Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Clarios, LLC (Clarios) purchased an industrial site in 2006, for which the seller had executed a remediation plan under the Industrial Site Recovery Act (ISRA) and placed funds in trust for future remediation. In 2007, Clarios ceased operations and sought a Remediation in Progress Waiver (RIP Waiver) from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), which was granted with the condition that the DEP reserved the right to enforce ISRA obligations in the future. Clarios sold the site in 2011, and the new owner, DeNovo, assumed remediation responsibilities. By 2021, the remediation trust was depleted, and the site was out of compliance. In April 2022, the DEP rescinded Clarios’s RIP Waiver due to non-compliance and depletion of funds.Clarios requested an adjudicatory hearing, arguing that the rescission without notice or a hearing violated its due process rights. The DEP denied the request, stating that rescission did not entitle Clarios to a hearing under the relevant regulations. Clarios appealed, and the Appellate Division ruled in favor of the DEP, holding that Clarios did not have a protected property interest in the RIP Waiver. The court found that Clarios’s expectation of continued suspension of remediation obligations was not based on any statutory or regulatory provisions but rather on a unilateral expectation.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. The Court held that the DEP’s initial grant of the RIP Waiver did not create a property interest in the continued suspension of Clarios’s remediation obligations. The Court found that neither the controlling statutes and regulations nor a mutually explicit understanding between the parties provided an entitlement to the indefinite continuance of the waiver. The governing laws and agency materials anticipated the DEP’s ability to enforce remediation obligations in the future, and thus, rescission of the RIP Waiver without a hearing did not violate Clarios’s due process rights. View "In re Appeal of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's September 6, 2022 Denial of Request for Adjudicatory Hearing" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute among members of several limited liability companies, which was arbitrated according to the parties' agreement. The arbitrator issued a series of awards, ultimately granting plaintiff Laurence Rappaport $4.9 million on various claims, offset by an award to defendant Kenneth Pasternak, resulting in a net award of approximately $3.8 million. The arbitrator did not award Rappaport damages for the loss of future distributions of carried interest. Rappaport contended that the issue of carried interest was not presented to the arbitrator and that the arbitrator improperly ruled on it.The Chancery Division confirmed the arbitrator's awards after remanding for clarification that the arbitrator intended to resolve the issue of carried interest. Rappaport appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the awards for Rappaport’s claims for lost income and future income based on his termination as a manager. However, the Appellate Division ruled that the parties had excluded the question of carried interest from the arbitration and concluded that the arbitrator had raised the issue sua sponte. It modified the awards to exclude any inclusion of Rappaport’s membership interest, including future carried interest, and reversed the Chancery Division’s judgment.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and disagreed with the Appellate Division’s conclusion. The Court found that the issue of carried interest was arbitrable and had been raised by the parties at several stages of the arbitration. The Court held that the remedy of modification under N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-24(a)(2) was not warranted and that the Appellate Division’s review did not conform to the deferential standard governing judicial review of arbitration awards. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and reinstated the Chancery Division’s decision confirming the arbitration award. View "Rappaport v. Pasternak" on Justia Law

Rosalyn Musker worked in sales for Suuchi, Inc., which sells software subscriptions to apparel manufacturers. In addition to her base salary, Musker was eligible for commissions under Suuchi’s Sales Commission Plan (SCP). In March 2020, Suuchi decided to sell Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) on a commission basis due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Musker generated approximately $34,448,900 in gross revenue by selling PPE. The parties disputed whether her 4% commission was based on gross or net revenue and whether these commissions were considered "wages" under the Wage Payment Law (WPL) or excluded as "supplementary incentives."The trial judge dismissed Musker’s WPL claims, holding that her PPE commissions were not "wages" under the WPL. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, agreeing that the commissions were "supplementary incentives" and not "wages" under the WPL. Musker appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case. The Court held that under the WPL, "wages" are defined as "direct monetary compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, where the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, or commission basis." The Court concluded that compensating an employee by paying a "commission" for "labor or services" always constitutes a wage under the WPL. Therefore, a "commission" cannot be excluded from the definition of "wages" as a "supplementary incentive."The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, vacated the trial judge’s order dismissing Musker’s WPL claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court clarified that Musker’s PPE commissions are "wages" under the WPL, regardless of whether they are based on gross or net revenue, and that receiving a base salary does not turn "commissions" into "supplementary incentives." View "Musker v. Suuchi, Inc." on Justia Law

Crystal Walcott Spill's estate and beneficiaries filed a wrongful death suit against several doctors, including Dr. Steven Paganessi and his medical group, alleging negligence during a surgical procedure that led to Spill's death. Spill, who had lupus, was under the care of Dr. Jenny Diep, a New York-based rheumatologist, and Dr. Jacob Markovitz, a New Jersey-based gynecologist. Before the surgery, Dr. Diep increased Spill's blood pressure medication dosage and recommended she see a nephrologist. Spill saw Dr. Holly Koncicki, a New York-based nephrologist, who conducted lab tests but did not receive the results before the surgery. Spill suffered a cardiac event during the procedure and died the same day. The lab results, available after her death, showed critically elevated creatinine and potassium levels.The trial court dismissed Dr. Diep from the case due to lack of personal jurisdiction and denied the defendants' motion to include her on the verdict form for fault allocation. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that an out-of-state individual over whom New Jersey courts lack personal jurisdiction cannot be included for fault allocation.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, with modifications. The Court held that an individual outside New Jersey's jurisdiction is not a "party" under the Comparative Negligence Act (CNA) for fault allocation purposes. However, such an individual may be considered a joint tortfeasor under the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law (JTCL), allowing defendants to seek contribution in a relevant jurisdiction if a judgment is rendered against them. The Court did not agree with the Appellate Division's view that the model civil jury instruction on causation mitigates any unfairness to the defendants. View "Estate of Spill v. Markovitz" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, D.T., alleged that he was sexually abused by Michael J. McCarthy, a priest assigned by the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, during an overnight trip to a private home in New Jersey in 1971. D.T. claimed that McCarthy, who was a family friend and mentor, used his position as a priest to gain the trust of D.T.'s mother and take him on the trip where the abuse occurred. The Archdiocese, which operates in Pennsylvania, argued that it did not own property or conduct business in New Jersey at the time of the alleged incident.The trial court granted the Archdiocese's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Appellate Division twice remanded the case for jurisdictional discovery and consideration of the Archdiocese's past ownership of property in New Jersey. After the second remand, the trial court again granted the motion to dismiss, and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding no basis for personal jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that D.T. had not demonstrated that the Archdiocese's supervisory authority over McCarthy established the minimum contacts with New Jersey necessary to exercise specific jurisdiction under Fourteenth Amendment due process principles. The Court found that the Archdiocese did not purposefully avail itself of conducting activities in New Jersey and that McCarthy's actions were not directed by the Archdiocese. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment, concluding that there was no basis for New Jersey to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Archdiocese in this case. View "D.T. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Michael Jones purchased Series EE federal savings bonds during his marriage to Jeanine Jones, designating her as the pay-on-death beneficiary. Upon their divorce, their divorce settlement agreement (DSA) did not specifically address the savings bonds but included a provision that any marital asset not listed would belong to the party currently in possession. The DSA also required Michael to pay Jeanine $200,000 in installments. After Michael's death, Jeanine redeemed the savings bonds and filed a creditor’s claim against Michael’s Estate for the remaining $100,000 owed under the DSA. The Estate argued that the redemption of the savings bonds satisfied Michael’s financial obligations to Jeanine.The trial court agreed with the Estate, ruling that the savings bonds counted towards Michael’s $200,000 obligation under the DSA and dismissed Jeanine’s claim for reimbursement. Jeanine appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the federal regulations governing U.S. savings bonds preempted state law, and Jeanine was the sole owner of the bonds at Michael’s death. Therefore, the value of the redeemed bonds should not be credited towards the Estate’s obligations under the DSA.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that preemption was not an issue because N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14 does not conflict with federal regulations governing U.S. savings bonds. The Court found that the DSA did not direct the disposition of the savings bonds, and thus, the bonds should not be credited against Michael’s $200,000 obligation. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment as modified, ruling that the Estate must make the remaining payments to Jeanine as required by the DSA. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, administrators of the Estate of April Carden, filed a medical malpractice complaint against Hackensack Meridian Health, Dr. Alok Goyal, and South Plainfield Primary Care. They alleged that Carden's death was due to Allopurinol prescribed by Dr. Goyal, claiming negligence and vicarious liability. Dr. Goyal and SPPC's answer included a Specialty Statement indicating they practiced internal medicine and gastroenterology. Plaintiffs provided an affidavit of merit (AOM) from Dr. Fitzgibbons, a board-certified internist. Defendants argued Dr. Fitzgibbons was unqualified as she was not certified in gastroenterology.The trial judge denied defendants' motions to dismiss, finding the treatment involved internal medicine. Alternatively, the judge ruled that the AOM from Dr. Fitzgibbons was sufficient under Buck v. Henry. Defendants' motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Appellate Division reversed, requiring an AOM from a physician certified in each of Dr. Goyal's specialties, and remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case. It held that when a defending physician practices in multiple specialties, an AOM from a physician specializing in any one of those specialties suffices. The Court found that Dr. Goyal's treatment involved both internal medicine and gastroenterology, and thus, the AOM from Dr. Fitzgibbons, a board-certified internist, was adequate. The Court reversed the Appellate Division's judgment and remanded for further proceedings, emphasizing that plaintiffs must still prove negligence at trial. View "Wiggins v. Hackensack Meridian Health" on Justia Law

Antonio Fuster went to the Chatham Township Police Department to report that his special needs child had accused an adult male relative of sexual misconduct. His interview with police was recorded on a body worn camera. Fuster and his wife, Brianna Devine, sought access to that video under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) and the common law right of access. They alleged inaccuracies in the initial police report and wanted the video to potentially file an internal affairs complaint.The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, holding that the body worn camera footage was a government record under OPRA but exempt from disclosure under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b), which protects the confidentiality of information regarding individuals not arrested or charged. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the video was exempt from disclosure under judicial case law protecting uncharged individuals' law enforcement records.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case. The Court held that N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(k) did not permit plaintiffs to review the video because Fuster had already requested the video be retained for three years, and Devine was not entitled to review it under the specified provisions. The Court also held that subsection (l) of the Body Worn Camera Law did not abrogate OPRA’s exemptions, but there was no OPRA exemption supporting the refusal to release the video. The Court found that OPRA does not contain an explicit exemption for information received by law enforcement regarding an individual who was not arrested or charged, and New Jersey case law had not established such an automatic grant of confidentiality.The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and ordered the release of the body worn camera footage to the plaintiffs, without reaching the common law claims. View "Fuster v. Township of Chatham" on Justia Law

The case involves a car accident where Thomas Irwin rear-ended Linda Brehme's vehicle. Brehme's Personal Injury Protection (PIP) carrier paid benefits but not up to the policy limits. Brehme filed a personal injury complaint against Irwin, seeking damages for pain and suffering, disability, impairment, loss of enjoyment of life, and past lost wages. At trial, Brehme attempted to admit evidence of her projected future medical expenses, but the trial judge denied the motion because she had not exhausted her PIP limits. The jury awarded Brehme $225,000 for pain and suffering and $50,000 for past lost wages, totaling $275,000. Irwin's carrier paid the final judgment, and Brehme's counsel signed a warrant to satisfy the judgment.The Appellate Division dismissed Brehme's appeal as moot, noting that she had accepted and received the full judgment amount and signed a warrant to satisfy the judgment before indicating her desire to appeal. The court found that Brehme's acceptance of the judgment precluded her from appealing the trial judge's ruling barring evidence of future medical expenses.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that a plaintiff who accepts a final judgment may still appeal if they can show that they made their intention to appeal known before accepting payment and executing the warrant to satisfy the judgment, and that prevailing on the appellate issue will not impact the final judgment other than to potentially increase it. The court found that Brehme did not express her intention to appeal before accepting payment and executing the warrant, and that the issue of future medical expenses was not separable from the underlying final judgment. Therefore, the appeal was properly dismissed as moot. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision and referred the matter to the Civil Practice Committee to assess whether to clarify Rule 4:48-1. View "Brehme v. Irwin" on Justia Law

In 1991, Celestine Payne poisoned her husband, Alphonso, to collect his life insurance policy. She then enlisted her children and a tenant, Eugene Cooper, to help dispose of Alphonso’s body. Two years later, Celestine convinced Cooper to name her the beneficiary of his life insurance policy and then orchestrated an attack on him. When Cooper survived, Celestine went to the hospital, pretended to be his mother, and signed a do-not-resuscitate order. Celestine also fraudulently obtained a life insurance policy on 18-year-old Tara Carter, naming herself as the beneficiary, and later had Tara bludgeoned to death by Charles Pinchom.In 1997, Celestine pled guilty to multiple charges, including two counts of first-degree murder, and was sentenced to two concurrent life terms plus a consecutive 20-year term. In November 2021, Celestine petitioned for compassionate release under the Compassionate Release Act (CRA), citing her permanent physical incapacity. The trial court found she met the Act’s medical and public safety requirements but denied her petition, citing the particularly heinous, cruel, and depraved nature of her crimes as extraordinary aggravating factors.The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the facts of the case did not rise to the level of extraordinary circumstances required to deny compassionate release. The court found that the trial court had abused its discretion in its application of the extraordinary aggravating factors.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that the trial court’s finding that Celestine’s crimes were extraordinarily heinous, cruel, and depraved was supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s application of the extraordinary aggravating factors and reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, reinstating the trial court’s denial of compassionate release. View "State v. C.P." on Justia Law