Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, Denise Wilkerson won the Democratic primary for a council seat in Roselle, New Jersey, by a narrow margin of three votes over Cynthia Johnson. Johnson requested a recount and a recheck, which ultimately reduced Wilkerson’s margin to two votes. Johnson then filed an amended petition contesting the election, arguing that three voters had been improperly denied the right to vote. The trial court initially ordered a new election but, after reconsideration prompted by the Attorney General, removed the requirement for a new election and directed that the Democratic County Committee select the nominee pursuant to N.J.S.A. 19:13-20.Wilkerson appealed the trial court’s September 12 order to the Appellate Division, seeking either a special primary and general election after Election Day or, alternatively, placement of both Democratic candidates on the general election ballot. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s order, upholding the use of the statutory process that allowed the county committee to select the nominee. Wilkerson then filed an emergent application with the Supreme Court of New Jersey, reiterating her requests for extraordinary remedies.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that neither of Wilkerson’s proposed remedies—holding a special primary and general election after Election Day or placing both Democratic candidates on the general election ballot—finds support in the statutory scheme. The Court determined that the relevant statutes, N.J.S.A. 19:13-18 and N.J.S.A. 19:13-20, govern the situation, and that the county committee’s selection of the nominee was proper, even though the statutory deadline was relaxed due to litigation delays. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "Johnson v. Wilkerson" on Justia Law

In 1973, Fred Krug committed murder and other violent crimes while on parole, leading to his conviction and a life sentence plus additional consecutive terms. Over the years, Krug accumulated numerous disciplinary infractions in prison but had maintained a largely clean record since 2003, aside from a single incident in 2017. He was denied parole in 1994, 1995, 2012, and 2016. In 2022, at age 75, Krug became eligible for parole again. A two-member panel of the New Jersey State Parole Board denied his application in 2023, citing both old and new information, including his criminal history and institutional behavior, and set his next eligibility for thirty-six months later.Krug appealed the denial to the full Parole Board, arguing that the panel violated the 1979 Parole Act by failing to present new evidence since his last denial, as that Act required only “new information” to be considered at subsequent hearings. The full Board affirmed the denial, explaining that a 1997 amendment had removed the new-information limitation, allowing consideration of the entire record at each hearing. Krug then appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, which upheld the Board’s decision, relying on its earlier ruling in Trantino v. State Parole Board (Trantino V) that the 1997 amendment was a procedural change and did not violate ex post facto protections.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that constitutional ex post facto prohibitions bar only punishment beyond what was contemplated at the time the crime was committed. Since the law in effect when Krug committed his offenses (the Parole Act of 1948) permitted the Board to consider all available information, the retroactive application of the 1997 amendment did not increase his punishment. The Court therefore rejected Krug’s ex post facto challenge and affirmed the lower court’s judgment as modified. View "Krug v. New Jersey State Parole Board" on Justia Law

In January 2020, Salve Chipola attended a high school basketball game where Sean Flannery made statements to a school official accusing Chipola of being a drug dealer and providing drugs and alcohol to students. As a result, Chipola was later banned from school grounds and questioned by a police officer about these allegations, which he denied. Flannery admitted to making the statements. Nearly two years after the incident, Chipola filed a lawsuit against Flannery for false light invasion of privacy, alleging that the false statements harmed his reputation and caused emotional distress.The Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, granted Flannery’s motion to dismiss, finding that Chipola’s claim was time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations for defamation, as established in Swan v. Boardwalk Regency Corp. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, reasoning that false light claims are essentially akin to defamation and thus subject to the same one-year limitations period. The court relied on prior case law, including Rumbauskas v. Cantor, which recognized the similarities between false light and defamation claims.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case to resolve whether the statute of limitations for false light invasion of privacy should be one year, as for defamation, or two years, as for personal injury. The Court held that the one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims also applies to false light claims. The Court reasoned that the conduct and injuries underlying both torts are closely aligned, and applying a longer limitations period to false light would undermine legislative intent and free speech protections. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "Chipola v. Flannery" on Justia Law

Police responded to a report of gunshots and encountered the defendant walking with two others. When approached by officers, the defendant fled and was seen discarding a loaded handgun. He was apprehended and charged with several offenses, including unlawful possession of a weapon and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, both of which are subject to mandatory minimum sentences under New Jersey’s Graves Act. The defendant, who had no adult criminal convictions, requested a waiver of the mandatory minimum sentence, but the prosecutor denied the request, citing the seriousness of the conduct and the risks posed during the incident.The defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of a weapon, and the trial court found the aggravating and mitigating factors to be balanced. During sentencing, the court learned of the prior denial of the Graves Act waiver and postponed sentencing for further explanation. The defendant then moved to override the prosecutor’s denial. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, determined that the defendant had not shown the prosecutor’s decision was a patent and gross abuse of discretion and sentenced him according to the plea agreement. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court should have applied the less deferential abuse of discretion standard. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed, holding that the patent and gross abuse of discretion standard applied.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case to determine the correct standard for reviewing a prosecutor’s denial of a Graves Act waiver. The Court held that the appropriate standard is ordinary abuse of discretion, not the heightened patent and gross abuse of discretion standard. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider the prosecutor’s denial under the ordinary abuse of discretion standard. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Police arrested the defendant in August 2021 on an outstanding robbery warrant and found a handgun believed to be his. He was charged with several offenses, including first-degree unlawful possession of a weapon under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) and (j), the latter applying when a person with a prior conviction subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA) commits an unlawful weapons possession offense. The defendant had a 2017 reckless manslaughter conviction, qualifying as a NERA offense. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to the first-degree weapons charge, and the State recommended a ten-year sentence with a five-year mandatory parole disqualifier under the Graves Act. Defense counsel reserved the right to argue that the Graves Act did not apply to subsection (j).The Superior Court, Law Division, imposed the recommended sentence, including the Graves Act parole disqualifier. On appeal, the Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed, reasoning that subsection (j) was a grading statute that elevated the degree of the underlying offense and thus permitted application of the Graves Act’s mandatory minimums. The Appellate Division relied on legislative history and policy arguments, concluding that excluding subsection (j) from the Graves Act would produce an “absurd” result.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and reversed. The Court held that N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j) creates a distinct, substantive first-degree offense that must be charged and proven independently, not merely a sentencing enhancement or grading provision. Because the Graves Act does not expressly include subsection (j) among the offenses subject to its mandatory parole ineligibility, a conviction under subsection (j) does not trigger the Graves Act’s mandatory minimums. The case was remanded for resentencing without the Graves Act parole disqualifier. View "State v. Cromedy" on Justia Law

In August 2019, a Jersey City Police Department (JCPD) lieutenant fired a shotgun during an argument with his girlfriend, leading to his arrest and charges of terroristic threats and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. He pled guilty to a lesser charge and completed a pre-trial intervention program. The JCPD conducted an internal affairs (IA) investigation, resulting in a ninety-day suspension for the lieutenant. Plaintiff States Newsroom Inc. sought access to the IA report under the common law.The trial court denied the plaintiff's request, citing the expungement statute and an expungement order that barred the release of information related to the lieutenant’s arrest and criminal case. The court also ordered the entire docket to remain sealed. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, instructing the trial court to apply the common law balancing test from Rivera v. Union County Prosecutors’ Office and to analyze the sealing of court documents individually.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the expungement statute does not categorically bar the release of IA reports but does prohibit the release of any information related to the lieutenant’s arrest, conviction, or criminal case disposition. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment with modifications, remanding the case to the trial court to redact such information from the IA report and then conduct the common law balancing test on the remainder. If the court finds that the interests favoring disclosure outweigh confidentiality concerns, it must further redact information as specified in Rivera before releasing the report. The Court also upheld the Appellate Division’s direction regarding the sealing of court documents. View "States Newsroom Inc. v. City of Jersey City" on Justia Law

A former Newark policeman, Keith Isaac, applied for special retirement in 2013, listing his estranged spouse, Roxanne, as his wife on the application. His retirement was approved in 2016, retroactive to August 1, 2014, resulting in $208,950.03 in unpaid benefits. Isaac passed away before receiving these benefits, and the Division of Pensions and Benefits distributed the unpaid benefits to Roxanne in March 2017. Isaac’s estate requested reconsideration, arguing that the benefits should be paid to the estate. The Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (PFRS) upheld the decision, stating that Isaac had designated Roxanne as his beneficiary.The estate appealed to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), which affirmed the Board’s decision, reasoning that listing Roxanne as his spouse on the retirement application constituted a beneficiary designation. The estate then appealed to the Appellate Division, which remanded the case to the OAL for a supplemental hearing to determine Isaac’s probable intent regarding the unpaid benefits.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that N.J.S.A. 43:16A-12.2 mandates that unpaid benefits be distributed to the decedent’s estate unless a beneficiary is nominated by written designation. Since Isaac did not make such a designation, the Court ruled that the Board’s decision to distribute the benefits to Roxanne was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision to remand for further fact-finding and directed that the $208,950.03 in unpaid benefits be distributed to Isaac’s estate. View "Isaac v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System" on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn M. Fenimore arrived at the Woodstown State Police barracks on June 2, 2021, in response to a request for a statement regarding a harassment claim. New Jersey State Police Trooper Daniel Radetich interviewed Fenimore, observed signs of intoxication, and administered three sobriety tests, two of which Fenimore failed. Radetich arrested Fenimore for driving while intoxicated (DWI) and secured him to a holding cell bench. Radetich and other troopers then conducted a warrantless search of Fenimore's car, parked in the barracks parking lot, and found drugs, a loaded gun, and other evidence. Fenimore was charged with possession offenses and moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the search.The trial court denied Fenimore's motion to suppress, reasoning that police had the right to search the vehicle without a warrant based on probable cause. Fenimore pled guilty and appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the warrantless search was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, even though the car was in a police station parking lot and subject to mandatory impoundment.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply under the circumstances. The Court emphasized that the car was parked in a State Police barracks parking lot, police had arrested the driver, removed the passenger, and obtained the keys, and the car was subject to imminent, mandatory impoundment. The Court concluded that there was no inherent exigency justifying a warrantless search and that the police were required to obtain a warrant before searching the vehicle. The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "State v. Fenimore" on Justia Law

The New Jersey Coalition of Automotive Retailers (NJCAR), a trade association representing franchised new car and truck retailers in New Jersey, sued Ford Motor Company. NJCAR alleged that Ford's Lincoln Commitment Program (LCP) violated the Franchise Practices Act (FPA) by creating price differentials among franchisees. NJCAR is not a franchisee itself but represents franchisee members, including Lincoln dealerships.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Ford, ruling that NJCAR lacked statutory standing to sue under the FPA because the statute limits the right to sue to franchisees. NJCAR appealed, arguing that it had associational standing to represent its members. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's decision, holding that NJCAR had associational standing and that New Jersey's liberal standing doctrine did not preclude NJCAR from bringing the suit.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court held that the FPA explicitly limits the right to bring a lawsuit to franchisees, as indicated by the statute's language stating that "any franchisee may bring an action against its franchisor." The Court emphasized that the Legislature's intent was clear in restricting the right to sue to franchisees only, and NJCAR, not being a franchisee, lacked statutory standing to bring the suit under the FPA. The Court did not address whether NJCAR would have associational standing under a different cause of action, limiting its holding solely to the FPA. View "New Jersey Coalition of Automotive Retailers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company" on Justia Law

M.R., an inmate serving a prison sentence for racketeering, experienced significant health issues, including balance problems and difficulty writing. In August 2020, he was diagnosed with a malignant brain tumor and underwent surgery in January 2021. By November 2022, M.R. was wheelchair-bound with residual neurological deficits. In February 2023, M.R. applied for compassionate release under the Compassionate Release Act (CRA). The New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) designated two physicians to review his medical records, who provided conflicting diagnoses regarding his terminal condition status. The DOC ultimately denied M.R. a Certificate of Eligibility for compassionate release.M.R. appealed the DOC's decision, and in August 2023, the Appellate Division remanded the case for reevaluation due to the conflicting medical opinions. The physicians provided updated reports, now uniformly concluding that M.R. did not suffer from a terminal condition or permanent physical incapacity, again relying solely on M.R.'s electronic medical records. The DOC reaffirmed its denial of the Certificate of Eligibility. The Appellate Division later affirmed the DOC's decision, concluding that the CRA does not require physical examinations and that the denial was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case, focusing on whether the CRA and its implementing regulation require physical examinations for compassionate release applications. The Court held that the CRA does not mandate physical examinations for medical diagnoses. However, the Court found the DOC's decision to deny M.R. a Certificate of Eligibility in August 2023 to be arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Court emphasized the need for contemporaneous and comprehensive medical evaluations to support such decisions and reversed the Appellate Division's judgment. View "M.R. v. New Jersey Department of Corrections" on Justia Law