Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal centered on challenges to several documents and disbursements that were purportedly executed by Adrian Folcher in the closing days of his life. Petitioner Bernice Tambascia-Folcher, Folcher's wife and a beneficiary, used that relationship to commit a pattern of fraud, forgery, and undue influence near the end of his life. After the conclusion of a lengthy estate contest, the trial court invoked that relationship, coupled with its finding of undue influence, to shift the Estate's counsel fees to Bernice. The issue for the Supreme Court's review was whether it should expand the narrow exception to the American Rule created in "In re Niles Trust," (176 N.J. 282 (2003)). After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court declined to expand the Niles exception to a person who did not owe a fiduciary responsibility to the Estate and its beneficiaries, no matter how repugnant the conduct. "Because that confidential relationship endowed Bernice with an obligation to only her husband, and not the Estate, a fee award was not the proper vehicle to do equity. The trial court had other, unused means at its disposal for that." The Court remanded this case back to the trial court to vacate the fee award and to allow the court to consider other equitable relief that was foregone because fee-shifting mistakenly became an integral part of the court's equitable remedy. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Adrian J. Folcher" on Justia Law

The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was a narrow one of appellate jurisdiction of an agency decision and the appropriate response by an appellate tribunal when it encounters on its calendar an interlocutory order from which leave to appeal was neither sought nor granted. A school principal was returned to teaching due to a reduction-in-force (RIF), which included elimination of all vice-principal positions throughout the school district. The principal filed a petition with the Commissioner of Education to establish her tenure and seniority rights as a vice-principal. Her employer, the Board of Education of the City of Elizabeth, challenged the validity of her principal certification, which challenge, if successful, affected her tenure and seniority rights. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) adopted the Elizabeth Board's position, but the Commissioner rejected the Initial Decision and remanded the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for calculation of the principal's tenure and seniority rights. The ALJ complied, the Commissioner adopted the Initial Decision, and the Elizabeth Board appealed. The Appellate Division held that the Commissioner's first decision was a final order from which the Elizabeth Board could have filed an appeal as of right. Having failed to do so, the panel concluded that the Elizabeth Board waived its right to appeal the Commissioner's first decision. The appellate panel raised the issue of the timeliness of the appeal sua sponte and determined that the Commissioner's first decision rejecting the ALJ s Initial Decision was a final order from which the employer should have taken an appeal. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the Commissioner's order became a final decision from which an appeal could be filed as of right only when the Commissioner adopted the decision of the ALJ following the remand proceedings. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. of Education of the City of Elizabeth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Rolando Fernandes and his boss, Mario Freitas (Mario), were installing a sewer pipe on a residential construction site. The wall of the trench in which Fernandes was working collapsed, burying him up to his chest. Mario promptly extricated plaintiff and later drove him home. Fernandes was seriously injured and has not worked since that day. Fernandes filed a complaint against the general contractor, DAR Development Corp. and DAR Construction, Inc. (collectively DAR or defendant), seeking compensatory damages. At trial, the court rejected defendant s request to charge comparative negligence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. In resisting defendant s request to charge Fernandes' negligence, plaintiff argued according to controlling New Jersey case law, a worker's negligence should not have been submitted to the jury in negligence claims by an injured worker against third parties, such as a general contractor. He also argued that the record provided no evidential support for a comparative negligence charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision by the trial court refusing to submit the issue of plaintiff's negligence to the jury. In doing so, the appellate panel invoked not only the leading authority on negligence claims by injured workers arising from workplace accidents against third parties, but also authority governing workplace accidents involving unsafe or defectively designed equipment. After review of the Appellate Division's decision, the Supreme Court concluded that in negligence claims by injured workers against third parties, such as a general contractor, there was no sound reason to depart from settled precedent that an employee's negligence may be submitted to the jury when evidence has been adduced that the injured employee unreasonably confronted a known risk and had no meaningful choice in the manner in which he completed that task. The Court also determined, like the Appellate Division, that in this case the evidence produced at trial provided no basis to submit the issue of Fernandes' negligence to the jury. View "Fernandes v. DAR Development Corp." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration centered on the circumstances under which a defendant can request a civil reservation. Defendant pled guilty to failing to report an accident. The transcript of the municipal court session contained no mention of a civil reservation. Following the municipal court session, defendant's attorney wrote a letter to the municipal court judge to confirm that a civil reservation was placed on the plea. There was no record whether defendant's attorney sent a copy of this request to plaintiff's attorney, who attended the municipal court proceeding. That day, the municipal court entered an order directing that defendant's guilty plea shall not be used or be evidential in any civil proceeding. After review of this case, the Supreme Court found that the request for a civil reservation was not made contemporaneously with the guilty plea or in open court. To the extent the Appellate Division held that a defendant may request a civil reservation after he has left municipal court, the Supreme Court disavowed that ruling. Nevertheless, the guilty plea in this case was inadmissible in the civil proceeding. "Whether a person reports an accident or files the report out of time has no relevance to the issue of whether he operated a motor vehicle negligently. Moreover, if a report had been filed, N.J.S.A. 39:4-130 expressly bars the admission of any statement made in such report in a civil or criminal proceeding for any purpose." View "Maida v. Kuskin" on Justia Law

The tragic accident that gave rise to this litigation occurred during the evening of August 9, 2008 in Willingboro Township. The accident occurred as the driver of the automobile Noah Pierre was turning left at an intersection controlled by a stop sign. Among the defendants named in plaintiffs' wrongful death and survival actions were the owner and lessee of a property located on a corner of the intersection where the accident occurred. Plaintiffs alleged that these defendants negligently maintained overgrown shrubbery on their property, blocking Pierre's view of oncoming traffic at the intersection. Pierre testified that shrubbery on the property initially obscured her view when she was stopped at the stop sign at the intersection, but that she edged forward, starting and stopping four times until her view of oncoming traffic was unimpeded. A passenger in Pierre's vehicle corroborated Pierre's testimony that when she turned left, she had an unobstructed view of approaching traffic. The record contained no testimony to the contrary. However, an engineering expert retained by plaintiffs opined that the overgrown shrubbery on the property next to the intersection was a proximate cause of the fatal collision. He acknowledged Pierre's testimony that she stopped four times before proceeding and that the shrubbery on the adjoining property did not obstruct her view, but contended that Pierre's account of the accident was mistaken. The trial court granted defendants motion to strike the expert's testimony as a net opinion lacking support in the record. The court then granted defendants motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims against the property owner and lessee. The Appellate Division vacated the trial court's order barring the expert's report and reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the expert's conclusion was sufficiently grounded in the record and that plaintiffs could elicit the expert's opinion disputing Pierre's testimony in the form of a hypothetical question at trial. Given the uncontradicted testimony of Pierre and her passenger that Pierre's view of oncoming traffic was unimpeded by the shrubbery on defendants property when she made her left turn, the Supreme Court held that the trial court properly barred the causation opinion of plaintiffs' expert and granted summary judgment. The expert's opinion that the defendant property owner and defendant lessee both had a duty to maintain the landscaping on their property so that it did not obstruct the view of drivers was properly substantiated and was therefore admissible under the New Jersey Rules of Evidence. However, his opinion on the issue of causation was a net opinion that was not only unsupported by the factual evidence, but directly contradicted that evidence. View "Townsend v. Pierre" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Augustine Badiali was injured when his motor vehicle was rear-ended by an uninsured motorist. Plaintiff filed a UM claim, which proceeded to arbitration and resulted in an award in plaintiff s favor. Plaintiff filed suit against his insurer, defendant New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Group ( NJM ), after NJM rejected the arbitration award and refused to pay its share. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award in a summary action and found NJM liable for its share of the award. In a subsequent action, plaintiff asserted that NJM litigated in bad faith by advocating that its policy language allowed for a rejection of the arbitration award at issue. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of NJM. The court agreed that the case was ripe for summary judgment although discovery had not been completed. The court was further persuaded that NJM s position was fairly debatable based on its policy language and on the existence of an unpublished Appellate Division decision involving nearly identical facts, in which NJM was also a party. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that NJM s position was fairly debatable because it was supported by a prior, unpublished opinion of the court. Plaintiff was thereby barred from recovering counsel fees or any other consequential damages. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Badiali v. N.J. Mfg. Ins. Grp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kwabena Wadeer suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident that occurred while he was attempting to avoid an unidentified vehicle. Plaintiff filed a UM claim against New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company (NJM), his insurer. The insurance policy provided $100,000 in UM and UIM coverage. NJM made no offers to attempt to settle plaintiff's UM claim and the parties proceeded to private arbitration pursuant to the terms of the policy. The panel determined that plaintiff was 30% liable for the accident, the phantom vehicle was 70% liable, and plaintiff was entitled to a net award of $87,500. NJM rejected the $87,500 arbitration award and demanded a trial. By letter, plaintiff's attorney acknowledged NJM s rejection of the arbitration award and notified NJM that he believed it was acting in bad faith by rejecting that award. Plaintiff submitted an Offer of Judgment to NJM in the amount of $95,000 and reiterated his belief that defendant's conduct was in bad faith. NJM rejected the offer and the case proceeded to trial. The jury determined that the phantom vehicle was 100% liable for the underlying accident and awarded plaintiff $210,000 for pain and suffering and $12,175 in lost wages. Plaintiff thereafter moved to enter judgment for the full amount of the verdict, notwithstanding the $100,000 policy limit, as well as for prejudgment interest on the verdict and attorneys fees. During argument on the motion, plaintiff's counsel raised the issue of bad faith, contending that defendant was on notice of the claim. In response, NJM argued that plaintiff failed to plead bad faith in his complaint. The trial judge entered an order reducing and molding the jury verdict to conform to the insurance policy limit of $100,000 and awarding plaintiff attorneys fees and prejudgment interest. In his accompanying statement of reasons, the trial judge found that NJM s actions did not constitute bad faith because NJM had fairly debatable reasons for denying the benefits of the policy. Plaintiff and NJM filed cross-appeals. Plaintiff contended the trial court should not have molded the verdict to the policy limits because NJM acted in bad faith. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial judge's modified jury verdict, but reversed the award of attorneys fees and expenses. Plaintiff then filed a separate complaint alleging that NJM breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to make a settlement offer to plaintiff and by failing to settle the claim in a timely manner. NJM moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's complaint was barred by the entire controversy doctrine, res judicata, and/or collateral estoppel. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that plaintiff's bad faith claim was barred in this action under the principle of res judicata because it was raised, fairly litigated, and determined by the trial court in the first litigation. View "Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

At trial, when Abbas Husain was sworn in, he raised his right hand and spoke the oath, but did not place his left hand directly on the Bible. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Tomika Davis for $12,500. After the verdict was rendered and the jury was discharged, but before post-trial motions were argued and the judgment was entered, the trial judge had a conversation with the jurors, outside the presence of counsel, which was not recorded. During that discussion, one juror noted that she was surprised that Husain had not placed his hand on the Bible before he testified. The judge did not make a record of the juror's observation, but later informed counsel. Both parties subsequently filed post-trial motions. A certification by Husain, filed in support of his post-trial motion, included a brief reference to the juror's observation. At oral argument on the motion, the trial judge expressed surprise that information he had provided counsel in confidence ended up in a certification and as part of the trial record. Ultimately, the court denied Husain's motion, finding the amount allocated in the verdict fair in light of the evidence and giving no regard to the comment the juror made in reference to the fact that Husain did not touch the Bible. After the judgment was entered, Husain appealed, raising several arguments. Relevant to the limited issue presented in this appeal as of right, he argued that the trial judge erred by failing to declare a mistrial on the basis of the juror's comment about the fact that he did not touch the Bible. In an unpublished decision, a majority of the Appellate Division panel affirmed the verdict as to this issue, holding that no manifest injustice inhered in the juror's observation and comment. The dissenting judge maintained that the trial judge had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and that the juror's observation was sufficient to warrant a new trial. Husain appealed to the Supreme Court as of right. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: post-verdict discussions between the court and discharged jurors are prohibited unless those discussions are part of a hearing ordered on good cause shown. View "Davis v. Husain" on Justia Law

In this case, a jury determined that two New Jersey public entities, South Jersey Transportation Authority and the New Jersey State Police, were liable for injuries sustained by plaintiff as a result of a multi-vehicle pile-up on the Atlantic City Expressway during a 2005 heavy snowstorm. Plaintiff alleged that the public entities were negligent in failing to adhere to standard operating procedures with respect to competing 9-1-1 calls for motorist assistance. The jury found no negligence on the part of plaintiff or the owners or drivers of the other vehicles involved in the several collisions. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the liability verdict against the public-entity defendants based on errors in the jury instructions with respect to the liability of the public entities for discretionary versus ministerial acts. The Appellate Division determined the trial court erred in failing to allow the jury to determine predicate facts that resolved whether ministerial or discretionary acts were involved. The Appellate Division remanded the matter for retrial only with respect to the liability of the public-entity defendants. The public-entity defendants argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that, at the retrial, the second jury should decide anew the liability of all parties. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. View "Henebema v. South Jersey Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

The defendants in this case were private fire sprinkler inspection companies that were hired to assess the operating condition of a hotel's sprinkler system. Following a fatal fire at the hotel, the parents of the victims, individually and on behalf of the estates of the decedents, alleged that defendants had negligently failed to inform the hotel owner about a flaw in the design of the hotel’s sprinkler system. The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding that defendants' inspectors had possessed no duty to report any sprinkler system design flaws to the hotel owner because applicable State regulations did not necessitate any such reporting. The Appellate Division reversed, agreeing with plaintiffs' contention that defendants' compliance with regulatory requirements was not dispositive of the issue of negligence. The appellate panel explained that defendants owed plaintiffs a duty of reasonable care and that a jury should decide whether defendants had been obliged to exceed the dictates of the regulations in their exercise of reasonable care. After considering the complex nature of the Uniform Fire Code and other factors relevant to sprinkler inspections, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that a jury should not be allowed to speculate as to the proper standard of care in this case. Instead, the Court held that plaintiffs were required to establish the applicable standard of care through expert testimony. Although plaintiffs presented an expert during pretrial proceedings, the standard of care he set forth represented only his personal view and was not founded upon any objective support. As a result of plaintiffs' failure to support their asserted standard of care with admissible expert testimony, they were unable to establish the required elements of their negligence cause of action. View "Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd." on Justia Law