Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves a challenge to the ward map adopted by the Jersey City Ward Commission following the 2020 federal census. The Commission found a 59% population deviation between the most and least populous wards, which exceeded the maximum allowed by the Municipal Ward Law (MWL). The Commission created a new map with a 1.8% deviation and revised the boundaries of all six wards. Plaintiffs, including individuals and community organizations, argued that the new map failed to meet the MWL’s compactness requirement and violated equal protection principles under the New Jersey Constitution. They also claimed a violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA).The trial court concluded that the Commission’s map created sufficiently compact wards under the MWL and dismissed the plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional claims. The Appellate Division reversed the dismissal of the MWL claims, remanding for factfinding on whether the Commission’s determination of compactness had a rational basis. It affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection and NJCRA claims.The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the MWL, equal protection, and NJCRA claims. The Court held that the Commission’s map was a proper exercise of its discretion under the MWL. It found that the Commission was not required to use mathematical measures of compactness or consider communities of interest in its determination. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s remand for additional factfinding, reinstating the trial court’s judgment on the MWL claim. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection and NJCRA claims, concluding that the Commission’s compliance with the MWL negated the equal protection claim and that no statutory or constitutional violation occurred to support the NJCRA claim. View "Jersey City United Against the New Ward Map v. Jersey City Ward Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and defendant were married in 2019 and have one son together. Plaintiff moved out of the marital home in January 2023 and initiated divorce proceedings in March 2023. In April 2023, defendant was arrested and charged with weapon offenses after threatening a process server with a handgun. Plaintiff filed a civil complaint in July 2023 under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) based on allegations of stalking and harassment. The court issued a TRO prohibiting defendant from contacting plaintiff, granting her temporary custody of their son, and denying defendant parenting and visitation time.During the final restraining order (FRO) hearing, plaintiff called defendant as a witness. Defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but the trial court ordered him to testify. Defendant refused to answer questions beyond stating his name, invoking the Fifth Amendment. The trial court ruled that defendant could not invoke the privilege and that an adverse inference could be drawn from his refusal to testify. Defendant appealed the decision.The Appellate Division denied leave to appeal. While defendant's motion for leave to appeal was pending, the Appellate Division published T.B. v. I.W., addressing a similar issue. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted defendant leave to appeal.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that while the Fifth Amendment does not provide blanket immunity in PDVA FRO hearings, a defendant may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in response to specific questions that pose reasonable risks of self-incrimination. The court ruled that no adverse inference may be drawn from the exercise of this right. The PDVA immunity provision in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) is not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment and does not adequately protect a defendant's rights. The trial court's ruling was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "M.A. v. J.H.M." on Justia Law

Antonio Fuster went to the Chatham Township Police Department to report that his special needs child had accused an adult male relative of sexual misconduct. His interview with police was recorded on a body worn camera. Fuster and his wife, Brianna Devine, sought access to that video under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) and the common law right of access. They alleged inaccuracies in the initial police report and wanted the video to potentially file an internal affairs complaint.The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, holding that the body worn camera footage was a government record under OPRA but exempt from disclosure under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b), which protects the confidentiality of information regarding individuals not arrested or charged. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the video was exempt from disclosure under judicial case law protecting uncharged individuals' law enforcement records.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case. The Court held that N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(k) did not permit plaintiffs to review the video because Fuster had already requested the video be retained for three years, and Devine was not entitled to review it under the specified provisions. The Court also held that subsection (l) of the Body Worn Camera Law did not abrogate OPRA’s exemptions, but there was no OPRA exemption supporting the refusal to release the video. The Court found that OPRA does not contain an explicit exemption for information received by law enforcement regarding an individual who was not arrested or charged, and New Jersey case law had not established such an automatic grant of confidentiality.The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and ordered the release of the body worn camera footage to the plaintiffs, without reaching the common law claims. View "Fuster v. Township of Chatham" on Justia Law

A.D., a student with disabilities, attended Sparta High School and was designated as having a disability under the IDEA. In early 2019, Sparta informed A.D. that he was in danger of failing several classes, leading to a period of home instruction. A.D.'s parents withdrew him from school, and he subsequently passed the GED, receiving a State-issued high school diploma in April 2019. Despite re-enrolling at Sparta High School and receiving home instruction again, A.D. faced academic challenges and was withdrawn from school multiple times. In May 2021, Sparta denied A.D.'s re-enrollment request, citing his receipt of the State-issued diploma.M.N., A.D.'s mother, requested a due process hearing with the New Jersey Department of Education (DOE). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled that A.D.'s State-issued diploma was a "regular high school diploma" under federal regulations, thus ending his entitlement to a FAPE. The Commissioner of the DOE upheld the ALJ's decision, and the Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that the State-issued diploma met state standards and ended A.D.'s entitlement to a FAPE.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that a New Jersey State-issued diploma based on passing the GED is not a "regular high school diploma" under 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(3)(iv). Therefore, a student who receives such a diploma remains entitled to a free appropriate public education under the IDEA. The Court reversed the Appellate Division's decision, concluding that A.D. remains entitled to receive a FAPE, and Sparta must provide it. View "Board of Education of the Township of Sparta v. M.N." on Justia Law

The case involves Christine Savage, a police officer who filed a lawsuit against the Neptune Township Police Department and others for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation. The parties entered into a settlement agreement in 2014, which included a non-disparagement clause. Savage filed a second lawsuit in 2016, alleging continued and intensified discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The parties entered into another settlement agreement in 2020, which also included a non-disparagement clause. After a television interview with Savage aired in 2020, the defendants claimed that Savage violated the non-disparagement provision of the settlement agreement.The trial court granted the defendants' motion to enforce the second settlement agreement, finding that the Law Against Discrimination (LAD) barred only non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements, and that Savage violated a non-disparagement clause. The Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding the non-disparagement clause enforceable but holding that Savage had not violated it.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the non-disparagement clause in the settlement agreement is against public policy and cannot be enforced. The court found that the LAD protects Savage’s statements. The court concluded that the non-disparagement clause in the agreement directly conflicts with the LAD as it encompasses and would bar speech the statute protects. The court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case. View "Christine Savage v. Township of Neptune" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Jersey delivered an opinion concerning an appeal by condominium owners who claimed they were discriminated against because of their need for an emotional support animal (ESA) that exceeded the weight limit set by the condominium association's pet policy. The owners argued that their ESA, a 63-pound dog, was necessary for one of the owners who had been diagnosed with several mental health conditions. The court considered whether the trial court correctly dismissed the disability discrimination claims under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD) and how requests of this type should be evaluated under the LAD.The court held that individuals seeking an accommodation must show they have a disability under the LAD and demonstrate that the requested accommodation may be necessary to afford them an "equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." The housing provider then has the burden to prove that the requested accommodation is unreasonable. Both sides should engage in good-faith, interactive dialogue in this process. If the parties cannot resolve the request, courts may be called on to balance the need for, and benefits of, the requested accommodation against cost and administrative burdens it presents. With this framework, the court found that the owners' claims should not have been dismissed and remanded the matter. View "Players Place II Condominium Association, Inc. v. K.P. and B.F." on Justia Law

For five months when C.V. was a pre-kindergarten student in the Waterford Township School District, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Alfred Dean, the seventy-six-year-old bus aide who was supposed to be ensuring her safety. C.V.’s parents only discovered the abuse when C.V. came home without her underwear one day. C.V. and her parents sued the Waterford Township Board of Education and Waterford Township School District (collectively, Waterford) alleging, among other things, discrimination in a “place of public accommodation” “on account of . . . sex” in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Waterford and dismissed plaintiffs’ LAD claims. The court found plaintiffs could not, as a matter of law, prove to a jury that Dean’s conduct occurred because of C.V.’s sex, or that it would not have occurred but for C.V.’s sex. According to the trial court, “the but for element can’t be satisfied . . . where you have a compulsive sexual predator, a pedophile,” especially one who testified at his deposition “that he is a compulsive sexual abuser of children, boys and girls.” The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the LAD did not apply “to a sexual predator’s assault of a student on a school bus where there is no evidence his actions were based solely on the victim’s status as a member of a protected group.” The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment because it conflicted with Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587 (1993) and L.W. v. Toms River Regional Schools Board of Education, 189 N.J. 381 (2007). The Court reiterated that under Lehman, sexual touching of areas of the body linked to sexuality happens, by definition, because of sex. The Court affirmed the denial of plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint and to obtain certain records, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "C.V. v. Waterford Township Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Church of St. Theresa (St. Theresa’s) owned and operated the St. Theresa School. St. Theresa’s terminated art teacher and toddler room caregiver Victoria Crisitello for violating the terms of her employment agreement. That agreement required employees to abide by the teachings of the Catholic Church and forbade employees from engaging in premarital sex; Crisitello, who was unmarried, had become pregnant. In response to her firing, Crisitello filed a complaint against St. Theresa’s alleging employment discrimination in violation of the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), based on pregnancy and marital status. St. Theresa’s countered that its decision to terminate Crisitello was protected by both the First Amendment and the LAD. The New Jersey Supreme Court held: (1) the “religious tenets” exception of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) was an affirmative defense available to a religious entity when confronted with a claim of employment discrimination; and (2) the uncontroverted fact was that St. Theresa’s followed the religious tenets of the Catholic Church in terminating Crisitello. The Court thus concluded St. Theresa’s was entitled to summary judgment and that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint with prejudice. View "Crisitello v. St. Theresa School" on Justia Law

After his employment was terminated in May 2008, plaintiff Harold Hansen brought claims against Rite Aid and other defendants alleging age discrimination, sexual orientation discrimination, and gender discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), as well as several common law claims. After three trials, a jury returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor on his LAD sexual orientation discrimination claim and awarded him a total of $420,500 in compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff moved for an award of counsel fees and costs. In plaintiff’s initial submission, he asked the trial court to determine that a reasonable hourly rate for his lead counsel and the attorney who assisted in the first of the three trials was $725, and that a reasonable number of hours spent on this matter was 3,252. He requested that the trial court determine the lodestar to be $2,355,892.50, and that the court apply a one hundred percent enhancement to the lodestar. Plaintiff also sought an award of costs. In total, plaintiff requested an award of $5,035,773.50. The trial court issued a seventy-three-page decision with a fifty-four-page spreadsheet reflecting its analysis of the time entries and disbursements set forth in plaintiff’s invoice. The court ruled that a reasonable hourly rate for plaintiff’s lead counsel in this case was $375 per hour and a reasonable hourly rate for the assistant attorney was $325 per hour. The court identified several categories of legal work improperly included in plaintiff’s fee application, including work on unrelated matters. The trial court also excluded all time entries reflecting plaintiff’s counsel’s representation of plaintiff in the Appellate Division and to the Supreme Court. Noting that plaintiff was successful on only one claim and that plaintiff’s lead counsel performed tasks that should have been assigned to a junior attorney or a paralegal, the trial court reduced the lodestar by twenty percent. Ultimately, the trial court awarded $741,387.97 in fees and costs. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it set the reasonable hourly rate for plaintiff’s counsel’s work, assessed the number of hours reasonably expended by plaintiff’s counsel in pretrial proceedings and at trial, reduced the lodestar because of plaintiff’s limited success and other factors, and determined plaintiff’s application for an award of costs. View "Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Hamid Harris alleged that Donald Stabile, a Newark Police Department detective, falsely accused him of four armed robberies that were committed in Newark in January 2015, and unlawfully arrested him in connection with those robberies based on an improperly issued arrest warrant. After the charges against plaintiff were dismissed, he filed this action. Defendants the City of Newark, Detective Donald Stabile, and Police Officer Angel Romero following the trial court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment, contended the trial court erred in denying them qualified immunity as a defense to Harris’s claims brought under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA). Defendants contended the trial court’s order denying summary judgment was a legal determination and should therefore be deemed appealable as of right, in keeping with both New Jersey appellate practice and federal law. The trial court reasoned that because Stabile did not have probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and because Stabile’s belief that plaintiff committed the robberies was objectively unreasonable, defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Appellate Division ruled that “[t]he appeal is interlocutory as it is not from a final order” and dismissed defendants’ notice of appeal. The appellate court also denied defendants’ motion for leave to appeal. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the trial court’s order was a decision premised on factual findings as well as legal conclusions, not an exclusively legal determination. "In an NJCRA action, a defendant seeking to challenge a trial court’s order denying qualified immunity prior to final judgment must proceed by motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal in accordance with Rules 2:2-4 and 2:5-6. View "Harris v. City of Newark, et al." on Justia Law