Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves a challenge to the ward map adopted by the Jersey City Ward Commission following the 2020 federal census. The Commission found a 59% population deviation between the most and least populous wards, which exceeded the maximum allowed by the Municipal Ward Law (MWL). The Commission created a new map with a 1.8% deviation and revised the boundaries of all six wards. Plaintiffs, including individuals and community organizations, argued that the new map failed to meet the MWL’s compactness requirement and violated equal protection principles under the New Jersey Constitution. They also claimed a violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA).The trial court concluded that the Commission’s map created sufficiently compact wards under the MWL and dismissed the plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional claims. The Appellate Division reversed the dismissal of the MWL claims, remanding for factfinding on whether the Commission’s determination of compactness had a rational basis. It affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection and NJCRA claims.The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the MWL, equal protection, and NJCRA claims. The Court held that the Commission’s map was a proper exercise of its discretion under the MWL. It found that the Commission was not required to use mathematical measures of compactness or consider communities of interest in its determination. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s remand for additional factfinding, reinstating the trial court’s judgment on the MWL claim. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection and NJCRA claims, concluding that the Commission’s compliance with the MWL negated the equal protection claim and that no statutory or constitutional violation occurred to support the NJCRA claim. View "Jersey City United Against the New Ward Map v. Jersey City Ward Commission" on Justia Law

A journalist, Charles Kratovil, learned through a records request that Anthony Caputo, the New Brunswick Police Director, had a voting address in Cape May. Kratovil, editor of New Brunswick Today, began investigating Caputo's residence, suggesting it was too far from New Brunswick for him to effectively perform his duties. After disclosing Caputo's address to local officials, Caputo informed Kratovil that he was protected under Daniel’s Law and requested that Kratovil refrain from republishing his exact home address. Kratovil then filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Daniel’s Law violated his constitutional rights to freedom of speech and the press.The trial court dismissed Kratovil’s complaint, ruling that while Kratovil could publish that Caputo lived in Cape May, he could not publish Caputo’s precise home address. The court found that Daniel’s Law was narrowly tailored to serve a state interest of the highest order. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, agreeing that the statute did not violate constitutional guarantees and that it was narrowly tailored to protect public officials.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case, applying First Amendment principles from Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. and Florida Star v. B.J.F. The Court held that Caputo’s home address was truthful information, lawfully obtained, and related to a matter of public concern. The Court agreed that Daniel’s Law served a state interest of the highest order and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment as modified, concluding that Daniel’s Law did not violate constitutional protections of free speech and the press. View "Kratovil v. City of New Brunswick" on Justia Law

The case involves the Attorney General's request to empanel a special grand jury to investigate allegations of sexual abuse by clergy within the Catholic Church in New Jersey. The Diocese of Camden challenged the grand jury's authority to issue a presentment on this subject, arguing that such a presentment would not relate to public affairs or conditions as required by law.The trial court denied the Attorney General's request to empanel a special grand jury and found that the anticipated presentment was not authorized by law. The court cited the substantial commitment of time and resources needed to select unbiased grand jurors, the financial hardship on jurors, and the fact that priests are not public officials and the Catholic Church is not a public entity. The court also noted that the presentment would be fundamentally unfair to those accused, as they would not have the same protections as defendants charged by indictment. The Appellate Division summarily affirmed the trial court's judgment.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that it was premature for the trial court to conclude that any potential presentment had to be suppressed, as no grand jury had completed an investigation or issued a presentment. The Court emphasized that the relevant case law and court rule on presentments contemplate the existence of both a grand jury investigation and an actual presentment for an assignment judge to review. The Court found that the State has the right to proceed with its investigation and present evidence before a special grand jury. If the grand jury issues a presentment, the assignment judge should review the report and publish it if it complies with the legal standards outlined by the Court. The Court vacated the trial court's analysis and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re the Matter Concerning the State Grand Jury" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and defendant were married in 2019 and have one son together. Plaintiff moved out of the marital home in January 2023 and initiated divorce proceedings in March 2023. In April 2023, defendant was arrested and charged with weapon offenses after threatening a process server with a handgun. Plaintiff filed a civil complaint in July 2023 under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) based on allegations of stalking and harassment. The court issued a TRO prohibiting defendant from contacting plaintiff, granting her temporary custody of their son, and denying defendant parenting and visitation time.During the final restraining order (FRO) hearing, plaintiff called defendant as a witness. Defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but the trial court ordered him to testify. Defendant refused to answer questions beyond stating his name, invoking the Fifth Amendment. The trial court ruled that defendant could not invoke the privilege and that an adverse inference could be drawn from his refusal to testify. Defendant appealed the decision.The Appellate Division denied leave to appeal. While defendant's motion for leave to appeal was pending, the Appellate Division published T.B. v. I.W., addressing a similar issue. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted defendant leave to appeal.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that while the Fifth Amendment does not provide blanket immunity in PDVA FRO hearings, a defendant may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in response to specific questions that pose reasonable risks of self-incrimination. The court ruled that no adverse inference may be drawn from the exercise of this right. The PDVA immunity provision in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) is not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment and does not adequately protect a defendant's rights. The trial court's ruling was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "M.A. v. J.H.M." on Justia Law

The Borough of Englewood Cliffs filed a complaint and an amended complaint against its former attorneys and a builder, alleging professional malpractice, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and aiding and abetting. The Borough's actions followed a previous affordable housing litigation where the Borough did not prevail and subsequently settled with the builder. The Borough's new council, elected after a municipal election, pursued the litigation despite warnings from the defendants that the claims were frivolous.The trial court dismissed the Borough's complaints with prejudice, finding that the Borough acted in bad faith to harass, delay, and cause malicious injury. The court awarded the defendants attorney fees and costs under New Jersey’s Frivolous Litigation Statute (FLS), totaling $216,484.45. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that a public entity is not immune from sanctions under the FLS.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that municipalities and municipal corporations that engage in frivolous litigation are subject to sanctions under the FLS. The Court found that the FLS does not provide immunity to municipalities and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not protect municipalities from liability under the FLS. The Court emphasized that the FLS aims to deter frivolous litigation and compensate the victims of such actions. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed as modified, holding the Borough liable for the sanctions imposed. View "Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Trautner" on Justia Law

John Bragg was involved in a violent altercation with Lorenza Fletcher and Daquan Anderson in an apartment in Trenton, New Jersey. Bragg claimed he had an informal sublease and had been living in the apartment for a few weeks. During the fight, all three adults sustained serious injuries, and Bragg was arrested. He was later indicted on nineteen counts, including attempted murder and kidnapping. At trial, Bragg claimed self-defense, stating that Fletcher and Anderson initiated the fight, while they testified that Bragg was the aggressor.The trial court did not instruct the jury on the "castle doctrine," which states that a person does not have to retreat from their dwelling unless they were the initial aggressor. The jury found Bragg guilty of twelve counts, including attempted murder and kidnapping. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, concluding that the failure to instruct on the castle doctrine was not plain error and that the evidence did not support a finding of self-defense.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case, focusing on whether the failure to instruct the jury on the castle doctrine constituted plain error. The Court found that the jury should have been instructed on the exception to the duty to retreat, as there was evidence suggesting the apartment could be considered Bragg's dwelling and conflicting testimony on who the initial aggressor was. The Court held that the failure to provide this instruction was capable of producing an unjust result and constituted plain error.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division's judgment, vacated Bragg's convictions on counts involving self-defense, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The other counts of conviction, for which self-defense was not a possible defense, remained intact. View "State v. Bragg" on Justia Law

The New Jersey Turnpike Authority (NJTA) solicited bids for a contract to repair bridges in the Newark Bay area. El Sol Contracting & Construction Corp. (El Sol) submitted the lowest bid, but the NJTA rejected it because the bid documents did not include a validly executed Consent of Surety (CoS) from Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (Liberty). The CoS was signed by an attorney-in-fact whose Power of Attorney (PoA) only authorized her to sign the Proposal Bond, not the CoS. The NJTA awarded the contract to the second-lowest bidder, Joseph M. Sanzari, Inc.The Appellate Division reversed the NJTA’s decision, interpreting the bid specifications to require that the PoA be tethered only to the Proposal Bond, not the CoS. The court concluded that Liberty’s offer to modify the PoA language addressed the NJTA’s concerns and that the NJTA’s rejection of El Sol’s bid was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that the NJTA did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable manner when it rejected El Sol’s bid. The court emphasized that the CoS is a critical component of the bidding process and must be validly executed. Since the PoA did not authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign the CoS, El Sol’s bid was incomplete. The court also noted that the NJTA’s past acceptance of similar documents did not estop it from rejecting El Sol’s bid once the defect was identified. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, upholding the NJTA’s rejection of El Sol’s bid. View "In the Matter of Protest Filed by El Sol Contracting and Construction Corp., Contract T100.638" on Justia Law

Clarios, LLC (Clarios) purchased an industrial site in 2006, for which the seller had executed a remediation plan under the Industrial Site Recovery Act (ISRA) and placed funds in trust for future remediation. In 2007, Clarios ceased operations and sought a Remediation in Progress Waiver (RIP Waiver) from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), which was granted with the condition that the DEP reserved the right to enforce ISRA obligations in the future. Clarios sold the site in 2011, and the new owner, DeNovo, assumed remediation responsibilities. By 2021, the remediation trust was depleted, and the site was out of compliance. In April 2022, the DEP rescinded Clarios’s RIP Waiver due to non-compliance and depletion of funds.Clarios requested an adjudicatory hearing, arguing that the rescission without notice or a hearing violated its due process rights. The DEP denied the request, stating that rescission did not entitle Clarios to a hearing under the relevant regulations. Clarios appealed, and the Appellate Division ruled in favor of the DEP, holding that Clarios did not have a protected property interest in the RIP Waiver. The court found that Clarios’s expectation of continued suspension of remediation obligations was not based on any statutory or regulatory provisions but rather on a unilateral expectation.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. The Court held that the DEP’s initial grant of the RIP Waiver did not create a property interest in the continued suspension of Clarios’s remediation obligations. The Court found that neither the controlling statutes and regulations nor a mutually explicit understanding between the parties provided an entitlement to the indefinite continuance of the waiver. The governing laws and agency materials anticipated the DEP’s ability to enforce remediation obligations in the future, and thus, rescission of the RIP Waiver without a hearing did not violate Clarios’s due process rights. View "In re Appeal of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's September 6, 2022 Denial of Request for Adjudicatory Hearing" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute among members of several limited liability companies, which was arbitrated according to the parties' agreement. The arbitrator issued a series of awards, ultimately granting plaintiff Laurence Rappaport $4.9 million on various claims, offset by an award to defendant Kenneth Pasternak, resulting in a net award of approximately $3.8 million. The arbitrator did not award Rappaport damages for the loss of future distributions of carried interest. Rappaport contended that the issue of carried interest was not presented to the arbitrator and that the arbitrator improperly ruled on it.The Chancery Division confirmed the arbitrator's awards after remanding for clarification that the arbitrator intended to resolve the issue of carried interest. Rappaport appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the awards for Rappaport’s claims for lost income and future income based on his termination as a manager. However, the Appellate Division ruled that the parties had excluded the question of carried interest from the arbitration and concluded that the arbitrator had raised the issue sua sponte. It modified the awards to exclude any inclusion of Rappaport’s membership interest, including future carried interest, and reversed the Chancery Division’s judgment.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and disagreed with the Appellate Division’s conclusion. The Court found that the issue of carried interest was arbitrable and had been raised by the parties at several stages of the arbitration. The Court held that the remedy of modification under N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-24(a)(2) was not warranted and that the Appellate Division’s review did not conform to the deferential standard governing judicial review of arbitration awards. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and reinstated the Chancery Division’s decision confirming the arbitration award. View "Rappaport v. Pasternak" on Justia Law

Rosalyn Musker worked in sales for Suuchi, Inc., which sells software subscriptions to apparel manufacturers. In addition to her base salary, Musker was eligible for commissions under Suuchi’s Sales Commission Plan (SCP). In March 2020, Suuchi decided to sell Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) on a commission basis due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Musker generated approximately $34,448,900 in gross revenue by selling PPE. The parties disputed whether her 4% commission was based on gross or net revenue and whether these commissions were considered "wages" under the Wage Payment Law (WPL) or excluded as "supplementary incentives."The trial judge dismissed Musker’s WPL claims, holding that her PPE commissions were not "wages" under the WPL. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, agreeing that the commissions were "supplementary incentives" and not "wages" under the WPL. Musker appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case. The Court held that under the WPL, "wages" are defined as "direct monetary compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, where the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, or commission basis." The Court concluded that compensating an employee by paying a "commission" for "labor or services" always constitutes a wage under the WPL. Therefore, a "commission" cannot be excluded from the definition of "wages" as a "supplementary incentive."The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, vacated the trial judge’s order dismissing Musker’s WPL claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court clarified that Musker’s PPE commissions are "wages" under the WPL, regardless of whether they are based on gross or net revenue, and that receiving a base salary does not turn "commissions" into "supplementary incentives." View "Musker v. Suuchi, Inc." on Justia Law