Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2001, plaintiff Doreen Hayes was diagnosed with a syrinx in her thoracic spine. Plaintiff’s last MRI, prior to the accident at issue in this case, was taken in May 2007. In 2008, plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle operated by her mother, defendant Barbara Delamotte. After the 2008 accident, plaintiff underwent spinal fusion surgery on plaintiff’s C6-7 and C7-T1 vertebrae. Plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint claiming that her mother and the unidentified vehicle caused the 2008 accident. Before trial, the defense retained Dr. Arthur Vasen, an orthopedic surgeon, to examine plaintiff and review her medical records, including cervical MRIs taken before and after the 2008 accident. The defense took Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposition for use at trial rather than call him to give in-court testimony. At trial, plaintiff moved to have portions of Dr. Vasen’s deposition referring to reports of non-testifying doctors stricken from the video. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, defendants presented Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposition. The trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction regarding the use of non-testifying experts’ opinions. Dr. Vasen testified that there were no differences between the MRIs taken before the accident in 2007 and after the accident in 2008. However, the films that Dr. Vasen showed in the tape were both labeled 2008. At the conclusion of the parties’ evidence, plaintiff’s counsel requested the opportunity to replay Dr. Vasen’s testimony during summation, and comment on the testimony, to demonstrate to the jury that the doctor compared MRI films marked with the same date. The trial court upheld defendant’s objection, and provided an additional limiting instruction as to the reports of non-testifying experts. Ultimately, the jury determined that plaintiff’s mother was solely responsible for the 2008 accident but found that plaintiff did not sustain a permanent injury proximately caused by that accident. Plaintiff was granted a new trial. At the second trial, the only issue presented was whether plaintiff sustained a permanent injury as a result of the 2008 accident. Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposition was retaken for use at the second trial; plaintiff once again moved in limine to bar Dr. Vasen’s testimony about the findings of non-testifying doctors. This time, the court granted plaintiff’s motion. After the second trial, the jury found that plaintiff sustained a permanent injury proximately caused by the 2008 accident and awarded her $250,000 in damages. The Appellate Division found that the trial court improperly granted a new trial and reinstated the jury’s verdict in favor of defendant from the first trial. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff following the second trial. Because the trial court’s error in preventing plaintiff from replaying a portion of the deposition during summation at the first trial resulted in a miscarriage of justice, the trial court properly granted plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. View "Hayes v. Delamotte" on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old A.F. and her infant son lived with her biological mother, A.B., in an apartment owned by A.B.’s sister, J.F. In 2012, the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) received a referral that A.F. had run away with her infant son in September 2012. The Division dispatched a caseworker to interview A.B. at her apartment. A.B. disclosed that A.F. had run away several days earlier when A.B. took away A.F.’s laptop and cellphone as punishment for being suspended from school. The caseworker went to the high school and met with A.F. During this meeting, A.F. related that she had been staying with various friends since leaving home. A.F. indicated that she had previously returned home to reconcile with A.B. and that they had gone together to the school to have A.F. reinstated. Near the end of the conference, A.F. expressed that she had “no intention of returning to her mom’s home,” and in fact did not. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s review centered on whether defendant A.B. abused or neglected A.F.; that A.B. willfully abandoned A.F.; and that remarks attributed to A.B.’s sister, J.F., were subject to suppression as embedded hearsay. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division majority’s judgment that the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency met its burden of proof concerning A.B.’s abuse or neglect of A.F. The Court found insufficient proof of willful abandonment and therefore reversed on that issue. The Court also found the hearsay evidence was properly suppressed. View "New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. A.B." on Justia Law

T.T., individually and on behalf of her three-year-old daughter, A.T., filed this medical malpractice action seeking damages from a hospital and several medical professionals for injuries caused during the child’s birth.1 The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants and dismissed the action with prejudice because plaintiff failed to serve a timely affidavit of merit. The Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the circumstances should have supported entry of a dismissal without prejudice under Rule 4:37-1(b). After review, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to defendants and remanded for further proceedings. The Court determined that a combination of circumstances (not the least of which was the failure to schedule a pretrial conference to address the affidavit of merit requirement as New Jersey case law directed), warranted allowing the untimely affidavit to be filed. "The equities militate in favor of permitting a facially meritorious action to proceed here, particularly because any prejudice to defendants may be addressed through costs imposed by the trial court. We decline to approve recourse to a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 4:37-1(b) as an appropriate avenue for addressing failures to comply with the affidavit of merit requirement, including when a minor is involved. Rather, we will require modification of the Judiciary’s electronic filing and notification case management system to ensure that, going forward, necessary and expected conferences are scheduled to enhance parties’ compliance with requirements under the Affidavit of Merit Statute (AMS or the statute), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, in furtherance of the statutory policy goals." View "A.T. v. Cohen" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether the 2000 and 2001 financial agreements between plaintiffs EQR-Lincoln Urban Renewal Jersey City, LLC (EQR-Lincoln), and EQR-LPC Urban Renewal North Pier, LLC (EQR-North Pier), and defendant, the City of Jersey City (City), incorporated 2003 amendments to the Long Term Tax Exemption (LTTE) Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1 to -22. Plaintiffs were limited liability companies that qualified as urban renewal entities under the LTTE Law. Each plaintiff entered into a separate financial agreement with the City to obtain a property tax exemption relating to an urban renewal project involving construction of an apartment building. Among other things, the financial agreements required plaintiffs to pay the City an “annual service charge” in lieu of property taxes. Plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint seeking a declaratory judgment against the City seeking: (1) a judgment declaring that the applicable law and financial agreements permitted plaintiffs to pay “excess rent” to affiliated entities under certain ground leases, with the effect of eliminating the “excess net profit” that plaintiffs might otherwise owe to the City; and (2) a judgment declaring that the parties’ financial agreements incorporated future changes to applicable law, such that plaintiffs could calculate their “allowable profit rate” in accordance with the 2003 amendments to the LTTE Law. The trial judge granted partial summary judgment on Count II, reasoning that the express language of the contract, “as amended and supplemented,” demonstrated that the parties agreed to incorporate future amendments to the LTTE Law in their financial agreements. The trial judge further concluded that the 2003 amendments to the LTTE Law applied to the financial agreements, and that legislative history supported his conclusions. The trial judge denied the City’s motion for reconsideration. The Appellate Division reversed, finding LTTE Law did not sanction plaintiffs’ unilateral changes to their financial agreements. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division. View "EQR-LPC Urban Renewal North Pier, LLC v. City of Jersey City" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a judgment requiring the release, pursuant to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), of the constitution and bylaws of a volunteer fire company that was a member of a fire district established pursuant to N.J.S.A.40A:14-70. The New Jersey Supreme Court held the fire district, to which the OPRA request was made, was obliged to release such documents in its possession or to obtain them from a member volunteer fire company under its supervision and release them. "OPRA demands such transparency and accountability of public agencies, and the fire district is undoubtedly a public agency subject to OPRA." However, to the extent the holding under review also concluded that the member volunteer fire company was a public agency subject directly and independently to OPRA requirements, the Supreme Court disagreed and modified the judgment below accordingly. View "Verry v. Franklin Fire District No. 1" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the tragic death of eleven-year-old Abiah Jones after she fell from a ride in an amusement park. The issues this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s consideration was: (1) the circumstances under which a defendant is barred from asserting contribution and common-law indemnification claims against a public entity for purposes of the Tort Claims Act; (2) whether the jury should be permitted to allocate a percentage of fault to a public entity pursuant to the Comparative Negligence Act and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law; and (3) the effect of any such allocation of fault on plaintiffs recovery of damages if the jury returns a verdict in their favor. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s determination. The plain language of N.J.S.A.59:8-8 required parties seeking to assert a claim against a public entity to serve a notice of claim within ninety days of the date on which the cause of action accrues. Because the Morey defendants did not serve a timely notice of claim on the Association, their third-party contribution and common-law indemnification claims against the Association are barred. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the trial court should have afforded defendants an opportunity to present evidence of negligence, that negligence was a proximate cause of Abiah Jones’s death. If defendants present prima facie evidence, the trial court should instruct the jury to determine whether any fault should be allocated in accordance with N.J.S.A.2A:15-5.2. Should the jury find negligence was a proximate cause of Abiah Jones’s death, the trial court should mold any judgment entered in plaintiffs’ favor pursuant to N.J.S.A.2A:15-5.2(d) to reduce the damages awarded to plaintiffs by the percentage of fault that the jury allocates. View "Jones v. Morey Pier, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in this case was whether, after a public entity denies a citizen's record request pursuant to the New Jersey Open Public Records Act (OPRA) and the common law right of access, the entity can be precluded from instituting a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). A month after the Appellate Division declared the New Jersey Firemen Association to be a public entity, plaintiff Jeff Carter submitted a request for the Association to release certain financial relief information issued to an Association member, John Doe. The Association refused, contending that disclosure would compromise the reasonable expectation of privacy that applicants, such as Doe, have when seeking its assistance. Carter renewed his request, claiming he was entitled to certain payroll records with appropriate redactions. The Association responded by filing a declaratory judgment action to obtain a judicial determination of its responsibilities under OPRA when it is asked to disclose the personal financial information of its members. Carter answered, counterclaimed, and filed a third-party complaint against Doe. At that point, Carter narrowed his records request to the relief checks paid to Doe. The trial court found that, under OPRA and the common law, Doe's privacy interest outweighed the public's interest in disclosure. The Appellate Division reversed and held that the Association s DJA complaint was improper because OPRA exclusively vests the requestor, not the custodian, with the right to institute a proceeding. The Appellate Division also determined that Doe's privacy interest was not substantial enough to outweigh the public's interest in government transparency. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division, concluding OPRA does not, in all instances, prohibit a public entity from instituting proceedings under the DJA to determine whether records are subject to disclosure. In addition, after carefully balancing the public's interest in accessing information against the private interest in confidentiality, the Court found find the relief checks to Doe were exempt from disclosure under OPRA and the common law right of access. View "In the Matter of the New Jersey Firemen Association Obligation to Provide Relief Applications Under the Open Public Records Act" on Justia Law

Defendant Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc., New Jersey’s largest health insurer, maintained a two-tiered provider-hospital system. Plaintiff Saint Peter’s University Hospital, Inc., and plaintiff Capital Health System, Inc. and others, commenced separate lawsuits claiming Horizon treated them unfairly and in a manner that contravened their agreements when they were placed in the less advantageous Tier 2. Plaintiffs assert Horizon’s tiering procedures were pre-fitted or wrongfully adjusted to guarantee selection of certain larger hospitals for the preferential Tier 1. The New Jersey Supreme Court was asked, by way of interlocutory appeal, to settle multiple discovery disputes that arose in the course of the litigation. The Supreme Court concluded the Appellate Division exceeded the limits imposed by the standard of appellate review both by assessing the disputed information’s relevance against the panel’s own disapproving view of the merits and by giving no apparent weight or consideration to the protections afforded by confidentiality orders. Having closely examined the record, the Supreme Court rejected the Appellate Division’s determination that the chancery judges encharged with these matters abused their discretion. It was not an abuse of discretion for the chancery judges to find the information sought was relevant to plaintiffs’ claims that Horizon violated either the network hospital agreements’ contractual terms, or the overarching implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, when they were relegated to the less desirable Tier 2. View "Capital Health System, Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal involved the collective negotiations agreements CNAs between: (1) Atlantic County and the Fraternal Order of Police, Atlantic Lodge #34 (FOP Lodge 34); (2) Atlantic County and the Atlantic County Prosecutor s Office, P.B.A. Local #77 (PBA Local 77); and (3) Bridgewater Township and the Policemen s Benevolent Association, Local #174 (PBA Local 174). Atlantic County informed FOP Lodge 34 and PBA Local 77 that when their respective CNAs expired the County would no longer implement the incremental salary scheme provided for in those contracts. Both unions filed charges with the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC or the Commission), claiming that Atlantic County had engaged in an unfair labor practice, contrary to the Employer-Employee Relations Act (EERA). The hearing examiner agreed with the unions and found that Atlantic County's departure from the dynamic status quo, in this case, the refusal to pay automatic increments, constituted a unilateral change in a mandatory subject of negotiations in violation of the [EERA]. Atlantic County petitioned PERC for review, and the Commission came to the opposite conclusion. All three unions appealed. The Appellate Division consolidated the cases and reversed the Commission. The New Jersey Supreme Court did not determine whether, as a general rule, an employer must maintain the status quo while negotiating a successor agreement. In these cases, the governing contract language required that the terms and conditions of the respective agreements, including the salary step increases, remain in place until a new CNA is reached. Therefore, the judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed on other grounds. View "In the Matter of Atlantic County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Emelia Jackson and Tahisha Roach purchased used cars from BM Motoring, LLC, and Federal Auto Brokers, Inc., doing business as BM Motor Cars (collectively, BM). As part of the transaction, each plaintiff signed an identical DRA, which required resolution of disputes through an arbitration in accordance with the rules of the AAA before a retired judge or an attorney. Two months later, Jackson filed a demand for arbitration against BM with the AAA, asserting a claim under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) for treble damages and other relief based on overcharges and misrepresentations by BM. Despite repeated requests by the AAA, BM did not advance the filing fees that the DRA obligated it to pay, or otherwise respond to the claim. The AAA dismissed Jackson’s arbitration claim for non-payment of fees. Six months after her vehicle purchase, Roach filed a complaint in the Superior Court against BM, and similarly, received no response from BM in response to the arbitration demand. Plaintiffs then filed this action against defendants, who moved to dismiss the complaint in favor of arbitration. Defendants contended that they did not contemplate using the AAA as the forum for arbitration, and consistently had not arbitrated customer disputes before the AAA, because of the excessive filing and administrative fees that the AAA charged. In opposition to the motion, plaintiffs asserted that defendants materially breached the DRA by failing to advance filing and arbitration fees, and waived their right to arbitration. Defendants contended that they neither breached the DRA nor waived arbitration because the AAA was not the appropriate arbitral forum. The trial court found that the parties intended to resolve disputes by arbitration. The court ordered the parties to attempt to reinstate plaintiffs’ claims with the AAA; if the AAA refused to administer the claim, plaintiffs could reinstate their complaint. The AAA reinstated the arbitration, and the court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, finding that there was a sufficient factual dispute as to the proper forum for arbitration that defendants conduct did not constitute a material breach of the DRA, nor did they voluntarily and intentionally waive their right to enforce the DRA. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment, finding defendants’ non-payment of filing and arbitration fees amounted to a material breach of the DRA. Defendants were therefore precluded from enforcing the arbitration provision, and the case proceeded in the courts. View "Roach v. BM Motoring, LLC" on Justia Law