Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a municipality’s efforts to use eminent domain to acquire two privately owned parcels, Lots 84 and 90, from their respective owners. The Township adopted a series of ordinances authorizing the taking of these lots. Rather than putting the condemned properties to public use, the Township arranged to swap these parcels with a private developer in exchange for other land owned by the developer, which would be used as open space. The ordinances did not specify any public use for Lots 84 and 90 after the exchange, nor did they restrict their use for public purposes.The Superior Court, Law Division, first found the taking was for a public purpose and allowed the condemnation process to proceed, appointing commissioners to determine just compensation. The property owners’ motions to stay the condemnation were denied by both the trial court and the Appellate Division. Upon appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the condemnation was not for a valid public purpose as required by law and that the lots were being used as “currency” for a land swap, with no assurance the condemned properties would serve any public use.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment. The Court held that neither New Jersey’s condemnation statutes nor federal or state case law authorize the condemnation of private property solely to exchange it for other land that will be put to public use. The Court further found that the Township failed to act forthrightly with the property owners. The matter was remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate remedy. Thus, the main holding is that condemning private property solely to swap it for property to be used for public purposes does not satisfy the public use requirement under New Jersey law. View "Township of Jackson v. Getzel Bee, LLC" on Justia Law

The State of New Jersey, through agreements with several financial services companies, required those companies to price and market Variable Rate Demand Obligations (VRDOs) according to specific criteria. B. Johan Rosenberg, acting through Edelweiss Fund, LLC, believed the defendants were improperly resetting VRDO rates and filed a qui tam suit on behalf of the State in 2015, alleging violations of the New Jersey False Claims Act (NJFCA). The Attorney General declined to intervene. Defendants sought dismissal under the NJFCA’s public disclosure bar, arguing the information underlying Edelweiss’s claims was publicly available.The Superior Court, Law Division, initially dismissed the complaint based on the public disclosure bar, finding the information was publicly available and that Edelweiss was not an “original source.” After an amended complaint and further discovery, the trial court denied defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss, finding additional factual questions. While summary judgment motions were pending, the Legislature amended the NJFCA to permit the Attorney General to oppose the public disclosure bar without intervening. The Attorney General filed a notice of opposition pursuant to the new amendment. The trial court granted summary judgment for Edelweiss, holding the Attorney General’s opposition was valid under the amendment. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding the amendment did not apply retroactively and ordered judgment for defendants.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that the 2023 amendment to N.J.S.A. 2A:32C-9(c), known as the Opposition Amendment, was procedural and took effect immediately, including in pending cases. Therefore, the Attorney General’s notice of opposition to the public disclosure bar was effective, and the case may proceed. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment. View "State of New Jersey ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co." on Justia Law

A neurosurgeon who co-owned a medical practice and several unrelated businesses purchased disability insurance policies through insurance brokers employed by a financial group. The brokers allegedly advised him he would receive maximum benefits if disabled, without disclosing that his other business interests could reduce his benefits. After being diagnosed with a vision condition that prevented him from performing neurosurgery, the plaintiff claimed maximum benefits but received only partial payments because of his unrelated business interests. He filed a complaint asserting, among other claims, that the brokers violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) by failing to obtain sufficient disability insurance.The Superior Court, Law Division, granted the brokers’ motion to dismiss the CFA count, relying on Plemmons v. Blue Chip Insurance Services, Inc., which held insurance brokers are exempt from the CFA as “semi-professionals.” The trial court noted but did not resolve the tension between Plemmons and Shaw v. Shand, which narrowly construed the CFA's “learned professional” exception. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted leave to appeal the CFA count.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that insurance brokers, producers, and agents are not exempt from liability under the CFA, neither as “semi-professionals” nor under the “learned professional” exception. The Court found no support for a “semi-professional” exemption in the CFA’s text and determined that licensing or regulation alone does not justify exemption. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, vacated the CFA count’s dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings, also inviting legislative clarification on professional exemptions under the CFA. View "Lowe v. Audet" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child after a jury found he had sexually assaulted a 12-year-old girl. After indictment, the State offered a plea deal, which the defendant rejected, and he proceeded to trial. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison under the Jessica Lunsford Act (JLA), which mandated a minimum of 25 years without parole. On direct appeal, the defendant challenged errors related to the indictment, jury instructions, prosecutorial conduct, and the sentence, but the Appellate Division affirmed and the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied certification.Subsequently, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the Superior Court, arguing that Attorney General Guidelines implementing the JLA, specifically a rule preventing prosecutors from offering the most lenient plea after indictment, were fundamentally unfair and violated due process. The PCR court denied relief, finding the claims could have been raised earlier and were therefore procedurally barred under New Jersey Court Rule 3:22-4(a). On appeal, the Appellate Division agreed that the claims could have been raised previously but invoked the “fundamental injustice” exception to the procedural bar, remanding for further fact-finding and creating a new rule requiring prosecutors to explain the timing and rationale of post-indictment plea offers.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division. The Court held that the defendant’s PCR claims were procedurally barred because he could have raised them on direct appeal and none of the exceptions to the procedural bar applied. The Court further ruled that the Appellate Division erred in both applying the “fundamental injustice” exception and creating a new procedural rule in this context. The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed. View "State v. Wildgoose" on Justia Law

A developer applied to the zoning board of a New Jersey township for a use variance to construct a senior living facility on a residentially-zoned eight-acre property. The proposed development, which included independent, assisted living, and memory care units, was undisputedly an “inherently beneficial use” as defined by the state’s Municipal Land Use Law. The application also sought several bulk variances. The planning board had previously declined to include the property in a newly created Senior Housing Overlay Zone, following public opposition and a policy goal of preserving farmland and open space. After a multi-day hearing, the zoning board denied the variance, finding that the detrimental impact on the zoning plan and ordinance, including concerns about density, impervious coverage, drainage, traffic, and prior zoning decisions, outweighed the public benefits of the proposed use.The developers challenged the denial in the Superior Court, Law Division, which reversed the board’s decision, finding insufficient evidence of substantial negative impact and remanding for the imposition of reasonable conditions, but barring reduction in the number of units. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the zoning and master plan did not specifically preclude the use, and that the board’s concerns did not justify denial under the deferential review standard.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case to clarify the standard for granting use variances for inherently beneficial uses after a 1997 legislative amendment to the Municipal Land Use Law. The Court held that the fourth step of the Sica v. Board of Adjustment of Wall test must be revised: before balancing positive and negative criteria, the zoning board must now specifically determine whether the applicant has shown that the variance “will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zoning plan and zoning ordinance.” The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and remanded for application of the revised standard. View "Monarch Communities, LLC v. Township of Montville" on Justia Law

An eighteen-year-old woman, referred to as Kim, accused her uncle of sexually assaulting her while she was living with her biological father and other relatives. Kim reported the alleged assault to her father, underwent a medical examination, and was interviewed by law enforcement. She described the incident and disclosed a medical history that included autism, bipolar I, PTSD, and other conditions, along with a list of prescribed psychotropic medications. The defense claimed Kim provided inconsistent accounts of the events and highlighted her history of mental illness and psychotropic medication use. Defense counsel interviewed Kim’s family and friends, who described her as having a tendency to lie and a history of making false accusations. Based on this, the defense moved for an in camera review of Kim’s pre-incident mental health records.The Superior Court, Law Division, granted the motion for an in camera review, finding that the defense demonstrated a substantial, particularized need under the standard articulated in State v. Chambers, 252 N.J. 561 (2023). The court limited the review to Kim’s two most recent hospitalizations, emphasizing that an in camera review would not guarantee disclosure to the defense. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the defendant did not meet the heightened standard required for such discovery and finding the trial court did not adequately address issues of witness reliability and bias.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division. The Court held that the trial judge correctly applied the Chambers standard and did not abuse his discretion in finding the defense met the threshold showing for an in camera review. The Court clarified that this decision concerns only the preliminary stage—whether a judge may review the records—not whether they will ultimately be disclosed. The court reinstated the trial judge’s order for a limited in camera review. View "State v. R.F.P." on Justia Law

After defaulting on his credit card debt, the plaintiff’s outstanding balance was sold by the issuing bank to a series of institutional debt buyers. None of these entities were licensed in New Jersey as consumer lenders or sales finance companies at the time they acquired the debt. The last entity in the chain, LVNV Funding LLC, obtained a default judgment against the plaintiff to collect the debt. Subsequently, the plaintiff initiated a separate class action against LVNV and the other assignees, seeking a declaration that the debt purchase was void under the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (CFLA) because the buyers lacked the required licenses, and requesting an injunction against further collection efforts.The Superior Court, Law Division, dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice, holding that the CFLA does not provide a private right of action for borrowers to void loan contracts based on alleged licensing violations. While the plaintiff’s appeal was pending, the Appellate Division decided Francavilla v. Absolute Resolutions VI, LLC, which held that the CFLA confers no such private right. Relying on that precedent, the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal and denied the plaintiff’s cross-motion to vacate the underlying default judgment.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case to determine whether a borrower may bring a private action under the CFLA to void a loan contract. The Court held that the CFLA does not contain an implied private right of action for borrowers to void loan contracts. The Court reasoned that the legislative history and statutory structure show no intent to permit such private suits, noting that prior statutes expressly granted a private remedy, which was omitted from the CFLA. The voiding provision in the CFLA operates within a penal framework, and absent clear legislative direction, the Court will not infer a private right of action. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "Diana v. LVNV Funding LLC" on Justia Law

The Legislature enacted a statute in 2014 mandating that police vehicles acquired after March 1, 2015 and used primarily for traffic stops be equipped with mobile video recording systems (MVRS). At the same time, the Legislature increased the surcharge for driving while intoxicated (DWI) offenses by $25, directing the additional funds to cover the cost of MVRS installation. In 2015, Deptford Township challenged the MVRS mandate before the Council on Local Mandates, arguing that the surcharge was insufficient to cover the costs and that the statute constituted an unfunded mandate. Deptford did not challenge the legality of the surcharge itself.The Council determined that the MVRS mandate was an unfunded mandate because there was a significant disparity between the anticipated costs and the funds generated by the surcharge. The Council declared the MVRS statute unconstitutional and also found the $25 surcharge provision “nugatory,” or without legal effect. In 2021, class actions were filed by individuals subjected to the surcharge, alleging its continued collection was unconstitutional. The complaints were consolidated in the Superior Court, which dismissed them. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the Council had exceeded its authority by invalidating the surcharge, because it was a funding mechanism and not an unfunded mandate.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed whether judicial review of the Council’s decisions was available and whether the Council had authority to invalidate the surcharge. The Court held that the Council is subject to judicial review when it acts beyond its constitutionally defined authority. It found that the Council’s power ended after it determined the MVRS mandate was unfunded, and it was not authorized to invalidate the $25 surcharge. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment. View "Reed v. Muoio" on Justia Law

A Moorestown restaurant was burglarized twice in September 2018. Security footage showed an intruder wearing a distinctive two-tone hooded sweatshirt taking or attempting to take cash from under the register. Police lifted five latent fingerprints from the register and a pizza oven after the incidents. Those prints were analyzed using the ACE-V method and compared against the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), which led to the identification of the defendant as the suspected source. Fingerprint evidence was the only direct link between the defendant and the burglaries.The Superior Court, Appellate Division, reviewed the case after the defendant was convicted at trial. The defendant argued pretrial that the fingerprint evidence was unreliable, citing the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) reports. The trial court denied the motion to bar expert fingerprint testimony without holding a hearing. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions, finding reversible error in the trial court’s failure to conduct a pretrial hearing on reliability under N.J.R.E. 702. It also held there was an abuse of discretion in not questioning prospective jurors about fingerprint evidence during voir dire and error in allowing lay witnesses to offer subjective interpretations of surveillance footage.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that trial courts must ensure the reliability of expert testimony before it is presented to the jury and agreed a hearing on the fingerprint evidence was necessary. The Court appointed a Special Adjudicator to conduct a hearing to evaluate reliability and any necessary limitations. The Court retained jurisdiction, declined to reverse the conviction at this time, and reserved judgment on the voir dire and narration testimony issues pending the hearing’s outcome. View "State v. Lee" on Justia Law

A twenty-one-month-old child suffered seizures and respiratory distress after a fall at home. His mother called 911, and basic life support EMTs arrived, followed by advanced life support paramedics. The paramedics, employed by Atlantic Ambulance Corporation, administered medications and attempted multiple intubations to open his airway. They communicated twice by phone with Dr. Niti Sharma, a licensed emergency physician, who gave them orders to administer drugs and to intubate the child. After several unsuccessful intubation attempts and continued resuscitation efforts, the child was transported into the hospital, where he was reintubated and resuscitated. He was discharged with an anoxic brain injury and other significant health repercussions.Plaintiffs, the child’s parents, sued Atlantic Ambulance Corporation, its paramedics, and other related parties, alleging negligence and reckless conduct caused the injuries. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing immunity under New Jersey’s Emergency Medical Services Act (EMSA), which shields paramedics from civil liability when they perform advanced life support services “in good faith” and “in accordance with” the EMSA. The Superior Court, Law Division, granted summary judgment, finding the paramedics followed physician orders and maintained appropriate communication. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding the paramedics’ actions met statutory requirements for immunity, and rejected plaintiffs’ argument that frequent or continuous communication with the physician was required.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed whether the paramedics acted “in accordance with the act” for purposes of statutory immunity. The Court held that the paramedics maintained direct voice communication and took orders from a licensed physician as required by the EMSA, and that the statute does not mandate continuous communication or specific recontact criteria. The Court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, granting them immunity under N.J.S.A. 26:2K-14. View "Almonte v. Township of Union" on Justia Law