Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Consolidated appeals presented a common issue: whether state or federal constitutional ex post facto prohibitions permitted the defendants in these cases to be charged with and convicted of the enhanced third-degree offense of failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements when each defendant’s registration requirement arose from a conviction that occurred before the penalty for noncompliance was raised a degree. In 1995, Rodney Brown (R.B.) was convicted of sexual assault. In 2000, Hakum Brown (H.B.) was convicted of sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child. As a result of those predicate convictions, H.B. and R.B. were subject to the sex offender registration requirements imposed by Megan’s Law. At the time of H.B.’s and R.B.’s sex-offender convictions, failure to comply with the registration requirements was punishable as a fourth-degree offense. However, in 2007, the Legislature upgraded failure to register to a third-degree offense. In 2014, H.B. failed to timely register with his local police department. R.B. similarly failed to register in 2015. Each was charged with third-degree failure to register. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined defendants suffered no ex post facto violation as a result of being charged with failure-to-register offenses bearing the increased degree. "The Legislature is free to increase the penalty for the offense of failure to comply with the regulatory registration requirement -- which is separate and apart from defendants’ predicate sex offenses -- without violating ex post facto principles as to those predicate offenses." View "New Jersey v. Brown" on Justia Law

To make up for the tax revenue shortfall COVID-19 created and to maintain the State’s fiscal integrity, the New Jersey Legislature passed, and the Governor signed into law a bill that authorized the State to borrow up to $9.9 billion. Under the new law, the “New Jersey COVID-19 Emergency Bond Act” (Bond Act or Act), the State could issue bonds for private sale or borrow funds from the federal government. Up to $2.7 billion in borrowing could be used for the period from July 1, 2019 through September 30, 2020, and up to $7.2 billion for the period from October 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021. Before the Bond Act was enacted, the Assembly Minority Leader asked the Office of Legislative Services (OLS) to offer an opinion on “whether or not the State may issue general obligation bonds without voter approval to meet the needs of the State arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.” OLS issued an opinion letter on May 7, 2020, answering in the affirmative: “the COVID-19 pandemic is a disaster contemplated by the [Emergency Exception], and the State therefore may issue bonds, without the usual requirement for voter approval, to meet COVID-19 related emergency needs.” The opinion letter drew a distinction between “borrowing to supplement revenue for future fiscal year budgets,” which OLS believed would violate the Constitution, and “borrowing money where the anticipated revenue certified in accordance with . . . the Constitution becomes insufficient due to an unexpected event” -- a reference to FY2020 -- which OLS found permissible. The New Jersey Republican State Committee filed a complaint contending the asserted legislation violated the Debt Limitation Clause of the State Constitution, and sought to restrain the Governor from signing or enforcing the bill. After review, the Supreme Court determined the Bond Act did not violate the Constitution, subject to limits imposed by the Court in this opinion. View "New Jersey Republican State Committee v. Murphy" on Justia Law

The target of a State narcotics investigation, Quincy Lowery, advised detectives that defendant Robert Andrews, a former Essex County, New Jersey Sheriff’s Officer, had provided him with information about the investigation and advice to avoid criminal exposure. The State obtained an arrest warrant for defendant and search warrants for defendant’s iPhones, which were seized. According to the State, its Telephone Intelligence Unit was unable to search Andrews’s iPhones. A State detective contacted and conferred with the New York Police Department’s Technical Services unit, as well as a technology company, both of which concluded that the cellphones’ technology made them inaccessible to law enforcement agencies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory advised that it likewise would be unable to access the phones’ contents. The State therefore moved to compel Andrews to disclose the passcodes to his two iPhones. The issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether a court order requiring a criminal defendant to disclose the passcodes to his passcode-protected cellphones violated the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution or New Jersey’s common law or statutory protections against self-incrimination. The Court held that neither federal nor state protections against compelled disclosure shielded Andrews' passcodes. "Here, the State correctly asserts that the lawfully issued search warrants -- the sufficiency of which Andrews does not challenge -- give it the right to the cellphones’ purportedly incriminating contents as specified in the trial court’s order. And neither those contents -- which are voluntary, not compelled, communications -- nor the phones themselves -- which are physical objects, not testimonial communications -- are protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, production of the cellphones and their contents is not barred." View "New Jersey v. Andrews" on Justia Law

Juan Cruz-Pena was convicted by jury of first-degree kidnapping for confining C.M. for a “substantial period” for the purpose of committing various crimes against her. The Appellate Division reversed the kidnapping conviction, concluding that C.M.’s captivity did not fall within the meaning of the kidnapping statute because her “confinement was merely incidental to the underlying sex crime.” The State appealed, and the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division: "the case law construing that language, must be read in a sensible manner and not taken to an illogical conclusion. Holding a victim in captivity for a period of four to five hours, while assaulting and sexually abusing her, satisfies the 'substantial period' requirement of the kidnapping statute -- even if the length of the confinement is co-extensive with the continuous sexual and physical abuse of the victim." View "New Jersey v. Cruz-Pena" on Justia Law

In the murder trial of defendants Cary Greene and Tyleek Lewis, the prosecutor opened to the jury that the State would present as a witness Greene’s grandmother, to whom he allegedly confessed his guilt in the shooting death of the victim. The prosecutor gave a detailed description of the grandmother’s expected testimony and a prediction of the emotional struggle she would encounter as a witness against her grandson. But before trial, Greene's grandmother recanted the statement she gave to police. At a hearing before the trial court, the grandmother asserted her Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination. Despite the court’s order compelling her to testify with an assurance of immunity, the grandmother refused to do so, resulting in the court holding her in contempt and jailing her. To remediate any prejudice from the prosecutor’s failure to produce the grandmother, with counsels’ consent, the court instructed the jury that the prosecutor’s opening statement concerning the expected testimony of Greene’s grandmother was not evidence or to be considered in its deliberations. Defendants Greene and Lewis were convicted of murder and related charges. The Appellate Division overturned the convictions of both defendants, finding the prosecutor’s opening statement, informing the jury about Greene’s confession to his grandmother, was highly prejudicial and that the court’s curative instruction was inadequate. To this, the New Jersey Supreme Court concurred and affirmed reversing Greene's conviction, but reversed the overturning of Lewis' conviction. "It is well understood that a 'defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can admitted against him.' A confession made to one’s grandmother may have even greater persuasive power than one made to the police. The prosecutor’s detailed account of Greene’s incriminating statement to his grandmother was not likely forgotten by the jury, despite the trial court’s best efforts in providing a curative instruction." View "New Jersey v. Greene" on Justia Law

Defendant Jose Medina was tried and convicted for offenses related to a non-fatal slashing that occurred outside of a bar in the Township of Belleville, New Jersey. Although no physical evidence linked defendant to the crime, surveillance footage captured the incident, and the victim selected defendant’s picture from a photo array. A woman who witnessed the attack identified defendant as the attacker to police but was unwilling to give a formal statement or testify. At defendant’s trial, the prosecutor referenced the anonymous woman, after which an officer testified that, based on the “evidence . . . collected,” he included defendant’s picture in the photo array. Relying on New Jersey v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973), New Jersey v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427 (1989), and New Jersey v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338 (2005), the Appellate Division found that this testimony violated the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause by suggesting that the anonymous woman -- a non-testifying witness -- implicated defendant in the crime. Viewing the trial record in its entirety, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the officer’s testimony did not generate such an inference. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Appellate Division. View "New Jersey v. Medina" on Justia Law

The trial court excused and replaced a juror who had a preplanned vacation and who had been part of deliberations after the jury announced that they had reached a partial verdict. The judge did not have the jury return a partial verdict. Instead, the court excused the juror and reconstituted the jury with a replacement juror. The court denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial and defendant’s request to voir dire the jury to determine its ability to begin anew with the replacement juror. The jury reached a unanimous verdict three days later. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. The Supreme Court found that in light of the defendant facing charges of murder, attempted murder, and weapons possession offenses, "we cannot know whether the jury will 'start anew' with the entry of a substitute juror and discard their views simply because there is a new juror amongst them. Nor can we know if the new juror will exercise independence or simply go along with the opinions of the existing jurors. We cannot know or speculate whether the replacement juror was a 'full participant[] in the mutual exchange of ideas.' The safest and fairest course is to take a partial verdict, declare a mistrial, and constitute a new jury to hear the remaining counts." View "New Jersey v. Horton" on Justia Law

Defendant Rahsjahn Courtney agreed to a negotiated plea agreement with the State, in which he pled guilty to a first-degree possession of heroin and a distribution charge in exchange for a fourteen-year prison sentence with a sixty-three-month period of parole ineligibility. As a part of the plea agreement, the State agreed not to request a mandatory extended-term sentence for which defendant was eligible under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f). The State alerted the court and defendant that defendant qualified for a mandatory extended term, but it agreed to defense counsel’s offered sentence. Defendant entered a guilty plea under the terms of the negotiated plea agreement. The court imposed the agreed-upon sentence. Defense counsel and defendant both acknowledged their understanding of the terms of the guilty plea and raised no objections regarding defendant’s eligibility for an extended term; the plea form and supplemental plea form reflected that agreement. Defendant, defense counsel, and the prosecutor signed both forms. Despite acknowledging the plea agreement, defense counsel requested a reduced sentence. The sentencing judge denied the request. The Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting defendant’s argument that the sentencing court had discretion to lower his sentence because the State failed to file a formal application requesting the extended mandatory term. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, finding that N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 did not require a formal application when a prosecutor agrees not to request a mandatory extended-term sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) yet seeks the benefit of a Section 12 plea agreement. Given the importance of ensuring consistency and accuracy in sentencing, the Court provided guidance for future cases where the State agrees not to request an extended term but still seeks the benefit of a negotiated waiver of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987's mandatory sentencing requirements under Section 12. View "New Jersey v. Courtney" on Justia Law

The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant facing the same charges as a cooperating witness should have been barred from exploring that adverse witness’s sentencing exposure. Tiffany Taylor, Javon Clarke, and defendant Michael A. Jackson were apprehended and charged with participating in a burglary. Clarke accepted a cooperating plea offer in which he agreed to provide testimony inculpating defendant and Taylor in exchange for a three-year sentence. The trial judge urged modification of the plea agreement, suggesting Clarke’s sentencing exposure be lowered to 180 days in county jail, and probation. The new deal was accepted; Clarke testified that defendant and Taylor participated in the burglary. In an effort to demonstrate Clarke’s bias in favor of the prosecution, counsel for Jackson sought to elicit during cross-examination the sentencing range of three to five years’ imprisonment that Clarke would have faced had he not accepted a plea offer in exchange for agreeing to testify against defendant. The trial court barred defense counsel’s line of questioning regarding Clarke’s maximum sentencing exposure, explaining that such information could improperly prejudice the jury if they heard Clarke’s maximum sentencing exposure on the same crimes as defendant. The trial court permitted defense counsel to elicit testimony regarding only the initial plea offer of three years’ imprisonment and the final plea agreement, in which Clarke accepted 180 days’ imprisonment in county jail, plus probation.Under the circumstances here, the Supreme Court found defendant was deprived of his right to confrontation and denied a fair trial. Judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, and defendant's conviction was vacated. The matter was remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant Isaiah Bell was arrested after James Kargbo died from stab wounds apparently inflicted during an altercation that occurred when defendant and his partner arrived at Kargbo’s house to pick up her son. A Somerset County prosecutor asked a grand jury to consider two charges against defendant: murder, a crime of the first degree, and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. The prosecutor explained the counts and elements of the offenses. A grand juror twice asked whether murder had different degrees, and the prosecutor explained that grand jurors do not determine degrees, only whether the facts presented “fit the elements of the crime.” After several witnesses testified and answered questions, the same grand juror asked, “is there such a thing as second-degree murder?” The prosecutor responded by discussing the grand jury’s responsibilities regarding “lesser included lower offenses,” and the elements of murder. The grand juror asked, “[T]here’s no part of the . . . statute that speaks to premeditation?” The prosecutor confirmed that there was not and read the model jury charge for murder. The grand jury indicted defendant on both counts. The issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether the prosecutor's failure to instruct the grand jury on lesser-included offense for murder in response to questions posed by the grand juror constituted an abuse of prosecutorial discretion that warranted dismissal of defendant's indictment for first-degree murder and weapons charges. The Supreme Court determined the prosecutor did not impermissibly interfere with the grand jury's investigative function. View "New Jersey v. Bell" on Justia Law