at the Intoxicated Driving Resource Center (IDRC). Dudley died as a result of his injuries and Green was charged with first-degree vehicular homicide while intoxicated and within 1,000 feet of a school. Before trial, the State moved in limine to introduce Green’s two prior DWI convictions, which the State argued were relevant to the issue of recklessness. According to the State, the prior convictions demonstrated that Green “had knowledge of the substantial and unjustifiable risks associated with driving while intoxicated.” The trial court denied the State’s motion to introduce those prior convictions; the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding those prior convictions. View "New Jersey v. Green" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s review centered on the State’s use of the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C (Alcotest) to obtain breath samples from drivers suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. In 2008, the Supreme Court found Alcotest results admissible in drunk-driving cases to establish a defendant’s guilt or innocence for drunk driving. The Court also required that the devices be recalibrated semi-annually to help ensure accurate measurements. Defendant Eileen Cassidy pleaded guilty in municipal court to driving under the influence based solely on Alcotest results showing her blood alcohol level had exceeded the legal limit. Upon learning that the results of her test were among those called into question from the New Jersey State Police’s Alcohol Drug Testing Unit; the coordinator responsible for administering the calibrations was criminally charged, and the samples taken from some 20,000 people were procured by machines calibrated by that coordinator. Cassidy moved to withdraw her guilty plea. A special master issued a 198-page report concluding the reliability of the Alcotest had been undermined by the coordinator’s faulty calibrations. As such, the State could not carry its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the Alcotest was scientifically reliable. The Supreme Court exercised its original jurisdiction to vacate Cassidy’s conviction. View "New Jersey v. Cassidy" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal presented two issues: (1) whether the State may rely solely on a hearsay certification to support a motion for an order to compel a buccal swab; and (2) whether the affidavit in this case provided sufficient probable cause to support the search. Two Jersey City police officers answered “a call of shots fired.” While investigating, one of the officers discovered a .357 handgun on the ground. That same night, a detective responded to investigate reports that a male had been shot near the area where shots were allegedly fired. At the hospital, the detective encountered defendant who had sustained a bullet wound on his left leg. While officers examined defendant’s pants, defendant said, “so I shot myself, that ain’t no charge.” Analysis of the gun, bullets and shell casings were used as grounds for a grand jury indictment of defendant for weapon possession offenses. Five months after defendant’s indictment, the State moved for an order compelling defendant to submit to a buccal swab. The Appellate Division granted defendant’s motion for leave to appeal and reversed the trial court’s order, reasoning that even if the assistant prosecutor’s hearsay certification could establish probable cause, the court’s order authorized an “unreasonable search, chiefly because of the timing of the request,” and because the New Jersey DNA Database and Databank Act of 1994 did not justify the intrusion. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal. Although an affidavit of a police officer familiar with the investigation is preferable, the Court determined a hearsay certification from an assistant prosecutor could support probable cause to compel a defendant to submit to a buccal swab if it set forth the basis for the prosecutor’s knowledge. Furthermore, an affidavit or certification supporting probable cause to compel a buccal swab must establish a fair probability that defendant’s DNA will be found on the evidence. Here, the State failed to show probable cause. View "New Jersey v. Gathers" on Justia Law

Defendant J.L.G. was tired for: first-degree aggravated sexual assault; third-degree aggravated criminal sexual contact; second-degree endangering the welfare of a child; and third-degree witness tampering. Defendant’s stepdaughter, “Bonnie,” testified at trial about an escalating pattern of sexual abuse that defendant carried out against her for roughly eighteen months, from when she was fourteen and defendant was about thirty-two. Defendant pointed a gun at Bonnie and threatened to hurt her, her mother, or her brother if word got out. Bonnie told no one about the abuse. A close friend of Bonnie’s mother visited the family apartment and found defendant lying on top of Bonnie. When Bonnie’s mother heard about the incident, she threatened to kill defendant. Bonnie was afraid her mother would follow through and denied any sexual activity. Although Bonnie claimed she wanted to tell her mother, she also did not “want her to do anything for her to get locked up.” The jury convicted defendant of all four counts. On appeal, defendant challenged the admissibility of the CSAAS testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that expert testimony about CSAAS in general, and its component behaviors other than delayed disclosure, may no longer be admitted at criminal trials. "Evidence about delayed disclosure can be presented if it satisfies all parts of the applicable evidence rule." In particular, the State must show that the evidence is beyond the understanding of the average juror. "That decision will turn on the facts of each case. Here, because the victim gave straightforward reasons about why she delayed reporting abuse, the jury did not need help from an expert to evaluate her explanation." The expert testimony about CSAAS introduced at trial was harmless, and the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s convictions. View "New Jersey v. J.L.G." on Justia Law

In this case, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review was whether the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (Commission) appropriately issued fines and suspensions without holding hearings. The Commission sent notices of proposed suspension to the dealers. The notice also informed the dealers of their right to request a hearing. Each dealer acted pro se and requested a hearing in writing. Each provided explanations for the alleged violations but did not deny the allegations. The Commission denied the requests for hearings and issued an order of suspension/final administrative decision letter to each dealer. The Commission ruled that each dealer had “failed to identify any disputed material fact(s), legal issue(s) and/or specific mitigating circumstances to be resolved at a hearing,” and interpreted the dealers’ responses as admissions. The Appellate Division panel consolidated the appeals and affirmed the Commission’s imposition of suspensions and fines, determining that the Commission could decide cases “without a trial-type hearing when there are no disputed adjudicative facts.” The panel found that the fines challenged by the dealers were authorized by N.J.S.A. 39:10-20, and the Commission could impose fines under the statute on a case-by-case basis. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that if the reasons given by the dealers presented a colorable dispute of facts or at least the presence of mitigating evidence, the Commission was required to provide an in-person hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:10-20. "An in-person hearing must be held prior to a license suspension or revocation when the target of the enforcement action requests it." View "Allstars Auto Group, Inc. v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission" on Justia Law

In March 2013, the Civil Service Commission (the Commission) published amendments to the New Jersey Administrative Code (the Proposed Rule). The Proposed Rule introduced the concept of a “job band,” defined as “a grouping of titles or title series into a single broad band consisting of title levels with similar duties, responsibilities, and qualifications.” Under the Proposed Rule, employees could advance between banded titles without competitive examinations, and the appointing authority would have the discretion to choose among all of the candidates who demonstrated the required competencies, rather than choosing among the three highest-ranking eligibles. In the Commission’s view, there was “no Constitutional or statutory impediment to the advancement of employees to different levels within a single title without a formal, competitive examination.” On June 27, 2013, the Legislature passed a concurrent resolution declaring the Proposed Rule inconsistent with the legislative intent of the Civil Service Act. On December 4, 2013, the Legislature transmitted the concurrent resolution, commencing the thirty-day period for the Commission to amend or withdraw the rule. The next day, however, the Senate commenced the second phase of the Legislative Review Clause by introducing a concurrent resolution invalidating the Proposed Rule. At issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was the Legislature’s first exercise of its constitutional authority under the Legislative Review Clause and the threshold question of whether and under what standard a court could review concurrent resolutions as to agency rules and regulations. The Court determined a court could reverse the Legislature’s invalidation of an agency rule or regulation pursuant to the Legislative Review Clause if: (1) the Legislature has not complied with the procedural requirements of the Clause; (2) the Legislature has incorrectly asserted that the challenged rule or regulation was inconsistent with “the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the language of the statute which the rule or regulation is intended to implement,” N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6; or (3) the Legislature’s action violates a protection afforded by any other provision of the New Jersey Constitution, or a provision of the United States Constitution. To determine legislative intent, a court should rely exclusively on statutory language and not apply a presumption in favor of either the Legislature’s findings or the agency’s exercise of its rulemaking authority. In this case, the Supreme Court found no procedural defect or constitutional infirmity in the Legislature’s actions. The Legislature correctly determined that N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A conflicted with two provisions of the Civil Service Act. View "Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. New Jersey Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law